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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Game theory analyses situations in which a number of people, each person having 
his own interest in the outcome of the situation, must decide on how they will act. 
There is a wide variety of real-life situations that can be, and have been, modeled in 
game theoretic terms, ranging from economies and auctions through legislation and 
the division of inheritances to the evolution of species and the division of political 
power. 
It should be clear from these examples that the term "game" theory is not to be taken 
too restrictive; game theory does not tell you how to play bridge, risk, soccer or darts. 
Nevertheless, a game theoretic model of a situation is usually called a game and the 
persons involved in the game are called the players of the game. 
The model (game) itself consists of a number of data such as the number of players 
and each player's characteristics, together with the rules of the game. Numerous 
features of the actual real-life situation may be included in the model, like the actions 
available to a player, the order in which the players have to execute their moves, 
chance effects, a player's information, etcetera. 
Furthermore, there are some basic assumptions concerning the nature of the players. 
First of all, the data of the game are supposed to be common knowledge, i.e., all the 
players know the data of the game, all the players know that everybody knows the 
data of the game, etcetera. Secondly, the players are supposed to understand the game 
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they are playing and to act only in their own interest. These last two assumptions 
are known as rationality. 
Game theory can roughly be divided into two areas, namely cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory. This division reflects the idea that there are two different 
approaches to a conflict situation wherein several people (the players) are involved. 
In a cooperative setting the players are supposed to work together. By doing so 
they can reach a (relatively) high profit in the given situation. Their problem is to 
divide these profits as fair as possible, considering the contributions of each player 
or group of players to the joint result. In a non-cooperative setting the players are 
not supposed to form groups. The task of non-cooperative game theory is to model 
non-cooperative situations and to figure out what a player should do in the model if 
he wants to maximize his profits. 
This dissertation only deals with non-cooperative game theory, and with strategic 
games (a special class of non-cooperative games) in particular. The next example is 
meant to give a first impression of the kind of games studied in this thesis. Subsequent 
examples will elaborate the relevant issues. 
Example 1.1 (The Dragon on the watch) Imagine that an adventurous Thief, 
let us call him Morlyg, has silently sneaked into the lair of Ancalagon the Black (a 
rather huge Dragon). Watching the creature from his hideout in the corner of the lair, 
Morlyg gets the impression that Ancalagon, Who is lying on the hill of treasures He 
has gathered over the ages, is fast asleep. Now Morlyg has two options (or strategies). 
He can give in to his lingering doubt that the Dragon is only pretending to be asleep, 
and try to get out of the lair as fast as possible. This strategy is denoted by F (Flight) 
and obviously yields our Thief a payoff of zero, whether the Dragon was really asleep 
or not. On the other hand he can take his chances and try to steal the priceless 
golden bracelet that is lying close to him on the side of the Dragon's treasure-hill 
(this is denoted by Τ (Theft)). In that case Ancalagon's state of mind certainly has 
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a dramatic effect on the outcome of the situation. If the Dragon was indeed sleeping 
(playing his strategy S, one might say), then Morlyg will get away with it (literally) 
whereafter he can sell the bracelet for, say, 10 gold pieces. A Dragon in a waking 
state (W) however will scare our Thief to death with His Deafening Roar and then 
send him to Oblivion with His Firebreath. From where Morlyg can only return to 
the lands of the living by paying 10 gold pieces. Thus, Morlyg's evaluation of this 
situation can be summarized as follows: 
F 
Τ 
S 
0 
10 
w 
0 
-10 
Here our Thief is the row player who has to choose one of the two horizontal arrays 
(rows) indexed with F and T, respectively, while Ancalagon picks one of the two 
vertical arrays (columns) indexed with S and W, respectively. Therefore the Dragon is 
called the column player. Note that the players are supposed to choose their strategies 
independently, i.e. they do not know what the other player is up to. Given a pair 
of strategies of both players (e.g. (T,S)) Morlyg's payoff is the number in the entry 
determined by these choices (10 in this case). 
The Dragon's evaluation of this situation is different. He has actually never had any 
interest at all in all that gold and jewelry surrounding him. The only reason why he 
ever laid His Claws on these treasures is because he has always liked the idea of other 
people not having them. And now, after many hundreds of years of lying here, he also 
does no longer care whether he is asleep or not. (Dragons do not seem to need any 
sleep whatsoever. They simply use it as a pleasant way to kill the time.) The only 
thing that is still delightful to Ancalagon is catching the little buggers that come by 
now and then in search for His gold. So His payoff-matrix looks like this: 
F 
Τ 
S W 
0 0 
0 10 
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In this way the example above determines the 2 χ 2-bimatrix game 
F 
Τ 
S 
0,0 
10,0 
W 
0,0 
-10,10 
The prefix 2 x 2 indicates that both players have 2 strategies. Furthermore, the first 
(second) number in an entry is the payoff of Morlyg (and the Dragon, respectively). 
This is just shorthand notation for the game we were talking about. < 
The basic method to decide what strategies the players ought to play in such a bi-
matrix game is to calculate its Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of 
strategies (one for each player) such that no player, given the equilibrium strategy of 
his opponent, can improve on his payoff by choosing some other strategy (unilateral 
deviation). E.g., the strategy pair (F,W) is a Nash equilibrium in Example 1.1, since 
a deviation of Morlyg to (T,W) gives him a payoff of —10 instead of the original 0, 
while the deviation of Ancalagon to (F,S) changes His payoff from 0 to 0, which is 
not an improvement. 
Example 1.2 However, there are bimatrix games that do not have Nash equilibria 
(in pure strategies): assuming that the Dragon in Example 1.1 does have an appetite 
for sleeping (rewarded with, say, 1 by Him) in case our Thief chooses to flee from the 
lair, we would get the 2 χ 2-bimatrix game 
F 
Τ 
S 
0,1 
10,0 
w 
0,0 
-10,10 
In this game neither (F,S) and (T,W) are Nash equilibria since our Thief has a 
profitable deviation from these strategy pairs, nor (F,W) and (T,S) because of the 
Dragon's preferences. A way to get rid of this unpleasant feature of bimatrix games is 
to consider mixed strategies. E.g., Morlyg can be allowed to play his (pure) strategies 
F and Τ with chances \ and | , respectively. This mixed strategy will be denoted by 
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( j , | ) . In general, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies. 
For this game they look like (p, 1 — p) with 0 < ρ < 1 since both players have two 
pure strategies. 
In fact it is very natural to consider mixed strategies, since each player can always 
flip a coin and let chance decide which strategy he will choose. Given such mixed 
strategies for both players, each entry of the payoff matrix has a certain chance to 
become the actual payoff. 
Example 1.3 If we take the strategy ( | , | ) for our Thief and the strategy ( | , | ) 
for the Dragon, then these chances can be calculated as follows: 
2 3 
5 5 
I f 1
 Y 2 i v i 4 4 * 5 4 * 5 
1 1 ν ?- i v i 
4 L 4 A 5 4 * 5 
Note that we can calculate the chance that an entry will be played by multiplying 
the weights put on this entry by the players since we assumed that the players chose 
their strategies independently. < 
Nash (1950) showed that such mixed extensions of games always posess at least one 
Nash equilibrium, (since we usually only consider mixed extensions of games, the 
prefix "mixed extension" will be omitted from now on.) Thus the unique Nash equi­
librium of the bimatrix game in Example 1.2 is the strategy pair ((γγ, ¿Oí!» §))· 
The expected payoff for, e.g., the Dragon given this strategy pair can be calculated 
as follows. Take the payoff in an entry of His payoff matrix, multiply this num-
ber with the chance that this entry will be reached, and sum up all the numbers 
thus obtained over the entries. In this case, the expected payoff of the Dragon is 
І 2
х
і
х
1 + І 2
х
і
х
 0 + 1 χ | χ 0 + ^ χ ί χ 1 0 = | 2 . 
The fact that all games posess Nash equilibria is of course a nice result. However, 
the problem with Nash equilibria is that not all of them are as nice as one might 
think. Nash equilibria are self-enforcing in the sense that, when playing equilibrium 
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strategies, no player can gain by deviating, but this does not mean that there cannot 
be another, more sensible equilibrium strategy for some player. 
For example, any strategy pair ((l,0)(p, 1 -p)) with 0 < ρ < \ is a Nash equilibrium 
of the bimatrix game in Example 1.1. These are the strategy pairs wherein our Thief 
always flees from the lair and the Dragon stays awake with chance more than ¿. A 
closer look at the payoff matrix of the Dragon however shows that His strategy W 
will give Him at least the payoff He gets when playing S, no matter what Morlyg does. 
So there is no reason for Him to go to sleep with positive probability since staying 
awake is at least as good and sometimes even better than sleeping. So, suggesting 
to Ancalagon that He should play ( \ , \), since it is His part of the Nash equilibrium 
( ( 1 , 0 ) ( | , | ) ) , would probably get Him into a laughing fit. He would tell you that 
staying awake (playing (0,1)) made more sense to Him and then He would show you 
why He thought so. 
In a case like this, where one strategy (like (0,1)) always gives a better (or at least 
equally good) payoff then the other (like ( | , \))), we say that the first strategy dom-
inates the other. Strategies like (\,\)) are called dominated strategies. In case these 
strategies do sometimes yield the same payoff, we use the term weak dominance. 
Which brings us to the main subject of this monograph. We will search for and analyse 
the various ways to eliminate dubious Nash equilibria like ( ( Ι ,Ο)^, \)) that use e.g. 
(weakly) dominated strategies and select the right ones. Of course, exactly what Nash 
equilibria are to be considered dubious is subject to discussion. However, irrespective 
of the answer to this question, the various methods developed to eliminate them do 
seem to follow a common pattern. The next example explains how these elimination 
methods usually work. 
E x a m p l e 1.4 As said before, over the ages Ancalagon lost his interest in sleeping. 
But as a young Dragon He now and then liked to dream away for a while, as long 
as nobody bothered Him. Let us say that He rewarded His sleeping periods with a 
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small positive amount ε > 0 in those millennia past. The Dragon and an ancient 
predecessor of our Thief would then have been confronted with the bimatrix game 
F 
Τ 
S 
Ο,ε 
10,0 
W 
0,0 
-10,10 
This bimatrix game can be seen as a perturbation of the game in Example 1.1. When 
ε gets smaller, this game starts to look like the original one and for ε = 0 it is the 
game from Example 1.1. The unique Nash equilibrium of this perturbed game is the 
strategy pair wherein Morlyg's predecessor plays (y^v^, nfe") a n d Ancalagon plays 
(5,5). Now, for small numbers ε, the equilibrium strategy of the predecessor looks 
very much like the flight-strategy (1,0) Morlyg is playing in a Nash equilibrium. And 
the strategy (212) Ancalagon is playing in the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game 
is indeed a strategy that combines with (1,0) to a Nash equilibrium of the original 
game. So we might say that this way of perturbing "selects" the Nash equilibrium 
((1,0)( | , | ) ) of the original game. Unfortunately, this equilibrium is precisely one of 
those dubious equilibria we wanted to eliminate. 0 
In fact, what we did in the example was to perturb the payoffs of the players (well, 
just one player in this case). This method of perturbing was introduced by Wu Wen-
tsiin and Jiang Jia-he (1962). Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) used these perturbations 
to define hypcrstable sets of equilibria. They concluded (like we just did) that hy-
perstable sets, although they eliminated certain Nash equilibria, still contained many 
equilibria they did not wish for. So they used a more subtle way to perturb games. 
Instead of perturbing the payoffs, they perturbed the strategy spaces of the players. 
Example 1.5 Imagine that our players are somewhat unpredictable when choosing 
their strategies. For instance, Morlyg is supposed to play his pure strategy F with 
weight ρ at least δ f (where δρ is a real number larger than zero) and his strategy Τ 
with weight 1 — ρ at least δτ > 0. Similarly, for Ancalagon we assume that the strategy 
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(q, 1 — q) of his choice satisfies q > es and 1 - q > ew- The numbers δρ, δτ, Ss and 
e-w are supposed to be fairly small. We can view this situation as a game where the 
payoffs for the players are as in Example 1.1, but where their strategy spaces have 
become smaller: they are only allowed to play those strategies that satisfy the above 
inequalities. This yields the following game: 
ρ>δρ 
1 - ρ > δτ 
q>€s l-q>£w 
0,0 0,0 
10,0 -10,10 
Now the analysis of this game is quite simple: since Morlyg tries to steal the bracelet 
with chance at least δτ > 0, it is clear from the payoffs for Ancalagon that he has to 
stay on the watch as much as possible. (Because sleeping always yields a payoff of 
0, while staying awake gives him a payoff of 10 now and then.) So, Ancalagon will 
choose to play (es, 1 — es)-
This strategy of our Dragon is bad news for Morlyg. If he plays Τ in this situation, 
his payoff will be —10 most of the time (remember that es was fairly small, so 1 — es 
is fairly close to 1). Therefore his best option is to play F with as much weight as 
possible, since F always results in a payoff of 0, which is considerably better than 
-10. So, Morlyg will choose to play (1 - δτ,δτ). 
This shows that ((1 — δτ, ¿T)(ÊS> 1 — Ss)) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game 
in this example. Just like in the case of perturbed payoffs, we can see what happens 
when the perturbation is going to zero. In this case we see that the equilibria of the 
perturbed games tend to the Nash equilibrium ((1,0)(0,1)) of the original game when 
δρ, δχ, es and ew tend to 0. Which is exactly the equilibrium we wanted to select. < 
Comparing the two perturbation methods of Examples 1.4 and 1.5 we see that there 
is a basic difference between them. Not only the types of perturbations differ but 
also the resulting equilibria are not the same. For example, a closer examination of 
our argument in Example 1.5 shows that any perturbation of the second type yields 
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an equilibrium close to ((1,0)(0,1)). So, the equilibrium ( (1 ,0 ) ( | , | ) ) selected by 
the first type of perturbations can never be selected when using perturbations of the 
second type. However, ((1,0)(0,1)) can be selected using perturbations of the first 
type. This is not a coincidence, it is a general fact; any equilibrium of a game that can 
be selected using perturbations of type two can also be selected by those of type one. 
Which brings us to the major issues of this thesis. On one hand wc want to study 
the properties of equilibria selected by certain types of perturbations (chapters 4, 6, 
7 and 9) while on the other hand we want to study the relations between different 
types of perturbations (chapters 5 and 8). 
Outline of this monograph 
We will now give a brief outline of this monograph. Generally speaking, this disser-
tation is an investigation of stability concepts and related refinements in the context 
of normal form games. 
Chapter 2 is introductory. In this chapter we will first define the class of n-person 
normal form games, together with some well-known solution concepts such as Nash 
equilibrium and perfect and proper equilibria. In section 2.2 this is done for the 
special class of bimatrix games. Then we will give a brief overview of the history of 
stability concepts and examine the requirements of Kohlberg and Mertens for stability 
concepts one by one. Finally we define some well-known stability concepts. 
In chapter 3 the relation between invariant solution concepts over normal form games 
and those over strategic form games is investigated. It turns out that each invariant 
solution concept over normal form games can be extended uniquely to an invariant 
solution concept over strategic form games. This shows that there is a simple one-
to-one correspondence between these two types of solution concepts. Furthermore 
in section 3.3 we present an alternative formulation of the invariance property for 
solution concepts over normal form games. We will use this alternative formulation 
of invariance in subsequent chapters. 
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In chapter 4 a new stability concept, called CKM-stability is introduced (CKM is an 
abbreviation of continuously Kohlberg-Mertens). This stability concept can be seen 
as a continuous version of the stability concept introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986). We show that this stability concept satisfies all of the requirements of the 
Kohlberg-Mertens program as it is presented in chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 mainly consists of two parts. In the first part we prove that each homotopy-
stable set is also CKM-stable. In the second part we show that CKM-stability equals 
Η-stability (Hillas (1990)). Combined these two parts imply that every stable set in 
the sense of Mertens (1989) contains a stable set in the sense of Hillas (1990). 
In the first part of chapter 6 we thoroughly investigate the invariance of a number 
of well known solution concepts over normal form games. In the second part we 
describe a method to make a certain type of solution concepts, so-called projection 
stable solution concepts, weakly invariant. It is shown that this method preserves the 
properties of the Kohlberg-Mertens program. 
From now on we restrict our attention to bimatrix games. Chapter 7 is almost entirely 
devoted to the proof that Q-stable sets (Hillas (1990)) of these games are finite. We 
end this chapter with an example showing that this result cannot be extended to 
games with more than two players. 
In chapter 8 we investigate the relation between strictly perfect and (strictly) proper 
equilibria. We start with an example of a 3 χ 3-bimatrix game with a strictly perfect 
equilibrium that is not strictly proper. Next we give a 3 x 4-bimatrix game with a 
strictly perfect equilibrium that is not proper. Then we prove that strictly perfect 
equilibria of 3 x 3-bimatrix games are always proper. Which shows that the 3 x 4 
example is as small as can be. Finally we give two situations in which a strictly perfect 
equilibrium is (strictly) proper. First we prove that a strictly perfect and quasi strong 
equilibrium is always strictly proper. Then we show that strictly perfect equilibria of 
zero sum games are proper. 
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In chapter 9 we show that the collections of perfect equilibria, Nash equilibria and 
strictly proper equilibria can be written as the finite union of polytopes. 
Chapter 10 is the collection of those mathematical tools that are used frequently in 
this dissertation. Special attention is paid to the Theorem of Cook, Gerards, Schrijver 
and Tardos and the Theorem of Kakutani. 

Notation 
For a finite set T, IR is the real vector space whose underlying set is the collection 
of T-tupIes of real numbers (xt)t€T- IR+ is the non-negative orthant of IRT. Δ(Τ) 
denotes the set of probability distributions on T, i.e. Δ(Τ) := {ρ G IR [ ρ > 
° . Е , е т А =
 1 ) · V(T) ••= {S С Τ \ S φ φ,Τ} is the collection of proper subsets of 
T. For a vector ρ G Δ(Τ), C(p) := {г G T \ pt > 0} is the carrier of p. For a subset 
S of T, A
s
:= {ρ e Δ(Γ) | С(р) С 5} is the S-face of Δ(Γ), p(S) := E . 6 s f t ^ d 
es G IRT is defined by 
_ f 1 if г e S 
es i
·~ιο mts. 
For χ,y € Η τ , (х,у) — Е . е г 1 · ' »»> ІІ^ІЬ := \/(^7^) and ||а;||
то
 := т а х ,
б Т
 | і , | . 
For С С Δ (Г), С is the set of completely mixed elements (i.e. all coordinates are 
positive) of C. (Note that this set С does not equal the relative interior of C.) For 
χ € Ш
т
 and r > 0, #
r
(a;) := {у &ШТ \ \\x - y| |T O.< r}· For a subset С of Ж т and 
r > 0, BT{C) := U I E C - ^ Z ) · The affine hull of С is denoted by ah(C), the relative 
interior of С is denoted by relint(C) (where the relative interior of С is the interior 
of С with respect to its affine hull), the convex hull of С is denoted by ch(C) and 
its closure by cl(C). Note that с G С is an element of relint(C) if and only if for all 
с G С there exists a number ε > 0 such that (1 + e)c — se G С. If С is convex, ext(C) 
denotes the set of extremal points of C. For two non-empty, compact sets С and D in 
I R T a n d a G [0, l],aC + (l-a)D := {ax + {1 -a)y | χ G С, y G D} anddH(C,D) := 
inf{r > 0 | С С B
r
{D) and D С B
r
(C)} is the Hausdorff distance between С and D. 
Note that dH(C,D) = max^gominsgc Ця - î/||oo Vmax i ecminj,e£» \\x -y| |oo· 
For a set X С IRT and a function f:X -»· IR, / + : X -* ïït is defined by /+(x) := 
max{/(x),0}. 
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Chapter 2 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter we will define and explain our game theoretic language. In section 2.1 
we introduce the game theoretic model studied in this monograph. First we give the 
definition of a game in normal form. Then we will come to the ultimate goal of game 
theory, i.e. solving games; we will tell what our notion of a solution concept is and 
present some well-known solution concepts for normal form games. 
In section 2.2 we will do essentially the same. Only this time we will concentrate on 
bimatrix games, i.e. games wherein only two players are involved. Bimatrix games are 
studied in the second part of this thesis. Since the notation in this case is somewhat 
simpler than in the η-person case, we present it beforehand in this chapter. 
Section 2.3 concerns the preliminary work on stable sets. Stability is certainly the 
main issue in this thesis. Therefore we present the historical framework and some of 
the stability concepts already introduced by other authors, just to make sure that the 
reader will be familiar with it before he starts to read the rest of this thesis. 
2.1 N-person games in normal form 
2.1.1 THE MODEL 
We assume that in a game, usually denoted by Γ, there is a finite set N := {1, . . . , n} 
of players. Each player i £ N has a finite set M¿ of pure strategies. When playing 
the game, each player г (Ξ N has to choose a pure strategy fc¿ G M¿ without knowing 
21 
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for sure what the other players will do. In fact one is more or less forced to assume 
that the players reached some sort of agreement in advance on what strategies they 
would choose when playing the game, since a player needs to have some idea about 
what the others are up to. It is a virtually impossible task for a player to decide 
what a "good" strategy is when he has no information at all on the intentions of 
his opponents, except of course in very special cases. There are ways to model this 
"stage of negotiation". E.g., Hurkens (1995) studied the effects of incorporating 
pre-play communictation and commitments into the game on the outcome of the 
game. However, we will assume that this stage is past, and start at the moment 
where the players choose their strategies without any further possibility (or wish) to 
communicate with the others. Deviating from the original agreement (cheating) is 
allowed. Given the pure strategy profile (fci, . . . , k
n
) of choices of the players, each 
player г € N receives a payoff ut(ki, ..., kn) and the game ends. So, our game Г is 
completely determined by the specification of the pure strategy spaces Mi, ..., M
n 
and the payoff functions U\, . . . , u
n
, where ut: M := f] Mt —ì IR assigns to each 
pure strategy profile (k\, ..., kn) in M the payoff ut(ki, ..., kn) for player i. 
Thus, for η € IN, a finite η-person game (in normal form) is a pair Γ = (M, и), where 
M is the product of the finite and non-empty strategy spaces Mt and и = (ωχ,..., un) 
is an η-tuple of functions ut: M -> IR. In order to avoid logical complications, we will 
assume that each Mt is a subset of IN. 
Furthermore, Г will always be identified with its mixed extension. In the mixed 
extension of Г, each player i is supposed to choose a mixed strategy xt := (xtk)kçMt 
in the space of probability distributions Δ(Μ,) over M%. Which means that player 
i plays his pure strategy к e М
г
 with weight (probability) xlk. Given the (mixed) 
strategy profile χ = (χι,χ2,... ,xn) £ AM '•= П»елг Δ(Μ,) of choices of the players 
we can define the (expected) payoff oí player г by 
u,(x) :- Σ ( Π X]k,j щ(кі,к2,...,кп). 
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Usually we identify a pure strategy к £ M, of player i with the mixed strategy 
e\ G Δ(Μ,) that puts all weight on k. We also write Δ, (Δ) instead of A(M t) (ΔΜ) 
if this cannot cause confusion. Furthermore, Γ will often simply be called a game, 
since we mainly deal with normal form games. 
2.1.2 BEST REPLIES 
Because of the rationality of the players in the game Γ = (M, и), a player will always 
try to maximize his payoff, given the strategies of the other players. In other words, 
once a player knows the strategies of the other players, he will try to find a best reply 
to these strategies among his possible actions. 
For future purposes we introduce some notation in this context. For a player i £ Ν, 
the set of strategy profiles of the opponents of player i is ( Δ ^ ) . , := Δ_» := П ? ^ І ^»· 
Furthermore, (χ-, | yt) € Δ is the strategy profile where player i uses y¿ G Δ 8 and his 
opponents use the strategies in х_
г
 G Δ - j . For player г and an element x_ t 6 Δ_,, 
a strategy yt G Δ, is a best reply of player г to х_г if for all г, e Δ „ 
u,(x-x\ Уг) > ut(x-t\ zt). 
The set of best replies of player i to i _ t is denoted by /?,(ι_,). The correspondence 
β: Δ - » Δ with for all χ e Δ, 
η 
/?(ι):= Π &(*-.) 
t = l 
is called the best reply correspondence of Γ. 
A pure strategy к G Mt is called a pure best reply of player г to a strategy profile x_, 
of his opponents if e* £ /3,(x_t). The set of all pure best replies of player г to i _ t is 
denoted by РВ
г
{х-
г
). For a strategy profile χ G Δ, PB(x) := FJ Pß t (x_ t ) is the 
ιξΝ 
set of pure best replies to x. 
2.1.3 SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
Now we come to one of the main tasks of game theory: solving games. Non-
cooperative game theory can be seen as the art of recommending the "right" strategy 
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profiles to the players of a game. Such a recommendation is called a solution. So, in 
general, a solution of a game is a strategy profile or a set of strategy profiles in the 
strategy space of the game. A rule that assigns to each game a collection of solutions 
is called a solution concept. It is not always possible to assign exactly one solution 
to a game, since the game might have several equally "nice" solutions. 
Formally, let Q
n
 be the collection of all η-person normal form games and Q := (J Q
n 
new 
the collection of all normal form games. Let, for a normal form game Γ = (M, и) € Ç, 
Т>г := 2 Δ Μ be the collection of subsets of the strategy space Δ Μ of Γ. Define 
V := (JreS ^ Γ · ^ solution concept (for normal form games) is a map σ: G —> T> with 
the property that for all games Γ G G we have 
σ(Γ) С Dr­
in words, σ assigns to each game Γ := (M, u) € <7 a collection σ(Γ) of (usually closed) 
subsets of the strategy space Δ Μ of Γ. An element of σ(Γ) is called a solution. 
Notice that G is indeed a set because we assumed that all pure strategy spaces M¿ 
are subsets of IN. 
Of course a game theorist will want a solution concept σ to have nice properties. He 
could for instance advice the players of a game to use the solution concept r that 
assigns to each game Γ its whole strategy space Δ Μ to determine which strategies to 
play. However, the predictive power of r, i.e. the information the players of the game 
can get on what to do in the game when they accept the advice of this game theorist 
and use τ to solve their problems, is not something to brag about. This solution 
is telling the players: "do whatever you want". Which is in some sense an advice, 
but certainly not always a good one. So, the game theorist will try to find solution 
concepts that are more informative than r. 
One of the first and probably the most famous solution concept was introduced by 
Nash (1950). A strategy profile χ £ Δ is called a Nash equilibrium of Γ if for every 
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player i S N and for all yt G Δ,, 
«і(я-«| я») > ω»(ζ-ι| У.)· 
It is easy to check that this condition is equivalent with χ G β{χ). The set of all Nash 
equilibria of the game Γ is denoted by -Б(Г). Nash (1950) showed that, for any game 
Г, the set Е(Г) is non-empty. 
Given the rationality of the players, it is very natural to assume that the players will 
only agree to play a Nash equilibrium. If a player i agreed to play a strategy xt as 
his part of a strategy profile χ while х
г
 is not a best reply to х_
г
, then the other 
players can be certain that player i will not stick to his part of the agreement. So, 
only when ι is a Nash equilibrium the players can safely believe that everybody will 
actually play according to the agreement. This property of Nash equilibria is known 
as self-enforcingness, meaning that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally 
from a proposed Nash equilibrium. 
Next, we will characterize the set of Nash equilibria in terms of carriers and best 
replies. For a strategy profile χ € Δ, C(x) := Пгелг С( хг) is called the carrier of 
x. The following lemma easily follows from Corollary 2.1 in section 2.3.6 and will be 
proved there. 
L e m m a 2.1 For a game Г = (M, и), a strategy profile χ G Δ is a Nash equilibrium 
of Γ if and only if 
C(x) С PB(x). 
As we already argued in chapter 1, not all Nash equilibria are equally convincing. 
Therefore, several authors introduced methods to eliminate the "bad" Nash equilibria. 
The methods that were studied at first were the refinements. 
Formally, a refinement is a solution concept σ with σ(Γ) С E(T) for all games Г G 
Q. A natural method to construct refinements is to require stability against some 
mistakes the players can make when choosing their strategies. The refinements we 
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will frequently come across are the ones defined by Selten (1975) and Myerson (1978). 
In their defintions, a strategy profile χ whose coordinates χ,* are all strictly larger 
than zero is called completely mixed. 
Definition 2.1 Let η > 0 and let χ € Δ be a completely mixed strategy profile. 
Then χ is called η-perfect if for all г G N and for all k,l £ Mt we have 
Xik < Ή whenever u¿(x_¿| e*) < u t(s-»| e',) 
and χ is called η-proper if for all i G N and for all k, l G М
г
 we have 
Xik < τ? · Xii whenever u¿(x_,| ек) < Uj(x_,| e[). 
An element χ 6 Δ is called perfect (proper) if there exist a sequence fak)k€W °f 
positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence (xk)keiN of strategy profiles 
in Δ converging to x, such that xk is //¿-perfect (rçfc-proper) for all k. The set of 
all perfect (proper) strategy profiles of Γ is denoted by PE(T) (PR(T)). It is well 
known that these sets are non-empty, that every perfect strategy profile is a Nash 
equilibrium and that every proper strategy profile is also perfect. 
Theorem 2.2.5 of van Damme (1987) characterizes perfect equilibria in terms of ad­
missible best replies. 
Definition 2.2 A strategy y, of a player г is an admissible best reply against an 
element χ G Δ - denoted as y, G -ßf(x) - if there is a sequence (a;*:)fce]N of completely 
mixed strategy profiles in Δ converging to χ such that y¿ G /?¿(x* j), for all k. For a 
subset S of Δ, Bf(S) := \J
x
es^i(x) 1S t n e s e t °^  admissible best replies against S. 
Then (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.2.5 of van Damme (1987) imply 
Theorem 2.1 Let Γ be a game. If a strategy profile χ is a perfect equilibrium of Γ, 
then, for each player i, x, is an admissible best reply against x. 
There are two important types of strategies that are not admissible, namely weakly 
dominated strategies and inferior responses. We will give the definitions of these two 
notions here and prove that such strategies are indeed inadmissible. 
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A pure stategy m of player j is called weakly dominated if there is a strategy y* of 
player j such that for all x-3 6 Δ__,, 
и3(х_3\у\*)>и3{х_3\е™) 
while we have that u3(z-3\ 3/*) > u,(2__,| e™) for at least one z_3 e Δ__,. We say 
that y* weakly dominates m. 
Proposition 2.1 Let Γ = (M, и) be a normal form game and let S be a subset of 
Δ. Suppose that m is a weakly dominated pure strategy of player j . Then m is not 
an admissible best reply against S. 
Proof. Suppose that y* weakly dominates m. Let (x')feiN be a completely mixed 
sequence of strategy profiles in Δ converging to some χ G S. We will show that 
e™ І ß3(xL3) for every l G IN. 
To this end we take a fixed I 6 IN. Notice that for every sequence (fcj, £2 , . . . , kn) G M 
with k3 = m we have 
«j((e?').*i! V*}) > « Ж * ) * , ! e") = u3((kt)^3\ m), 
because y* weakly dominates m. For the same reason one of these inequalities must 
be strict. Otherwise we would have u3(z-3\ y*) = u3(z-3\ e™) which is not the case. 
So, we get 
«,(*'-, ι »;) Σ (Π *U) M ( ^ W , I у;) 
(fci> ,к
п
)еМ, kj=m гф] 
> Σ ( Π ^*.) «Л(*.).ЛІ "О = «,(*ί-,Ι e?) 
because, by the complete mixedness οΐχ1, Π»^ι ^ ' t , > 0 f° r а ^ sequences (fci,..., k
n
) 
in M with fcj = т. Hence, e™ £ β3(χι_3)· < 
A pure strategy m of player 7 is called an inferior response to a set 5 С Δ if for every 
strategy profile χ £ S there is a strategy y3 of player j with u3 (x-3 \y3) > u3 {x-3 \e\ri). 
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Proposition 2.2 Let Γ be a normal form game. Suppose that m is an inferior 
response of player j to S С A. Then m is not an admissible best reply against S. 
Proof. Since m is an inferior response of player j to S, it is not a best reply to any 
strategy profile χ G S. Then it is certainly not an admissible best reply for player j 
against any strategy profile χ G S. Hence, e™ £ B"(S). < 
2.2 Bimatrix games 
A special class of normal form games are the bimatrix games , i.e. games with only 
two players. Since these games occur in the second part of this thesis and the notation 
for bimatrix games is somewhat simpler than for the general η-person case, we will 
give a brief overview. 
Let A and В be two real m χ η-matrices. The τη χ n-bimatrix game (A, B) is defined as 
the two-person game where player 1 and player 2 independently choose the strategies 
ρ G A
m
 and q G Δ
η
 respectively, and obtain the payoffs pAq and pBq accordingly. 
A pair of strategies (p, q) G Д
т
 χ Δ
η
 is called a Nash equilibrium of (A, B) if 
pAq > p'Aq for all p' Ç. Am 
and pBq > pBq' for all q' G Δ„. 
The set of Nash equilibria of the bimatrix game (A, B) is denoted by E(A, B). 
For a strategy ρ G Д
т
 we denote by PB2(p) := {j | pBe-¡ = maxi pBe¡} the set of pure 
best replies of player 2 to p. For a strategy q G Δ
η
, PBi(q) is defined analogously. 
Then Lemma 2.1 translates to 
Lemma 2.2 A strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A, B) 
if and only if 
C{p)cPB1(q) and C(q) С PB2(p). 
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For bimatrix games the refinements of Selten (1975) ала Myerson (1978) can be 
defined as follows. 
Definition 2.3 Let (A, B) be an τη χ n-bimatrix game. Let (p, q) G A
m
 χ Δ
η
 be 
completely mixed and let η > 0. Then the the pair (p, q) is called η-perfect if 
Pi<V if i^PB^q) and q, < η if j І PB2(p) 
and (p, q) is called η-proper if 
Pi <V Pk if z%Aq < ekAq and q¡ < η · q¡ if pBej < pBe¡. 
A strategy pair (p, q) of (Л, B) is called perfect (proper) if there exists a sequence 
(^ jOfceiN in (0, oo) converging to zero and a sequence (pk,qk)keis in Am x Δη con­
verging to (p,q) with, for every к G IN, (pk,qk) is an %-perfect (%-proper) pair. 
The set of perfect (proper) equilibria of (A,B) is denoted by PE(A,B) (PR(A,B)). 
2.3 Stability concepts 
2.3.1 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
After the definition of equilibria by Nash (1950), the first step in the development 
of stability concepts was taken by Wu Wen-tsiin and Jiang Jia-he. In 1962 they 
defined essential equilibria for η-person normal form games. An equilibrium is called 
essential if it "survives" small perturbations in the payoffs of the game. In this 
context, "surviving" means that each game obtained by a slight perturbation of the 
payoff functions of the original game has an equilibrium close to the target essential 
equilibrium. One of the problems with essentiality is that not every game has an 
essential equilibrium. However, Wu Wen-tsiin and Jiang Jia-he showed that there 
exists a generic set of games whose equilibria are all essential. In the same year, 1962, 
Jiang Jia-he defined the essential components of a game. He called a component of 
the set of Nash equilibria essential if for every sufficiently small perturbation in the 
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payoffs of the game there is at least one equilibrium within such a component that 
survives this perturbation. Moreover, he showed that every game has at least one 
essential component. However, no one proceeded along this line of research, and the 
idea was left during the following two decades. 
In 1975 Selten defined perfect equilibria. Though we used completely mixed strategy 
profiles to define perfect equilibria in section 2.2, Selten introduced a certain type 
of perturbed games to this end. The differences between the approach of Wu Wen-
tsiin and Jiang Jia-he and Selten's definition were that, first of all, Selten did not 
perturb payoffs but strategy spaces. Secondly, he did not require that an equilibrium 
should survive all perturbations. He simply demanded that an equilibrium be the 
limit of a sequence of equilibria of perturbed games. In 1978 Myerson argued that 
the concept of perfect equilibria had a drawback. It turned out that certain perfect 
equilibria did not stay perfect when weakly dominated strategies were eliminated. 
To circumvent this problem, Myerson introduced proper equilibria. However, proper 
equilibria suffered from the same flaw. 
The next step in the development of stability concepts was taken by Okadain 1981. He 
required that an equilibrium be stable against all of Selten's perturbations. Equilibria 
satisfying this condition are called strictly perfect. The problems with strict perfection 
are similar to those with essentiality: not every game has a strictly perfect equilibrium. 
In their seminal work, published in 1986 in Econometrica, Kohlberg and Mertens 
combined the ideas of Jiang Jia-he, Selten and Okada. They started their paper 
with the presentation of a number of properties they considered vital for the strategic 
stability of a solution concept. They also showed that their requirements for stability 
inevitably led to set-valued solution concepts like essentiality. 
Motivated by their results on the structure of the graph of the Nash equilibrium 
correspondence over games (Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 of Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986), see also Theorem 2.2 in this thesis) and the results of Jiang Jia-he they started 
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a search for components of the set of Nash equilibria of a game that are stable against 
all perturbations of the game. However, some of their requirements implied that it 
was impossible to assign whole components to games. In some games parts of an 
essential component turned out to be superfluous after all, e.g. those parts where 
weakly dominated strategies are used. Therefore they used Selten's perturbations to 
perturb games. They called those parts of the set of Nash equilibria that survived 
stable sets. (Solution concepts defined in a similar way will be called stability concepts 
in this thesis.) Unfortunately, even this stability concept did not meet all of the 
requirements they themselves asked for. E.g., not every stable set in their sense was 
contained in one component of the set of Nash equilibria (see example 11 of Kohlberg 
and Mertens (1986), due to Gul). Nevertheless, they stated that this stability concept 
"looked like the right one" and they expressed the hope that some future adaption of 
this concept would do exactly that. 
And indeed, Mertens (1989) and Hillas (1991) succeeded in finding stability concepts 
that satisfied all of the (original) requirements. In Mertens (1991) and (1992) some 
further properties of the stability concept introduced by Mertens were proven. Only 
the definition introduced by Mertens though seemed to be a direct adaption of the 
original definition of Kohlberg and Mertens. Hillas used other techniques to perturb 
games. However, chapter 5 of this dissertation shows that Hillas' stability concept is 
also closely related to the stability concept of Kohlberg and Mertens. It can even be 
redefined in terms of Selten's perturbations. 
The paper of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) plays a key-role in this monograph. There-
fore we will first present an overview of their requirements for stability. Then we will 
shortly discuss the arguments for set-valued solution concepts. Thirdly we will intro-
duce the stability concepts defined by Wu Wen-tsün and Jiang Jia-he, Kohlberg and 
Mertens and Hillas since these are the ones we will use in subsequent chapters. 
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2.3.2 THE KOHLBERG-MERTENS PROGRAM 
In order to avoid ambiguity we will try to describe each property as precise as possible. 
We will discuss each requirement and their motivation. For a detailed explanation of 
all relevant definitions and notions we refer to the corresponding sections in chapters 
3 and 4 and the literature. 
(1) Existence. Every normal form game posesses at least one stable set. 
For most stability concepts it is fairly easy to derive the existence of stable equilibria 
for generic sets of games. However, these generic sets tend to exclude many interesting 
games, like the ones arising from extensive form games. 
Consider for instance the following two-person extensive form game. (Since extensive 
form games only implicitly play a role in the rest of this thesis, we will not give a 
formal definition. The interested reader is referred to Myerson (1991).) 
Example 2.1 (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) 
3 0 0 3 
0 1 1 0 
Player I has two information sets and three pure strategies Τ, M and B. Player II has 
one information set (indicated by the dotted line) and two pure strategies, namely 
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I and r. (An information set indicates that the player in question does not know in 
which node of this set he is.) The normal form (interchanging the roles of the row 
player and the the column player to save space) of this game is 
TM ТВ DM DB 
1 Г 2,0 2,0 0,1 3,0 
г [ 2,0 2,0 3,0 0,1 
The equality of the payoffs of both players in the first two columns of this bimatrix 
is simply a consequence of the fact that the choice of player II between 1 and г in his 
information set and the choice of player I between В and M in his second information 
set has no effect at all on the outcome of the game, once player I has played T. < 
Clearly, this sort of degeneracy will occur when players make choices in parts of 
the tree that are not reached by the eventual play of the game. In other words, a 
given strategy profile determines a path in the game tree. When a player changes his 
strategy in an information set outside this path, the strategy profile changes, but the 
path, and therefore the payoff for a player, does not change. 
Degenerated games like the one in the example usually do not have stable equilibria. 
However, especially for these games (the ones that come from extensive form games) 
we still want to find out what strategy profiles combine to a strategically stable 
collection. In other words, we want to find a stable set in every game, not just for a 
generic set of games. 
(2) Connectedness . Stable sets are connected. 
The earlier comments of Kohlberg and Mertens on this requirement seem to suggest 
that they only wanted to make sure that a stable set would always be contained in a 
unique component of the equilibrium set (see their remarks on Faruk Gul's example 
I I of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). 
In his paper in Mathematics of Operations Research, Mertens strengthened the con­
nectedness requirement. First of all he suggested that stable sets should be the limes 
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superior in the zero-perturbation of a subset of the graph of the equilibrium corre-
spondence over completely mixed perturbations. Then he required that the part of 
this subset above the completely mixed perturbations be connected. It is not clear 
whether he thought that the connectedness of the graph should be an a priori require-
ment for stability. He simply included this form of connectedness into his definition 
of stable sets. As a result of this the hard work is shifted to the problem of existence. 
Presumably, the conditions concerning connectedness and the limes superior were only 
incorporated into his definition in order to avoid that stable sets would become too 
big. At first, Kohlberg and Mertens used a minimality condition to circumvent this 
problem. However, Mertens (1987) found out that this method, combined with con-
nectedness, destroys the invariance (requirement (8)), even if the non-minimal variant 
of a stability concept does satisfy invariance. Therefore he also called somewhat bigger 
(but still connected) sets stable. 
(3) Admissibility. Every stable set consists of perfect equilibria. 
As we already argued in the introduction it is not likely that a player would agree 
to use a weakly dominated strategy even if it is (accidently) a best reply given the 
choices of the other players. So it is very natural for a player to insist that the strategy 
he eventually has to play in the equilibrium will not be a (weakly) dominated one. 
Admissibility of a best reply to a strategy profile of the opponents guarantees that it 
is not (weakly) dominated (see section 2.1.3 for a precise definition). Hence the name 
of this requirement. Now Theorem 2.1 (van Damme (1987)) shows that strategies 
used in a perfect equilibrium are indeed admissible best replies. However, since most 
stability concepts do satisfy the stronger requirement of perfection, we chose this 
variant of the requirement. 
(4) Backward Induction. Every stable set contains a proper equilibrium. 
In extensive form games, the so-called sequentially of equilibria is a natural con-
sequence of the assumption that a player will optimize his expected payoff in any 
information set (cf. Kreps and Wilson (1982)). Consequently, one might argue that, 
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for every equilibrium in a stable set of a normal form game Γ, one should be able to 
extend it to a sequential equilibrium of any extensive form game whose normal form 
is Γ. However, the comments concerning figure 7 of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) 
show that this is impossible. Therefore we are forced to accept the weaker condition 
that a stable set only contains such an extendable equilibrium. This condition can be 
sharpened somewhat by using Proposition 0 of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) (see also 
van Damme (1984)). The proposition states that a proper equilibrium of a normal 
form game is sequential in any extensive form game with that normal form. Therefore 
we will use the above definition of backward induction. 
(5) Iterated Dominance. Let S be a stable set of the game Γ. Let m be a weakly 
dominated strategy of player j . Then S contains a stable set of the game Γ' 
induced by the deletion ofm. 
The argument for iterated dominance is based on the assumption that rational play­
ers will never use weakly dominated strategies as we argued for the admissibility 
requirement. Once wc accept that the players indeed do not use their weakly domi­
nated strategies and that the players themselves are aware of this, it is reasonable to 
assume that the mere existence of such strategies will not influence their decisions. 
However, similar to the situation for backward induction, one cannot require that a 
stable set S will also be stable in the smaller game where a weakly dominated strategy 
m is deleted as the next example shows. 
Example 2.2 (Kohlberg and Mertens) Consider for example the following 3 x 2 -
bimatrix game. 
1 r 
Τ [ 5 , 2 3,2" 
M 0,1 1,0 • 
В L 1,0 0,1 . 
Suppose that stable sets should remain stable in the smaller games. After deletion of 
the strictly dominated strategy В of player I the game 
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Τ 
M 
1 г 
5,2 3,2 
0,1 1,0 
remains. Then we can successively delete the weakly dominated strategies г of player 
II and M of player I and see that {(T, /)} should be the unique stable set of the 
original game. However, in the same way successive deletion of M, I and В would 
show that {(T, r)} should be the unique stable set. < 
This example shows that we can only hope that a stable set contains a stable set of 
the smaller game. As it turns out, this requirement can be met. 
(6) Forward Induction. Let S be a stable set of the game Г. Let m be an inferior 
response of player j to S. Then S contains a stable set of the game Г" induced 
by the deletion of m. 
This requirement is based on the idea that abandoning certain strategies can give 
information to a player about the target equilibrium. Obviously, this idea only makes 
sense in an extensive form context. First we will try to explain the philosophy behind 
this requirement. Consider the following extensive form game. 
Example 2.3 
0 1 3 0 
0 1 3 0 
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Imagine that in this game player II has to make his move. He does not know in which 
node of his information set he is, but he does know that player I did not play T. Then 
it is also clear that player I did not play B, since this strategy is strictly dominated by 
T. Apparently, player I played M, betting on a chance to get 3. In which case player 
II has to play 1. So, the fact that player I did not play Τ gives player II information 
about the strategy player I actually played in his second information set. Now, once 
player II is convinced that player I played M, his strategy r is an irrelevant one, 
even when the game is slightly perturbed. So, (M, 1) must be a stable equilibrium. 
Moreover, the irrelevance of r for player II in his information set implies that this 
equilibrium must remain stable in the game where strategy г of player II is deleted 
(in this case this is a trivial observation; the example can be made less obvious by 
adding a third strategy). < 
Clearly, this story does not make sense in a normal (or strategic) form context. How­
ever, if we consider the normal form 
1 r 
Τ [ 2 , 2 2,2 " 
M 3,3 0,0 
В L 0,0 1,1 . 
of this extensive form game, we can see that, г is still an inferior response for player 
II to the target equilibrium strategy M of player I. Also in this case it is clear that 
the deletion of г can never harm the stability of (M, 1). 
(7) Independence of Inadmissible Strategies. Let S be a stable set of the 
game Г. Suppose that m is not an admissible best reply of player j against S. 
Then S contains a stable set of the game Г' induced by the deletion of m. 
This property can be motivated as follows: once a player accepts the fact that inad­
missible strategies will not be played by his opponents, the deletion of such a strategy 
should not alter his decision. It is included in our list of requirements because it is 
satisfied by most stability concepts and it is a strengthening of both iterated domi-
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палее and forward induction. The proofs of the latter statement can easily be derived 
from propositions 2.1 and 2.2. We will use this property in the rest of this dissertation 
instead of iterated dominance and forward induction. 
The last item of the Kohlberg-Mertens program is invariance. The definition of this 
property can be found in section 3.3. 
(8) Invariance. A stability concept is invariant. 
Invariance describes the relation between the solutions of two "equivalent" games. 
Usually two games are considered to be equivalent if they have the same reduced 
normal (or strategic) form. 
As a first definition of invariance, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) write: "A solution of 
a game is also a solution of any equivalent game (i.e. having the same reduced normal 
form)". Now at first sight this is a strange requirement, since equivalent games need 
not have the same strategy spaces. So, a solution of a game can never be a solution 
of another equivalent game because of the simple fact that it is a subset of the wrong 
strategy space. However, the comments of Kohlberg and Mertens on pages 1010-1012 
point out that this definition should be interpreted as: given a solution of a game, 
any equivalent game should have a solution whose (canonical) projection onto the 
strategy space of the reduced normal form equals the (canonical) projection of the 
solution of the original game. 
This interpretation of invariance has the following drawback. In essence it only de­
scribes the relation between the solutions of a game and those of its reduced normal 
form. Namely, the condition stated above is equivalent with "for any game, the 
solutions of its reduced normal form are exactly the (canonical) projections of the 
solutions of the original game". 
In his mimeo (1987) Mertens proposes a stronger requirement. He requires that for 
any normal form game Г and any strategic form game Г' to which Г projects (a) 
the solutions of Г' are exactly the projections of the solutions of Г (similar to the 
requirement stated above) and (b) the inverse image under the projection of any 
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solution of Γ' equals the union of all solutions of the game Γ that project onto this 
solution of the game Γ'. 
Our definition of invariance is based on the conditions (a) and (b) of Mertens. In fact 
we use exactly these conditions, under the restriction that Γ' is also a normal form 
game. We will come back to this in chapter 3. 
2.3.3 ARGUMENTS FOR SET-VALUED SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
We will now discuss two reasons why point-valued solution concepts cannot satisfy all 
requirements. Firstly, take a solution concept that satisfies backward induction and 
invariance. Consider the following bimatrix game 
(A,B) := M 
В 
1 г 
6,0 6,0 
8,0 0,8 
LO,8 8,0 J 
If we add for 0 < λ < 1 the strategy (λ, 0,1 - λ) as a fourth pure strategy S to the 
strategies of player I, we get the bimatrix game (A(X), 23(A)) with 
A(X) = 
Τ 
M 
в 
s 
1 г 
6 6 
8 0 
0 8 
6λ 8 - 2λ 
and Β(\) = 
Τ 
Μ 
Β 
s 
1 г 
0 0 
0 8 
8 0 
8(1 - λ) 0 
Using the approach of Borm, Gijsberts and Tijs (1989)it is easy to check that (p, q) := 
((1,0,0,0) ( ^ r ^ , f r f £ ) ) is the unique proper equilibrium of (A(\),B{\)). So, by 
backward induction, (p,q) must be contained in any solution of (A(X),B(\)). Then, 
by invariance, the projection ((1,0,0) ( / ~Д, frfx)) of (p, q) must be contained in any 
solution of the original bimatrix game (A,B). Hence, any solution of (A, B) must 
contain the set {((1,0,0) (μ, 1 - μ)) | | < μ < f}. 
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By adding the strategy (λ, 1 — λ, 0) and using the same arguments, one can show that 
{((1,0,0) (μ, 1 — μ)) | \ < μ < | } must be a subset of any solution of (A,B). So, 
if the solution concept also satisfies admissibility, we can conclude that E(A, B) = 
PE(A, B) = {((1,0,0) (μ, 1 - μ)) | \ < μ < \} must be the unique solution of (A, B). 
A second argument can be derived from Example 2.2. In this example it is clear that 
any stable set of the original game must contain both (T, 1) and (T, r) whenever we 
insist on iterated dominance. 
2.3.4 STABILITY CONCEPTS 
In the first attempt of Kohlberg and Mertens to define a stability concept satisfying all 
the conditions of their program (section 2.3.2) they considered an invariant version of 
essentiality, called hyperstability. This concept however fails to be admissible. Their 
second attempt, full stability, suffered from the same flaw. Eventually they used the 
perturbations introduced by Selten to define stability. Also this concept did not satisfy 
all conditions. (It fails even on a weak version of connectedness. Furthermore there 
are connected sets that are stable in this sense that still suffer from lack of backward 
induction as Example 8.2 in section 8.2 shows.) Nevertheless they claimed that this 
concept looked like the right one, and Mertens indeed succeeded in finding a modified 
version that satisfies all conditions, together with some additional properties (see 
Mertens (1989) and (1991)). Two other stability concepts that play an important role 
in this monograph are the ones defined by Hillas (1990). We will give the definitions 
of those stability concepts and some preliminary results needed further on. We will 
present them in chronological order. 
2.3.5 ESSENTIALITY 
For a finite η-person game Γ = (M, и) in normal form, 
ЦГЦоо :=max{|u,(A;i,...,fe
n
)| | (*i * „ ) e i i } . 
i 
This defines a norm on the collection Q
n
 of all η-person normal form games. 
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Wu Wen-Tsün and Jiang Jia-he call a closed subset S of Ε(Γ) an essential set of 
the game Γ if for any open set V containing S there is a number η > 0 such that 
E(T*) Π V is non-empty for all games Γ* with ЦГ - Γ*||οο < η. An essential set of 
Γ not properly containing another essential set of Γ is called minimal. The solution 
concept that assigns to a game its collection of essential sets is denoted by OES-
Jiang Jia-he (1963) proved that, for each game Γ, at least one component of E(T) is 
essential. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) proved the following result: 
Theorem 2.2 For any game Γ, E(T) consists of finitely many connected compo­
nents. At least one of them is an essential set. 
2.3.6 KM-STABILITY 
Selten's perturbations of the strategy space and the stability concept generated by 
them will be used freely throughout this monograph. So we will repeat the definitions 
of Kohlberg and Mertens here. 
Definition 2.4 A KM- perturbation of the game Γ is an η-tuple ζ •= (ζι, •••, ζ
η
), 
where & := (Сгт)тем, is a vector of non-negative real numbers such that the set 
A,(C») := {xt e Δ, [ xtm > Cîm for all m e M,} 
is non-empty for each player i 6 N. Note that this is the case if and only if for each 
player i e Ν, Е
т е
м , Cm < 1· 
The set Δ (С) := f] Δ, (ζ,) is called the (^-restricted strategy space. The maximum-
norm of a KM-perturbation ( is ЦСІІоо := rnaxKtm \ i S N, m £ M,}. The space /С 
of all KM-perturbations endowed with this norm is compact. Furthermore, a KM-
perturbation ζ is called completely mixed if £
г т
 > 0 for all i G N and m E Mt. 
A KM-perturbation ζ gives rise to the KM-perturbed game Γ[ζ], whose space of strat­
egy profiles is the (^-restricted strategy space Δ (ζ). The payoff function of player г 
is simply the restriction of u, to this space of strategy profiles. The best replies for 
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a player now depend on both the strategy profile his opponents are playing and the 
restrictions imposed on his strategy space by the perturbation. So we will use the 
following notation. 
For a given strategy profile χ and a KM-perturbation ζ, the strategy z t £ Δ,(ζ,) 
is called a best reply of player i to i _ , in Δ,(ζ,) if Ui(i_ t |z,) > ω,(ι_,|2/,) for all 
strategies j/ , € Δ,(ζ,). The set of best replies of player г to i _ , in Δ,((,) is denoted 
by /?,(&> z-,) . 
A strategy profile ζ is a best reply to χ in Α(ζ) if each z, is a best reply of player г 
to I _ J in Δ,(ζ,). The set fj /?,(£,, i_,) of best replies to χ in Δ(£) is denoted by 
/3(C, i ) . Now the set of equilibria of the perturbed game Γ[ζ] is 
Ε(Γ[ζ]) = {χ e Δ Ι χ e β(ζ, χ)}. 
Definition 2.5 A closed set 5 С Δ is called a KM-ser if for every neighborhood 
V of 5 there exists a number η > 0 such that V Π .Ε(Γ[£]) is non-empty whenever 
llClloo < Ц- A minimal KM-set is called KM-sia6/e. The solution concept that assigns 
to a game Γ the collection of its KM-stable sets is denoted by ацм-
KM-stable sets satisfy existence, admissibility, independence of inadmissible strategies 
and invariance. Counterexamples for the other requirements can be found in this 
monograph. 
These perturbed games can also be used to characterize perfect equilibria. Theorem 
2.2.5 of van Damme (1987) shows 
Theorem 2.3 Let Τ be a game. Then a strategy profile χ e Δ is a perfect equi­
librium of Γ if and only if there is a sequence (Cfc)fceiN of completely mixed KM-
perturbatwns of Γ converging to zero and a sequence (xk)keiN tn Δ converging to χ 
such that xk e £(Г[С*]) for all k. 
Just like Nash equilibria, equilibria of KM-perturbed games can be characterized in 
Preliminaries 43 
terms of carriers and pure best replies. This basic characterization will be used in 
various chapters. Therefore it is presented here in the introduction. 
For a KM-perturbation ζ and a strategy profile z G Δ(ζ), Ος(ζ) := Π Сс
г
{гі) is the 
»елг 
ζ-саггіег of ζ, where Q,(z t ) := {m G M, | z,m > £ t m } . 
Lemma 2.3 Let ζ be a KM-perturbatton and let χ be a strategy profile. Let z be an 
element of Α(ζ). Then z is a best reply to χ m Δ(ζ) if and only if C^{z) С PB(x). 
Proof. The proof is simple when one realizes that a strategy zt G Δ,(£ι) is a best 
reply to :r_, in Δ,(ζ,) if and only if the pure non-best replies to z_, are played with 
minimal weight within the simplex Δ,(ζ,). < 
Corollary 2.1 Let Τ be a game and χ be a strategy profile m Δ. Let ζ be a 
KM-perturbatwn of Γ. Then 
χ e Ε{Γ[ζ]) if and only if Ο
ζ
(χ) С PB(x). 
2.3.7 Q-STABILITY 
This type of stability is defined by Hillas in his paper in Econometrica (1990). He 
proved that it satisfies existence, admissibility, backward induction, iterated domi­
nance and forward induction. It does satisfy independence of inadmissible strategies. 
Counterexamples for the other requirements of the Kohlberg-Mertens program can 
be found in this thesis. 
Definition 2.6 A Q-perturbation of Г is an n-tuple 7 := (71, . . . , j
n
) where 
7J := (ът)т€ (м.) is a vector of non-negative real numbers, such that for all г G Ν 
Δ,(7.) := {xt e Δ, I xt(T) > ът for all Г e V(Mt)} 
is non-empty. 
A Q-perturbation 7 is called completely mixediîjtT > 0 for all г 6 TV and Τ € V(Mt). 
The set Δ(7) := Π Δ,(7,) is called the 7-restricted strategy space. The maximum-
i€JV 
norm of 7 is ІІ7ІІОО := max{7,T | i G Ν, Τ G (Мг)}. 
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Also in this case the set ß(j, χ) of best replies to χ in Δ(7) for the perturbed game Γ[7] 
can be defined in the obvious way. Consequently we can define the set of equilibria 
£?(Г[7]), which naturally leads us to 
Definition 2.7 A closed set 5 С Δ is called a Q-set if for every neighborhood 
V of S there exists a number η > 0 such that V П £(Γ[7]) is non-empty whenever 
ІІ7І|оо < ??· A minimal Q-set is called Q-stable. 
This is quasi-stability in the sense of Hillas (1990). The solution concept that assigns 
to a game Г the collection of its Q-sets is denoted by OQ. 
2.3.8 H-STABILITY 
Finally we describe the stability concept introduced by Hillas (1990) as stable sets. 
Notice that, for a game Г = (M, и), the Hausdorff distance «f# is a metric on the class 
£ ( Δ ) of all compact subsets of the strategy space Δ. Furthermore, {)С(А),ан) is a 
compact metric space. Now, for two compact- and convex-valued upper semicontin-
uous correspondences φ, ψ: Δ—»Δ we define 
άοο{φ,ιΡ) •= 5\ιρ{ά
Η
(φ(χ),ψ(χ)) Ι χ € Δ}. 
Note that the best reply correspondence β of the game Γ is an element of the class 
Ή of all compact and convex valued upper semicontinuous correspondences φ: Δ - » Δ 
and that а
ж
 is a metric on this class. The set of fixed points of an element ψ of К is 
ηχ(φ) := {χ € Δ | χ G φ(χ)}-
Definition 2.8 For the game Γ, a closed set S С -Б(Г) is an R-set if for any 
neighborhood V of 5 there exists a number η > 0 such that fix(v) Π V is non-empty 
whenever ά^β,φ) < η. A minimal Η-set is called an Η-stable set. 
This is stability in the sense of Hillas (1990). The solution concept that assigns to a 
game Γ the collection of its Η-sets is denoted by ан-
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Reduction and invariance 
In this chapter we study the invariance of solution concepts. Roughly speaking in-
variance of a solution concept means that the solutions of a game do not change if 
one reduces the game. We will consider two ways of reducing a game and thus we 
obtain two types of invariance. The first type of invariance is concerned with solution 
concepts for normal form games, while the second type deals with solution concepts 
for strategic form games. We will show that an invariant solution concept for normal 
form games can be extended uniquely to an invariant solution concept for strategic 
form games. Consequently, one might argue that it is sufficient to define solution 
concepts for normal form games only. 
In section 3.1 we define the reductions of normal form and strategic form games. These 
reductions were first decribed by Mertens (1987) and van Damme (1994). In section 
3.2 the (weak) invariance of a solution concept is defined. Furthermore our main result 
is proved. In the last section the (weak) invariance of solution concepts for normal 
form games is considered. We show that a game is a reduction of another game if and 
only if the first game arises from the other by adding convex combinations of pure 
strategies as new pure strategies. This leads to an equivalent definition of invariance 
for solution concepts defined on normal form games. 
The results in this chapter are based on Vermeulen and Jansen (1995). 
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3.1 Reductions of games in strategic and normal form 
A solution concept is invariant if it survives some form of reduction of a game. So, 
clearly the notion of invariance depends on the type of reduction. The type of reduc­
tion we will use in the normal form context is based on the payoff-equivalence of a 
pure strategy with a (possibly mixed) strategy of the same player. Here two strategies 
of the same player are payoff-equivalent if both strategies - no matter what the other 
players do - lead to the same payoff for all players. Formally 
Definition 3.1 Two strategies x, and у
г
 of player г of a game Г = (M, и) are 
payoff-equivalent iiUj(z-t\ xt) = Uj(z-,\ yt) for all j and all z_¿ e A_¿. Two strategy 
profiles χ and у in Δ are called payoff-equivalent if xt is payoff-equivalent with уг for 
all players i. 
Note that it is easy to check whether a given pure strategy is payoff-equivalent with 
some other strategy of the same player. Furthermore, the type of reduction defined 
above again yields normal form games. The second way of reducing a game is based 
on the identification of arbitrary payoff-equivalent strategies. We will show that this 
type of reduction may lead to a game in strategic (not necessarily normal) form. 
Definition 3.2 Following Mertens (1987) and van Damme (1994), we define an 
η-person game in strategic form as a pair (P,v), where Ρ = Yl¡Pt is a product of 
polytopes and υ = (v\,.. .,v
n
) is an η-tuple of multi-affine functions v¿:P —• IR. A 
solution concept for strategic form games is a map which assigns to each strategic 
form game Γ = (Ρ, ν) a collection of closed, non-empty subsets of P. 
We assume, just like we did for normal form games, that all polytopes Pi are subsets 
of some IR" to avoid logical complications. 
Example 3.1 We consider the 2 χ 4-bimatrix game 
Γ 1,1 - 1 , - 1 2,-2 -2,21 
(A,B) = 
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Let χ and y in Δ 4 be two strategies of player 2 and let ζ := χ — y. Then χ is 
payoff-equivalent with y if and only if 
etAx = etAy ( etAz = 0 
for all i <=$• < for all г 
etBx = etBy [ егВг = 0 ( zi— Z2 + 2z3 — 2zi = 0 
Zi - z2 
Г 
Zi=Z2 
z3 = zt. 2z3 + 2г4 = 0 
So, two strategies of player 2 are payoff-equivalent if and only if their difference is an 
element of the linear subspace 
L:={a 
Г ! Ί 2 
1 
2 
0 
. 0 . 
+β 
"0" 
0 
1 
2 
1 
L 2 -I 
I a,/?eE}. 
In the next picture the equivalence class of the strategy ( | , | , 0 , 0 ) of player 2 is 
depicted by the coarsely dotted line. The equivalence class corresponding to a strategy 
χ of player 2 is the set of points on the line through χ parallel to this dotted line. 
Since two different pure strategies of player 2 are apparently not payoff-equivalent, 
the strategy space of the second player can be identified with a quadrangle. < 
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This second method of reducing a game was introduced by Mertens (1987) (see also 
van Damme (1994)). In the next section, this method plays an important role in 
the definition of (weak) invariance of a solution concept for strategic form games. 
Furthermore we construct for each strategic form game a normal form game that can 
be reduced to the original strategic form game. 
Definition 3.3 A strategic form game Γ' = (Q,w) is a reduction of the strategic 
form game Γ = (Ρ, υ) if there exists a map f = (fi,..., ƒ„) such that for all г 
(1) / , : P , -> Q, is affine and surjective 
(2) v, = wt о ƒ. 
In this situation we write Г —>¡ Г' and call ƒ a reduction from Г to Г'. 
In section 3.3 we will show that this definition restricted to normal form games is 
equivalent with the elimination of pure strategies (that are payoff-equivalent with 
other strategies). 
Remark 3.1 If Г = (M,и) and Г' = (L,v) are two normal form games with 
Г —>ƒ Г', then the strategies xt and y, in Δ(Μ,) are payoff-equivalent if and only if 
for all j and г_, € (Δ
Μ
)-» := Π Δ ( Μ * ) 
Uj(z_ t | x t) = Uj{z-t\ yt), i.e. v3(fk(zk)kï,\ ƒ»(*.)) = w,(ƒ*(**)*#·! Л Ы ) · 
Since fk is surjective for all к, this is equivalent with 
VJ ( s -tl fifa)) = VJ ( s - t | My,)) for all j e N and s_, 6 (A¿)_,. 
This shows that ƒ, preserves payoff-equivalence, i.e. xt is payoff-equivalent with j / , if 
and only if ft(xt) is payoff-equivalent with /
г
(у,). 
Remark 3.2 For a game in strategic form (best replies and) equilibria can be 
defined in an obvious way. If βγ· denotes the best reply correspondence for a strategic 
form game Γ and Γ -»ƒ Γ', then y G ßr(x) if and only if f{y) € ßr>(f(x)) as one 
easily verifies. Hence, χ e E(T) if and only if f(x) e і?(Г"). 
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Remark 3.3 When all ƒ» are not only surjective but also injective, we have both 
Γ —>/ Γ' and Γ' —>f-ì Г. In that case we will call ƒ an isomorphism between Г and 
Г'. Consequently, Г and Г' are called isomorphic. This is denoted by Г =ƒ Г'. 
An extremely weak form of invariance of a solution concept r for strategic form games 
is obtained if we require that 
т(г') = { / ( Г ) | г е г ( г ) } . 
only in case that Г =ƒ Г'. We will say that τ is invariant under isomorphisms. Since 
all solution concepts used in non-cooperative game theory satisfy this requirement we 
will regularly abuse notation and identify isomorphic games. (Obviously the same 
remarks can be made in the normal form context.) 
Let Γ = (Ρ, ν) be a strategic form game. Corresponding to Γ we will construct a 
normal form game Г
п о г т
 = (M, и) such that Г is a reduction of T
norm
. Since P, 
has a finite number of extremal points, there is a finite (index) set M¿ such that 
ext(P t) = {p\n\ m e Mt). The affine map p¿: Δ(Μ,) -> P¿ defined by 
Рг{хг) •= Σ XimP? 
тем, 
is surjective. Next we consider the normal form game (M,u), with M := Г] ( M t and 
щ:М —> Ш. is the function defined by u% := vt о p. This game is called the normal 
form extension of Г and is denoted as Г
п о г т
. Furthermore, since for all г and χ 
u,(i) = Y2 Y[x3k,Ui(ki,...,kn) 
(fci,...,fc„)eAf ι 
Σ n^^teî1)'-··»^*")) 
(*ι У е м J 
Σ n
xJkMPil>--->Pn) 
(fci,...,fc„)6M 3 
' =
 VÁ Σ ZU.PÎ 1 , · · · , Σ Хпк»Рп") =υϊ(Ρΐ(.Χΐ)>···,Ρη(Χη)), 
u¡ =
 г
 о ρ, and ρ is a reduction from Г
п о г т
 to Г. 
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Remark 3.4 Notice that Г
п о г т
 is not uniquely determined because we only spec­
ified the number of elements of the index sets M„ not the index sets themselves. 
However, it is clear that Г „
о г т
 is determined up to isomorphisms, i.e. if we have two 
games Г „
о г т
д and rnorm¿, then there is a function ƒ such that Г„
О Т
.
т і
і ^ / Г „
о г т ) 2 . 
So, like we said in Remark 3.3, we will abuse notation and simply write Г
п о г т
. 
For later purposes we will show that the game Г'
погт
 is a reduction of the game Г
п о г т 
if the game Г' is a reduction of the game Г. Therefore we need the following result. 
Lemma 3.1 If f is a reduction from Γ = (Ρ, υ) to Γ' = (Q,w), then 
ext(Q,)c A(ext(P,))· 
Proof. Let q% 6 ext(Q,). We will show that there exists a strategy p, € ext(P,) 
with / t(p,) = qt. 
Since ft is surjective and affine, /t-1(<7t) is the non-empty intersection of P, with a 
linear variety. Hence / , - 1(ç t) is a polytope and we can choose an extremal point, say 
Рг,оі f~l(qt). 
Clearly, /t(p») = g». We will show that pt is an element of ext(P,). Suppose that 
р
г
 = \x, + (1 - X)y, with λ <Ξ (0,1) and x„yt e Ρ,- Then q, = Xft(xt) + (1 - \)f,(y%) 
and f(xt),f(Vi) € Qi- Since qt is an extremal point of Qlt this implies that qt = 
ƒ,(!,) = ft(yz). Then however, х
и
у
г
 G Л_1(9г)· Finally, the fact that pt is an 
extremal point of }~l{q%) implies that i , = y, which completes the proof. < 
Proposition 3.1 Let f be a reduction from the strategic form game Γ = (Ρ, υ) 
to the strategic form game Γ' = (Q,w). Then there exists a reduction f* from the 
normal form game Г
погт
 = (L, u) to the normal form game T'
norm
 = (M, u') such 
that, for all i, ƒ, ο ρ, = p\ o f*, where Г
п о г т
 -л
р
 Г and
 П0Тт ->ρ· Γ'. 
Proof. As noticed before, ext(P,) = {p[ \ l e L,} and ext(Qt) = {q? Ι τη € M,}. In 
view of Lemma 3.1, we can find for any extremal point g[" of Q, at least one extremal 
point, say pj™. °f Pi s u c n that ft(p?) = ?!"• Now, like we did in Remark 3.3, we abuse 
notation and write Lt = M, U K, for some finite set Kt with Κ, Π Μ, = φ. 
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We will construct a reduction ƒ* from Г
п о г т о
 to Г ^ п , such that the diagram 
AL • Δ
Μ 
I- I ' 
Ρ —Í-+ Q 
commutes. 
Since p[ is surjective, we can find for all к e Kt a strategy rf € Δ(Μ,) such that 
pj(r*) = fi(Pt)· Next we consider the linear map f*:A(L,) -+ Δ(Μ,) defined by 
(e\ if / е м . 
Λ·(4):=< 
i r | if í e A:,. 
First of all, note that ƒ* is surjective. Furthermore for an index / e M» 
(Λ o ft)(eí) = Л(р{) = 9Î = //.(ei) = ρ«ƒ,' (e',)) = ( ¿ o /;)(ej) 
and for an index l £ К, 
(Л о
 Л
)(еі) = M) = PÎ(ri) = M:(ei)) = (/< o /,·)(β|). 
Finally, since u, = υ, ο ρ = ш, о ƒ о ρ = w, о ρ' о ƒ* = и\ о ƒ*, ƒ* is a reduction from 
Гпогт to Гп
о г г о
 with the properties as mentioned in the proposition. < 
3.2 Invariant solution concepts 
Mertens and van Damme call a solution concept for strategic form games invariant 
if two requirements relating the solutions of a game and those of a reduction of that 
game are satisfied. Since several solutions only satisfy the first of these requirements, 
we prefer to call such solutions weakly invariant. In this section we show that a 
(weakly) invariant solution concept for normal form games can be extended uniquely 
to a (weakly) invariant solution concept for strategic form games. 
Definition 3.4 A solution concept τ for strategic form games is called weakly 
invariant if for all triplets (Γ, Γ', ƒ) with Γ -¥f T' 
г(Г') = Ш Г ) | Т е г ( Г ) } . 
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A weakly invariant solution concept τ is called invariant if, moreover, for all S £ τ(Γ") 
r
l(S) = \J{Ter(r)\f(T) = S}. 
A solution concept for normal form games is called (weakly) invariant if the above 
holds for all triplets (Г, Г', ƒ) with Г and Г' normal form games. 
Remark 3.5 When proving the invariance of a solution concept r (either over nor­
mal or strategic form games) we will frequently use the following stronger condition: 
suppose that, for all triplets (Г, Г", ƒ) with Г -τ ƒ Γ', τ satisfies 
(1) if Γ e τ(Γ), then ƒ (Γ) e τ ( Γ ) 
(2) if 5 € т(Г'), then f'1 (S) £ г (Г). 
Then τ is invariant. 
We will show that a (weakly) invariant solution concept for normal form games can be 
extended uniquely to a (weakly) invariant solution concept for strategic form games. 
In the proof we need the following technical result. 
Lemma 3.2 Let σ be an invariant solution concept for normal form games, Γ = 
(Ρ,ν) a strategic form game with Г
п о г т
 = (M,и) and Г
п о г т
 ->p Г. If χ £ Δ Μ 
satisfies ρ(χ) £ p(W) for some W £ σ(Γ
η ο Γ Τ η
), then there exists a solution V € 
"•(Гпогт) containing χ such that p(V) = p(W). 
Proof. Since p{x) 6 p(W), there is a strategy profile у £ W such that p(y) — p(x). 
Corresponding to χ we introduce a normal form game Г
п о г т
[л:] in such a way that 
Гпогт is a reduction of Г
п о г г а
[а;]. In this new game each player gets an extra pure 
strategy, say fc¿ for player i. In order to define the payoff function u\ for the new 
game, we consider the linear map (7rx)t: Δ(Μ, U {kt}) —> A(Mt) with 
ΚΟ,(ζ,) := 5Z ¿ime? + Zik,Xi-
m€M, 
We take u't := u, ο ττ
χ
 as the payoff function for player г in the new game. Clearly, 
π ! is a reduction from the game Γ
η 0 Γ τ η[χ] to the game Г п о г т . Corresponding to у we 
similarly construct the normal form game Г
п о г т
[у] and the reduction ny. 
Reduction and invariance 53 
First we will show that for all г G Ν, ρ, о {•К
Х
)І = pt о (π„),. For Zj 6 Δ(Μ< U {Ы}), 
Рг((тгх)г(.гч)) = p,( ^ ^ „ . e ^ + z,*,i t) = ^ г .тр.Се^ + г.к.рДіі) 
m€Af, тпбЛЛ 
= Σ
 г
«тМ
е
Г) +*і*.РгЫ=Рг( 5Ζ г.теТ'+гль.й) 
meW, m€AÍ, 
= Ρ»(Κ),(ζ,)). 
Now we can calculate that, for all z, 
u't(z) = ut{irx(z)) = vt(p(nx(z))) = vt(p(ny(z))) = ut{ixv{z)) = u'l(z). 
Hence, Т
потт
[х] = T
norm
[y]. 
Now ъ
у
{е\1, • • ·, e*") = у € W. So, by the invariance of σ, there exists a solution 
Τ e a(T
norm
[y]) = a ( r „
o r m
[ z ] ) containing ( e * 1 , . . . ,e*") such that π
ν
(Τ) = W. 
Let V := π
χ
(Τ). Firstly, notice that χ = ir
x
{e^,... ,e*") € π
χ
(Τ) = У. Secondly, 
V € σ(Γ
η 0 Γ Τ„) in view of the weak invariance of σ. Finally, using the equality ρ, о 
( О » = Ρ· ° (πν)ι w e c a n easily deduce that p(V) = ρ(π
χ
(Τ)) = ρ(π
ν
(Τ)) = p(W). « 
T h e o r e m 3.1 If σ is a weakly invariant solution concept f or normal form games, 
then there exists a unique weakly invariant solution concept τ for strategic form games 
such that τ(Γ) = σ(Γ) for all normal form games Γ. If σ is invariant, then τ is 
invariant too. 
Proof. For a strategic form game Γ let τ(Γ) be defined by 
т(Г) := {p(T) | Τ € a(Tnorm)} 
with r n o r m —>p Γ. Now recall that Г
п о г т
 was not uniquely determined. However, 
Г„огт is determined up to isomorphism, so the invariance under isomorphisms of the 
(weakly invariant) solution concept σ assures that τ is well-defined, 
(a) In order to show that τ is weakly invariant, let ƒ be a reduction from the strategic 
form game Γ to the strategic form game Γ'. Using Proposition 3.1, the weak invariance 
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of σ implies that 
r(r') = {AT) Ι τ e а(
 потт
)} = {Arm I и e а(Г
погт
)} 
= UW)) I U e σ(Γ
η0Γίη)} = {/(5) I S e т(Г)}. 
So r is weakly invariant. 
(b) Furthermore, for a normal form game Г, Г
п о г т
 = Г and ρ is the identity. So for 
such a game, τ(Γ) = {Τ | Τ e σ(Γ)} = σ(Γ). 
(c) In order to show that r is unique, let r ' be a weakly invariant solution concept 
for strategic form games such that г'(Г) = σ(Γ) for all normal form games Γ. If Γ is 
a strategic form game, the fact that ρ is a reduction from Г
п о г т
 to Γ together with 
the weak invariance of r ' imply that 
τ'(Γ) = {p(T) | Τ € т ' ( Г „
о г т
) } = {р(Т) Ι Τ 6 σ(Γ„ 0 Γ 7 η)} = τ(Γ). 
(d) Finally, suppose that σ is invariant and that ƒ is a reduction from a strategic form 
game Γ = (Ρ, υ) to a strategic form game Γ' = (Q, w). Let S € τ (Γ') and let ρ be an 
element of Ρ with f(p) e 5. We have to show that there exists a solution Τ e τ(Γ) 
containing ρ such that ƒ (Γ) = S. 
Write r
n o r m
 = (L,u). Since ρ is surjective, there exists a strategy profile ζ € A¿ 
such that p(z) = p. Then p'(f*{z)) = /(р(г)) = /(ρ) e 5. By the definition of τ 
there is a solution W € σ(Γ^ 0 Γ ι π) with p'{W) = 5. In view of Lemma 3.2 there is 
a set V e σ(Γ'
ηοΓτη
) containing f*(ζ) such that p'(V) = S. By the invariance of σ, 
there exists a solution U e <т(Г
п о г т
) containing ζ such that ƒ*({/) = V. 
For the set Γ := p{U) we have Τ e τ(Γ) and ρ = p(z) G p(U) = T. Finally, 
/(Γ) = f{p(u)) = p'(r(tf)) = AV) = S. < 
In view of this result we only consider solution concepts for normal form games in 
this monograph. In the next section we will show that the (weak) invariance of such 
concepts can be described by means of so-called extension sets. 
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3.3 The invariance of normal form solution concepts 
As it is argued in section 3.1, two normal form games will be "identified" if one of 
them is a reduction of the other. In this section we will show that a normal form 
game is a reduction of a normal form game if and only if one of the games arises 
from the other one by adding convex combinations of pure strategies as new pure 
strategies. To that purpose, we include these combinations - that can be represented 
by probability vectors - in a so-called extension set. This extension set is used to 
construct a reduction. To be precise, let Γ = (M, и) be an η-person game in normal 
form. 
Definition 3.5 For each player i e Ν, let Ρ, = {ρ* € Δ, | к € Kt} be a finite set 
of strategies. We call the set of vectors Ρ := \jPt an extension set for Γ. For such a 
set Ρ we introduce the P-extended game Τ ρ = (M', и'), where М'
г
 := M, U К
г
 is the 
disjoint union of the sets M, and K
x
. In order to define the payoff functions of this 
game, we consider for all г the linear map π,: A(L,) -» Δ(Μ,) with 
,,. fei ¡fi e M, 
The payoff function u't: Α ι -> IR is then defined by u't := u, ο π, where π := 
( π ι , . . . ,7Г„). The projection π: Δχ, —> AM defined in this way is sometimes denoted 
by π ρ to avoid a possible misinterpretation. 
Obviously, r ¿ = Г. Furthermore, Гр can be considered as an extension of Г since the 
game that results when each player г in Гр is restricted to his pure strategies in M, 
is exactly Г. 
Example 3.2 We choose for the 2 χ 2-bimatrix game 
[1,2 0,0-
(A,B)=\ 
1.0,0 2,1. 
Pi = {( | , ! ) } , P2 = φ, πι: Δ3 -> Δ 2 as the map defined as follows 
if г = 1.2 
*ì(e,) = \
 (\ 2 
l. ^3' 3 1) if г = 3 
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and 7Г2: Δ2 —• Δ2 as the identity map. 
(i.l.o) 
In this picture it can be seen how e3 € Δ 3 is mapped by πχ to (5, §) e Δ 2 . Any other 
strategy ρ € Δ3 of player 1 is mapped to the strategy in Δ2 obtained by moving from 
ρ parallel to the dotted arrow until we intersect the line segment between e\ and ег. 
Obviously Tp is the 3 χ 2-bimatrix game 
(A,B) = 
1,2 0,0 
0,0 2,1 
Ì 2 
"- 3 ' 3 
4 2 
3 ' 3 
Clearly, in the previous example, Γρ —>
v
 Г. In the following theorem we show that 
any reduction of a normal form game can be obtained in this way. 
Theorem 3.2 If ƒ is о reduction from the normal form game Г' = (L, v) to the 
normal form game Г = (M, и), then there is an extension set Ρ for the game Γ such 
that f = π ρ and Τ' = Тр. 
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.1 one can show that, for any i, L, = MtUKt 
for some finite set K
x
 and that Л(е|™) = e|™ for each m 6 M,. 
Now we consider the set P, := {/»(ef) | к € Kt). Then Ρ := \JtPt is an extension set 
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for the game Γ. Moreover, since for all i, 
e[ = ft(e[) if Ζ e M , 
ft(e;) = < 
ІЛ(еі) iîleKu 
it follows that π = ƒ. Consequently, Γ' = Γρ. < 
Corollary 3.1 A solution concept σ for normal form games is weakly invariant if 
and only if for any game Γ and any extension set Ρ for Γ 
σ(Γ) = {тгя(5) I S e σ(Γ
Ρ
)}. 
Further, σ is invariant if and only if for any game Γ and any extension set Ρ for Γ, 
*ï1(T) = {J{Sea(rP)\np(S) = T}. 
Proof. (a) Suppose that σ is a weakly invariant solution concept for normal form 
games. If Ρ is an extension set for a normal form game Γ, then Γ ρ —>
π
 Г. Hence, 
σ(Γ) = { π ( 5 ) | 5 ε α ( Γ ρ ) } 
by the weak invariance of σ. 
(b) Suppose, conversely, that for any game Γ and any extension set Ρ for Γ, 
σ(Γ) = { π
Ρ
( 5 ) | 5 € σ ( Γ ρ ) } . 
Let ƒ be a reduction from a normal form game Γ' to a normal form game Γ. Then 
by Theorem 3.2 there is an extension set Ρ for the game Γ such that ƒ = πρ and 
Γ' = Γρ. Hence σ is weakly invariant because 
σ(Γ) = {πρ(5) I S G σ(Γ
Ρ
)} = {f (S) | S 6 σ(Γ')}· 
In a similar way a proof can be given for the invariance of a solution concept. < 
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Remark 3.6 The invariance of a solution concept σ for normal form games implies 
the following property: if a solution contains a strategy profile χ and y is a strategy 
profile that is payoff-equivalent with x, then there is a solution containing y. 
In order to prove this property, let ι e Γ 6 σ(Γ). We introduce the extension sets 
Ρ and Q with P, = {i,} and Q, = {yt}. Then Γ Ρ = TQ and -кР(е\\... ,e*-) = x, 
where kt is the 'new pure strategy' of player i. Since σ is invariant, there is a solution 
S' £ σ(Τ
Ρ
) containing (ef1,..., e£" ) such that nP(S') = T. Now we take S := TCQ(S'). 
Then S e σ(Γ) and 
y = »Q(ef 1 , . . . ,e*-)6 i r Q (5 ' ) = 5. 
Furthermore one can show that for all strategy profiles г e 5 there is a z' £ Τ that is 
payoff-equivalent with ζ and vice versa. 
Chapter 4 
Continuous KM-stable sets 
The two stability concepts introduced sofar in literature that satisfy all the require-
ments of the original program of Kohlberg and Mertens are those defined by Mertens 
(1989) and Hillas (1990). Unfortunately, the definition of stable sets in the sense of 
Mertens is difficult because of the use of homology theory. Hillas uses all compact 
and convex valued use correspondences to perturb the best reply correspondence of 
a game. In this chapter we introduce a compomise between these two approaches. 
As with Hillas' perturbations, our perturbations depend on the strategy profile being 
played. Given a strategy profile, such a perturbation yields a KM-perturbed polytope 
in which the players must choose their optimal response. This yields a set of pertur-
bations considerably smaller than the one used by Hillas and closer to game theoretic 
intuitions. First we will prove some basic facts concerning these perturbations. Then 
we will introduce the stability concept generated by this set and prove that it satisfies 
all properties of the original Kohlberg-Mertens program. 
This chapter is based on Vermeulen, Potters and Jansen (1994) and work of Hillas and 
Vermeulen. At this point I would like to thank Professor Hillas for explaining to me 
the proof of the backward induction property of stable sets in the sense of Mertens. 
The proof of Theorem 4.8 is a result of this discussion. 
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4.1 Continuous perturbations 
Usually, the best reply correspondence gives optimal reactions to proposed strategy 
profiles x. For the perturbations we propose, best replies to a strategy profile χ must 
be chosen within a polytope generated by a KM-perturbation. This polytope depends 
continuously on x. Thus we get 
Definition 4.1 A CKM-perturbation of a game Γ = (M, u) is a continuous function 
ε := (ε,),£Λτ: Δ —• К from the strategy space Δ to the space К of KM-perturbations 
of Г. Then, by the definition of KM-perturbation, the polytope 
Δ,[ε](ar) := Δ,(ε,(ar)) := {у
г
 Ε Δ, | ytm > ε,™(ar) for all m € M,} 
is non-empty. Moreover, 
εχί(Δ,[ε](χ)) = {d*m[e](i) € Δ; | m 6 M,}, 
with 
f e,* (ar) іікфтп 
4 т И ( а г ) := \ 
U - E ^ m ^ W iffc = m. 
The collection С of all these perturbations is endowed with the norm 
ІИІ —maxilar)! !«, . 
Ι Ε Δ 
First we consider the correspondence Δ [ε] that assigns to a strategy profile x G Δ the 
polytope 
Δ[ε](χ) := Π Δ,[ε](ϊ). 
»€ΛΓ 
Sometimes we will also call the correspondence Δ [ε] a CKM-perturbation. 
T h e o r e m 4.1 For each perturbation ε e С, Δ[ε] is a continuous correspondence. 
Proof. Take a CKM-perturbation ε. Since, for a; £ Δ and i € Ν, ext (Δ, [ε] (ar)) = 
{ff т[г](аг) € Δ, I m 6 M,}, the correspondence assigning εχί(Δ,[ε](ι)) to χ is contin­
uous. Then the correspondence that assigns Δ,[ε](ι) = ch(ext(A,[e](ar))) to ar must 
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be continuous too. Now the observation that Δ[ε](χ) := П»€лг^»[£](х) shows that 
Δ[ε] is continuous. < 
4.2 Best reply correspondences 
The correspondences Δ[ε] can be used to introduce 'perturbed games' as follows. For 
a perturbation ε e С, Γ(ε) is the generalized game, wherein player г given a strategy 
profile χ G Δ has to respond to x_, by choosing a best reply in the set Δ,[ε](χ). Since 
this is a non-empty compact set and yt i-> u,(x_ t | yx) is continuous, there is at least 
one best reply. This leads to 
Definition 4.2 For a perturbation ε G С the best-reply correspondence of the 
'perturbed game' Γ[ε] is given by β[ε] = Піелг&И' wherein for г 6 N and χ e A 
β,[ε]{χ) := {у, e Δ,[ε](χ) | u,(x-,| у,) > щ{х-
г
\ zt) for all ζ» € Δ,[ε](χ)}. 
If these best reply correspondences of perturbed games are used to define stability 
one gets a stability concept that, to our knowledge, satisfies all requirements of the 
Kohlberg-Mertens program described in chapter 2 but one, namely invariance. To 
circumvent this problem we define for a 'perturbed game' Γ[ε] the saturated best 
reply correspondence β*[ε] by taking for all χ e Δ, 
β*[ε](χ) := {ζ e Δ I there is a y e β[ε](χ) that is payoff-equivalent with z}. 
The proofs of the properties of the saturated best reply correspondences naturally 
depend heavily on the structure of the equivalence classes of the payoff-equivalence 
relation. Therefore we will first prove a basic result concerning this structure. 
Let Ρ С Δ χ Κ, be the closed set of pairs (χ, ζ) with the property that there is at 
least one strategy profile у £ Α(ζ) that is payoff-equivalent with χ. (K is the space of 
KM-perturbations.) Note that Ρ is non-empty since each pair (x,C) with χ € Δ(ζ) 
is an element of P. Define the correspondence ψ: Ρ—»A by 
φ(χ,ζ) := {у e Α(ζ) Ι у is payoff-equivalent with χ}. 
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Then φ is non-empty-valued by the definition of P. Furthermore there exists a ma­
trix В such that for all x,y e Δ, Bx = By if and only if χ is payoff-equivalent 
with y. So, we can write φ(χ, ζ) as the set of vectors у € Піелг ^Mi w * t n У*™ ^ 
um, Z)m€Aí¡ У im = 1 a n c ^ ^У — -^χ· Note that only the righthand sides of these 
(in)equalities depend (linearly) on χ and ζ. So there is a linear function b on Ρ and 
a matrix A with 
^ , 0 = {yeIl I R M i \Лу<ь(хХ)}. 
Now we can apply Remark 10.1. (In fact Remark 10.1 is a consequence of the theorem 
of Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos concerning the sensitivity of the solution of a 
linear programming problem to perturbations of the right hand side of the system of 
linear inequalities. In words, the theorem states that the correspondence that assigns 
the solution of the perturbed problem to a perturbation is Lipschitz continuous with 
a Lipschitz constant that only depends on A. This is a very useful theorem and we 
will apply it regularly in this dissertation.) 
Corollary 4.1 There is a constant D (only depending on A and b) such that 
α
Η
(φ(χ,ζ),φ(χ',ζ')) < D\\(x,Q - (x',<')l|oo 
forall(xX),(x',C)eP. 
Switching back to our main concern (perturbed games), notice that the compact-
and convex-valuedness of the best reply correspondence β[ε] easily follows from the 
linearity of y¿ ι-» Щ(Х-І\ y¡) and the fact that the values of Δ*[ε] are polytopes. The 
compact- and convex-valuedness of the correspondence β* [ε] then follows from this 
fact and the linear structure of the payoff-equivalence classes. Furthermore, 
T h e o r e m 4.2 For each perturbation ε e С, β*[ε] is an upper semicontinuous cor­
respondence. 
Proof. Take a perturbation ε in C. Take sequences (ζ*)*ςΐΝ and (z*)it
e
]N with 
zk 6 ß*[e\{xk) and xk -¥ x, zk -+ z, as к -)• со. To prove: z Ç. β*[ε]{χ). 
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By definition of ß*[e](xk), we know that there are strategy profiles yk G ß[e](xk) with 
yk is payoff-equivalent with zk. We may assume w.l.o.g. that yk -+ y as к —• oo. 
Application of Theorem 10.4 (2) (the Maximum theorem) to the continuous function 
ƒ,: Δ χ Δ , -» IR defined by /
г
(х,у
г
) := u t( i_¿ | t/,) and the, by Theorem 4.1 continuous, 
correspondence А
г
[е]: Δ-»Δ, leads to the upper semicontinuity of the correspondence 
βι[ε]. Hence, y G β[ε](χ). Furthermore, the continuity of the functions υ,χ, ..., u
n 
and the payoff-equivalence of yk with zk implies that y is payoff-equivalent with z. 
Hence, ζ G β*[ε](χ). < 
Now we know that the saturated best reply correspondences of perturbed games are 
convex- and compact-valued and use. So, the collection of correspondences β* [ε] with 
e G С is a subset of the perturbation space Ή (see section 2.3). Next we will give a 
relation between the distance functions on С and Ή.. 
Theorem 4.3 The map β* is Lipschitz continuous: there is a constant D* such 
that for all δ, ε €. С, 
d o o ( f f l , 0 * [ e ] ) < I > * P - e | | 
Proof. Take δ, ε G С and a strategy profile χ G A. Then we can calculate that 
а
н
Щ6]{х),РгШх)) < d*(ext(Ä[<W*)W(A[E](:E))) 
< dff({d*m[Ä](x) I m G P B , ( i - , ) } , K m H ( z ) I m G P B , ( i . , ) } ) 
< | M t H I < * ( * ) - ^ ) l l o c < | M t | . | | á - e | | . 
The Hausdorff-distance considered here is based on the maximum-norm. So, these 
inequalities imply 
α
Η
(β[δ}(χ),β[ε](χ)) = тах<*яОЭД(аО, A[
e
](aO) < тах\М%\ • \\δ - ε\\. 
ι ι 
Now take a strategy profile ζ G β*[ε](χ). Then by definition of β*[ε](χ) there is a 
strategy profile y G β[ε](χ) that is payoff-equivalent with z. According to the previous 
remark there is a strategy profile y' G β[δ](χ) with 
lltf-v'IU<G||Ä-e|| 
64 Chapter 4 
wherein G :— maxj |М<|. Using Corollary 4.1 we get a constant D such that 
<**(¥>(»,0), (У',0)) < D\\(y,0) - (y',0)\\oo = D\\y - у'Ц«, < DG||á - ε | | . 
Since ζ is contained in tp(y, 0), this implies that there is a strategy profile z' e <p(y',0) 
with \\z — z'Woo < DG\\S — ε\\. However, z' 6 <p(y',0) means that z' is payoff-equivalent 
with y' and y' was an element of /3[J](:r). Hence, z' is an element of β*[δ](χ). Since 
χ and ζ were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that, for every χ € Δ, we have 
β'[ε](χ) С BDG¥_e]lJß-[S}(x)). 
Then by interchanging the roles of δ and ε, 
ά
Η
{β*[δ](χ),β·[ε)(χ))<Ο0\\δ-ε\\. 
Therefore the theorem holds for D* := DG since neither D nor G depends on x. < 
4.3 On continuously KM-stable sets 
In view of Theorem 4.2 and Kakutani's fixed point theorem (Theorem 10.7), ήχ(/3*[ε]) 
is non-empty and closed for each perturbation ε G С. We will use this fact to define 
a CKM-set as a set of strategy profiles such that for all small perturbations the 
perturbed games have a fixed point close to this set. 
Definition 4.3 A closed, non-empty subset 5 of Δ is a continuously KM-stable 
set - CKM-set for short - if for each open neighborhood V of S there is a number 
η > 0 such that fix(/3*[e]) П V φ φ for every perturbation ε e С with ||e|| < η. A 
CKM-set that does not contain another CKM-set is called minimal. 
Comments Clearly, the collection of constant CKM-perturbations can be identified 
with the collection K. of KM-perturbations. So, a CKM-set is also stable against 
KM-perturbations. Therefore it contains a KM-stable set. Furthermore, Theorems 
4.2 and 4.3 imply that the correspondence β*[ε] is in fact a small perturbation of the 
best reply correspondence of Γ in the sense of Hillas whenever ε is small. This implies 
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that every Η-set is a CKM-set. Another consequence is the existence of CKM-sets. A 
direct proof of this fact can be based on the following lemma which is also important 
for later purposes. 
Lemma 4.1 The correspondence ε н-> πχ(/3*[ε]) is upper semicontinuous. 
Proof. Take a sequence (ek)kejN in С converging to ε and a sequence (xfc)fc6iN 
converging to χ such that xk in πχ(/3*[ε*]) for all k. We will show that χ is an 
element of ίίχ(/3*[ε]). 
Let η > 0. Take D* as in Theorem 4.3. Since ||ε* - ε | | < (·0*)- 1τ/ for large к, Theorem 
4.3 implies that ά00(β*[εΙί],β*Ιε]) < η for large k. Hence, by the definition of d ^ and 
the fact that xk is an element οι ß*fek](xk), 
x
k
 G Β
η
(β*[ε](χ")) for large к. (1) 
Furthermore, by the upper semi-continuity of β*[ε], 
β*[ε](χ") С Β
η
(β*[ε}(χ)) for large Α. (2) 
Combination of (1) and (2) leads to xk 6 Β2
η
(β*[ε](χ)) for large k. Since (a;fc)jt6iN 
converges to x, this implies that χ e οΙ(Β2η(β*[ε](χ))). Now η is arbitrary and β*[ε](χ) 
is a closed set, so χ is an element of β*[ε](χ). < 
Since Γ[0] = Γ and Ε(Γ) = fix(/3*[0]), Lemma 4.1 implies 
T h e o r e m 4.4 The set Ε(Γ) of equilibria is a CKM-sei. 
In order to formulate two characterizations of CKM-sets, we introduce the following 
terminology. 
Definition 4.4 A perturbation ε = (ε,)ίζΗ is called completely mixediiε
ίτη
{χ) > 0 
for all χ Ε Δ, г e JV and m G M». 
For a sequence (ε*)*;
ε
ΐΝ of perturbations converging to zero (i.e. 1 і і щ
ч о о
 | |ε*| | = 0), 
we denote with lim supfc ηχ(/9*[ε*]) the set of cluster points of sequences (i*)fcgiN with 
x
k
 is a fixed point of β* [ε*] for all к G IN. 
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L e m m a 4.2 For a non-empty and closed set S С Δ, the following three statements 
are equivalent: 
(1) S is a CKM-sei 
(2) for any open set V containing S there is a number η > 0 such thatfix(ß*[e])n 
V φ φ for every completely mixed perturbation ε with | |ε| | < η 
(3) for any sequence {ek)k£W of completely mixed perturbations converging to 
zero, 
5 η lim sup fix(/T[efc]) φ φ. 
к 
Proof. We will only prove the implications (2) -* (3) and (3) -> (1). 
(a) Assume that (2) is true. Take a sequence (e*)jtgiN of completely mixed perturba­
tions converging to zero, and an open set V containing S. By (2) there is a AT e IN 
such that fix(/3*[e*]) Π F is non-empty, whenever к > К. Hence, the intersection of 
the set of cluster points of (fix(/3*[e*])fc6rj and the closure of V is non-empty. Since 
this holds for any neighborhood V of S and the set of cluster points is closed, it is 
clear that the intersection of S and the set of cluster points of (nx(ß*[ek]))k^TN is 
non-empty. This establishes (3). 
(b) Suppose that the condition in (3) is satisfied and that S is not a CKM-set. Then 
there exists a number δ > 0 such that for any Ä; G IN there is a perturbation tk with 
||e*|| < \ and fix(/?V]) П BS(S) = φ. 
Now for a given k, we consider for / € IN the completely mixed perturbation ekl 
defined by ек^(х) := (1 - j)ek
m
{x) + j , where г e Ν, m e M¿ and ι 6 Δ. By Lemma 
4.1, nx(ß*[ekl]) С B^s(nx(ß*[ek])), for large Л So we can choose, for each к £ IN, a 
number l(k) > к such that ftx(ß*[eklW}) Π Bi
s
(S) = φ. By construction £*'<*> -• 0 
as к -> oo, while limsupknx(ß*[ekt(-k^}) does not intersect S. This contradicts (3). < 
4.4 The Kohlberg-Mertens properties 
In this section we will investigate the properties of the Kohlberg-Mertens program 
as mentioned in chapter 2 for CKM-sets. Some proofs of these properties depend on 
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technical details. Those details that are used more frequently will be elaborated in 
separate lemmas. 
4.4.1 ON EXISTENCE AND CONNECTEDNESS 
In this section we deal with the existence and connectedness of minimal CKM-sets. 
Theorem 4.5 (Existence) Each finite η-person game has a minimal CKM-sei. 
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, the collection of CKM-sets of Γ is non-empty. For a 
sequence S\ D S2 D S3 D ·• • οι CKM-sets we consider the non-empty and closed set 
S := Π. Sj. In order to show that 5 is a CKM-set, let V be an open neighborhood 
of S. 
First we will show that 5, С V for large j . If no Sj is contained in V, we can choose 
for each index j a point i J £ S, \ V. Since Δ is compact, we may suppose that the 
sequence x 1 , ! 2 , . . . converges, say to χ G Δ. Now take j 0 6 IN. As x J G S}0 for all 
indices j > jo, we have χ G Sj0. Since j 0 was arbirary, χ G S. This is impossible 
because χ $ V. 
So there is an index j with Sj С V. Because Sj is a CKM-set, there is a number 
η > 0 such that fix(/3*[e]) Π V φ φ whenever | |ε| | < η. Hence S is a CKM-set. 
Now, since Δ has finite dimension, the existence of a lower bound (w.r.t. inclusion) 
for each decreasing sequence S\ D S2 D S3 D • · • in the collection of CKM-sets is 
a sufficient condition for the application of Zorn's lemma. Hence, the collection of 
CKM-sets has a minimal element. < 
Theorem 4.6 (Connectedness) Every minimal CKM-set is connected. 
Proof. Suppose that a minimal CKM-set S is not connected. Then there are two 
disjoint, non-empty closed sets Si and S2 with S = Si U SV 
Let η > 0. Since 5 is a minimal CKM-set, S\ and £2 are not CKM-sets. So there 
are open neighborhoods Vi of Si and V2 of 5*2 and perturbations ε 1 and ε 2 with 
Цг
1!! < η and | |ε 2 | | < η such that β* [e1] and β* [ε2] have no fixed points in Vi and 
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V2) respectively. We may assume without loss of generality that also cl(Vi) Π с1(Уг) 
is empty. 
By Urysohn's lemma there is a continuous function α: Δ —¥ [0,1] with value one on 
cl(Vi) and value zero on сІ( г). Then ε := α ε 1 + ( 1 - α ) · ε 2 is a CKM-perturbation. 
Since ε equals ε* on VJ for t = 1,2, it is clear that β*[ε] has no fixed points in V¡. 
Therefore β*[ε] has no fixed points on V\ U Vi. Furthermore, it is straightforward to 
show that | |ε| | < η. However, Vi U V2 is an open neighborhood of S. This contradicts 
the stability of S. < 
4.4.2 ON ADMISSIBILITY AND BACKWARD INDUCTION 
In this section we show that the intersection of a CKM-set with the set of perfect 
equilibria is also a CKM-set and that each CKM-set contains a proper equilibrium. 
In both proofs we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.3 There exists a constant D such that for any perturbation ε, strategy 
profile χ and strategy profile ζ € β*[ε](χ) there is a strategy profile y in β[ε](χ) that 
is payoff-equivalent with ζ and \\y — z\\oo < -D||e||-
Proof. Take D as in Corollary 4.1. Take a perturbation ε, a strategy profile χ and 
a strategy profile ζ € /ϊ*[ε](χ). Then there is a y' 6 /3[ε](χ) that is payoff-equivalent 
with z. In particular, y' is an element of Δ[ε](χ) (and Δ) while y' is payoff-equivalent 
with z. Therefore, (using the notation from section 4.2), (ζ, ε(χ)) and (z, 0) are 
elements of P. Then Corollary 4.1 yields 
ά
Η
(φ(ζ, ε(χ)), ψ(ζ, 0)) < D\\(z, ε(χ)) - (ζ, 0) |U = £>||ε(*)||οο < £>||e||. 
So, since ζ 6 φ(ζ, 0), there is a strategy profile y in ψ(ζ, ε(χ)) with ||y — z||oo < ί?| |ε | | . 
Then y is an element of Δ[ε](χ) and y is payoff-equivalent with z. However, since ζ is 
also payoff-equivalent with y', y is payoff-equivalent with y'. Now y' is a best reply to 
χ in Δ[ε](χ). So, y is also be a best reply to χ in Δ[ε](χ). This concludes the proof. < 
We start with the proof of the admissibility of minimal CKM-sets. 
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Theorem 4.7 (Admissibility) For every СКМ-seí S of Γ, ΡΕ(Γ) Π S is also a 
CKM-setofT. 
Proof. Suppose S is a CKM-set. Then statement (3) of Lemma 4.2 holds for S. 
We prove that statement (3) also holds for the closed set ΡΕ(Γ) Π S. Take a sequence 
(£h)kew of completely mixed perturbations converging to zero. By statement (3), 
we may assume that there is a sequence ( Ζ * ) *
€
Ι Ν converging to some ζ E S and 
zk e fix^*^]) for all fee IN. 
We will show that ζ is perfect. Since zk € ß*[ek](zk), Lemma 4.3 shows that there is 
a strategy profile yk in ß[e]{zk) that is payoff-equivalent with zk and ||y* - zk\\(x> < 
Β||ε*||. So the sequence (yk)kew converges to z. 
We will show that yh is ||e*||-perfect. Since each ε* is completely mixed, yk is also 
completely mixed. Suppose that m is not a pure best reply of player ζ to j / * , . Then m 
is not a pure best reply of player i in Δ, to z*, since yk and zk are payoff-equivalent. 
So, by Lemma 2.3, ytm = etm(z) < \\ek\\. < 
As the next item of the Kohlberg-Mertens program we consider backward induction. 
The next lemma will be used in the proof of this property. 
L e m m a 4.4 (Partition of unity) Let i 1 , . . . , x* 6 Δ and v\ > 0, . . . , v
s
 > 0 be 
such that Bl := BVl{xx), ..., Bs := BVs(xs) covers Δ. Then there are continuous 
3 
functions a 1 , . . . , a s from Δ to [0, 1] such that Σ а ' ( у ) = 1 for all y Ç. Δ and for 
t=i 
each t: a'(y) > 0 •«• у e Вг. 
Proof. Define for t e {1, . . . , s) the function β1: Δ -¥ Щ, by 
?(у):=(1-\\х<-у\\М-1)+. 
Define for i 6 {1, . . . , s} the function α ' : Δ -> [0, 1] by 
а
4
Ы:=^(у)(е^(у))_1. 
t = i 
It is straightforward to show that a1, ..., as have the properties mentioned. < 
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Now we will prove that every CKM-set contains a proper equilibrium. In the proof 
we will exploit the fact that a strategy profile x_ t e A_¿ (weakly) orders the set of 
pure strategies M, of player i in (pure) best replies, scond best replies, third best 
replies, etc. In order to formalize this observation we consider the set A% of rankings 
at := (o,it)fc6M, of M,. (The vector o, is a ranking if {α,& | к G M,} = {1, . . . , m,}.) 
For a strategy profile χ in Δ, A(x) := ΠΓ=ι ^»(^-O with 
А
г
(х-
г
) := {α, e Ai \ alk < atm whenever u,( i_, | екг) > u t(x_<| e™)} 
is the set of vectors of rankings that is consistent with the weak order induced by 
x_¿. For a number η € (0,1) and a player i, we will consider the set of permutations 
of the vector (η,η2,... ,η"1') that are consistent with the weak order induced by x_ t 
to construct an //-proper strategy profile. Formally, for a strategy profile a; G Δ and 
a vector of rankings о e A(x) we define p(a) e ПГ=і ^ M ' ^У Ρ(α)** : = rìa'k · We will 
prove 
T h e o r e m 4.8 (Backward Induction) Every СКМ-seí contains a proper equilibrium. 
Proof. Take a CKM-set S and a number μ > 0. It is sufficient to show that 
F := cl(Bß(S)) contains an 77-proper equilibrium for η sufficiently small (since then 
F also contains a proper equilibrium). 
Since S is a CKM-set there exists a number ν > 0 such that ίίχ(/3*[ε]) Π с1(5і^(5)) 
is non-empty whenever | |ε| | < v. 
For sufficiently small η we will construct a sequence of perturbations (el)¡cw This 
sequence of perturbations yields a sequence (y')ieiN (each yl being payoff equivalent 
with a fixed point zl of β* [ε1]) whose cluster points are contained in F and η-proper. 
To this end, take η < ν and some 7 > 0. Since the collection {By(x) \ χ € Δ} is 
an open cover of the compact set Δ, we can choose strategy profiles x1, ..., x" such 
that By(x1), ..., -B7(xs) still covers Δ. Now Lemma 4.4 yields a partition of unity 
a
1
, ..., a
3
 subordinate to this cover of Δ. Take for each xl a vector of rankings 
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o' € Α(χ*). Define the perturbation e(= e 7) by 
ε ( » ) : = έ α ' ( » ) ρ ( α * ) . 
We may assume that η < 1. Then each e(j/) is a convex combination of vectors of 
rankings p(al) with ||ρ(α')||οο - η. So we get that | |ε| | < max
a
 ||ί>(α)||οο = η < v. 
Hence, by the choice of ν there is a fixed point ζ of β*[ε] contained in cl(Biß(S)). 
Repeating this construction for every element of a sequence (7¡)jeiN converging to 
zero we get strategy profiles x'1, . . . , xls^ and perturbations 
t= i 
together with fixed points z' of β*[ει]. 
Now Lemma 4.3 yields a constant D and strategy profiles yl in β[ει](ζι) payoff-
equivalent with z' with ||i/ — z'lloo < Ζ?||ε'||. Furthermore, since zl is also contained 
in c\(Biß(S)), the inequalities 
Иг/- s'il«, < Я|Иі < ^ 
imply that yl is contained in d(Bß(S)) = F whenever η < ^ . 
Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that η < ^ and that yl -> y and zl -+ ζ as Ζ -»· oo. Since 
F is closed and y1 G F for all Í, г/ e F . So the proof is complete if we can show that 
у is an 77-proper equilibrium. 
Firstly we will show that у is completely mixed. Note to this end that for all Ζ € IN, 
players i e N and pure strategies m € M, we have y\m > e\m{zl) > 7/m'. Hence, 
î/im > '7m' also holds, because yl —¥ y as I -» 00. 
Secondly, assume that u t(y_,| ef) > ut(2/_i| e™) for the fixed pure strategies k,m G 
M t . Left to show: η^
ι
>
ί
> у
гт
-
Since у' —> j/ and z' —У ζ as I -> 00, and each г/1 is payoff-equivalent with z', it is clear 
that у is payoff-equivalent with z. Therefore, 
ti,(z_,| ef) = u,(p_,| e,fc) > u,(y_,| e?*) = u,(z_,| <")• 
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So by the continuity of the payoff function и
г
 we can choose a neighborhood Bp (z) of ζ 
such that w,(i_,| e*) > u,(*- i | e™) holds for all χ e Bp(z). Then by the convergence 
of (z')ieiN to ζ we can choose a natural number L such that zl 6 і?іДг) for all I > L. 
Now, take I > L with 7J < ìp , and an index t € {1, . . . , s(i)} with alt(zl) > 0. First 
we will show that η -р(а")
г
* > p(o")tm· By the construction of alt we know that 
II*" - ¿II«, < II*" - *'II» + \W - z | L <
 7 i + èP < Ρ-
So, χ " € Bp{z) which implies «,(*",| ef) > u,(*'i,| e^1). Therefore, o(J. < o ^ . Then 
^ · p(a"),Jt = ι? · î7a!i > 4β"~ = p(a"),m. 
Hence, τ/ · ε[
Α
(ζ') > e(
m
(z') also holds, because 
•(0 
e
V):=EQ'V)p(«")= Σ «V)P(«") 
i = l t a ' « ( z ' ) > 0 
is a convex combination of vectors p(a") each satisfying η • p(alt),k > p{alt)
xm
. 
Finally, recall that yl € β[ει](ζι). Furthermore, m is not a best reply for player г to z' 
(since I > L, which implies that u»(z!_,| e*) > ut(z'_,| e¡")). So, we can apply Lemma 
2.3 and find 
ri-yìk>V-e[k(z,)>eitm(zl) = ylim 
where our previous argument was used to get the second inequality. Hence, by taking 
the limit for I - • oo we get η • y,k> J/im- < 
4.4.3 INDEPENDENCE OF INADMISSIBLE STRATEGIES 
In the definition of independence of inadmissible strategies we will use a technique to 
delete one pure strategy of the original game. First we will introduce the notation 
concerning the deletion of a strategy from the game Γ. 
Definition 4.5 Let Γ be the finite η-person game (M, u). Let τη be a pure strategy 
of player j , who has at least two pure strategies. The game Γ' induced by the deletion 
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of m is by definition (M',u'), wherein 
К ••= { 
[M3\ {m} if i = j 
and u[ is the restriction of щ to ГТ, M't. 
The strategy spaces of Г and Г' are denoted by Δ and Δ', respectively. From у € Δ ' 
(уj € Δ ' ) the lift у in Δ (у-, in Δ^) is obtained by adding to y3 zero as the m-th 
coordinate. 
Loosely speaking, independence of inadmissible strategies means that a stable set S 
of a game Γ remains stable if a pure inadmissible reply against S is deleted from Γ. 
In the proof of this property for CKM-sets we need a way to extend a perturbation 
of Γ' to a perturbation of Γ. This extension technique uses a retraction from Δ to 
Δ'. In the construction of the retraction the following polytope will be used. 
Let Π С Δ be the set ΠΓ=ι »^> where П, is the collection of those strategies z
x
 € Δ, 
of player г for which there exists a strategy yt € Δ^ such that zt is payoff-equivalent 
with y%. Clearly, Пг = Δ, = Δ( whenever г φ j . 
L e m m a 4.5 There exists a continuous function ρ3-Δ} -> Δ^ such that Zj € ΓΓ, if 
and only if P]{z3) is payoff-equivalent with z}. Moreover, р3(у~]) = y3 for all y} £ Δ ' . 
Proof. This function p3 is constructed in two steps. First we introduce the corre­
spondence 7 : lij—»Δ^ by 
7(zj) := {y} e A'j \y} is payoff-equivalent with ζ3} 
Since 7 is only defined on ΓΓ,, its values are non-empty. Now note that there is a 
matrix A such that for all strategies x2, z3 € ΓΓ,, x} is payoff-equivalent with z3 if and 
only if Ax j = Azj. Since the map from Δ^ to Δ^ defined by y} i-> у3 is also linear, 
we get that y3 G Ί{Ζ3) if and only if y} is a solution of the finite system of linear 
(in)equalities Ay3 = AzJt y3 > 0 and ^Сіьелг У]к = 1· Hence, by Remark 10.1, 7 is 
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continuous. Now, for z3 e lij with zjm = 0, let z'3 € A'3 be the strategy obtained by 
the deletion of the coordinate zjm = 0 from z3. Define Ύ*:Ώ.3-*Α'3 by 
\Ύ(Ζ,) else. 
This is clearly a non-empty compact- and convex-valued correspondence. Furthermore 
it is Isc by Lemma 10.1 (take Ζ = {ζ, € A3 | z,m = 0} С П
л
 F = 7, H = 7*). Then 
by Theorem 10.5 (Michael) there exists a continuous selection pl : H3 —• Δ ' of 7*. 
Secondly, we construct p23 : A3 -+ П^ as follows. Take a pure strategy к φ m 
that is not payoff-equivalent with m (if there is no such k, then П^ = A3 and we 
can take p3 :— p}). Define p23{z3) := z3 + X(z3)(e3 - e™) with λ(ζ3) := πύη{λ > 
0 | ζ., + Л(е* - e™) G ГГ,}. Define p3: A3 -»· Δ^ by p_, := p)°py We will show that ρ 
satisfies the properties mentioned in the lemma. 
(a) If z3 € Uj. Then p3 = p)· So we have p3(z3) = p)(z¿) € 7(zj)· Then it is clear 
that ρj (z3 ) is payoff-equivalent with z}. 
(b) If Zj $. Uj. Then pj(zj) = p](p2(z3)) and p23{z3) 6 Π 7 . So, the argument of 
part (a) shows that p3{z3) is payoff-equivalent with p2{z3). Furthermore, z3 is not 
payoff-equivalent with p2(z3) since z3 $. u j and p2(z3) G ΓΙ,. Hence, z3 cannot be 
payoff-equivalent with p3(z3). 
(c) Finally, take a strategy y3 e Δ^. Then y3 G. U3 and y]m = 0. So, p3(y3) = 
Р)( Э) € 7*(Й) = ( И ' ) · Hence, p j (^) = y3' =У]. < 
Now we can use the function defined above to extend a perturbation ε' of the game 
Γ' to a perturbation ε of the game Γ: if ρ :— (pi, ..., p
n
):Δ -»· Δ ' is the function 
with p3 defined as in Lemma 4.5, and p, equals identity for all г ^  j , then 
{£[k(p(x)) i f Mi ori=jandfc^m 
elk(x) :=i (x € Δ). 
I, 0 if г = j and к — τη 
It is evident that ε indeed is a perturbation and that | |ε| | = | |ε' | | . 
We need the next two lemmas in the proof of independence of inadmissible strategies. 
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Lemma 4.6 Let ζ G Δ. Then for ρ and ε as defined before, the following holds 
(1) if y G Δ[ε](ζ) and y}m = 0, then p(y) e Δ[ε'](ρ(ζ)) 
(2) if y € Δ[ε'](ρ(ζ)), í/ien у is an element of Δ[ε](ζ). 
Proof. (1) Let j/ e Δ[ε](ζ) and 2/jm = 0. Then for A; G М'г, p(y)tk = y,* > etk(z) = 
е[
к
Ш)-
(2) Let y G Δ[ε'](ρ(ζ)). If г φ j and fc G M,, or г = j and fc G M,, к φ m, then 
У ik = Угк > e[k{p(z)) = £tk(z). 
Otherwise, yjm = 0 = e]m(z). < 
Lemma 4.7 Let y,z be two strategy profiles in П. Then p(y) is payoff-equivalent 
with p(z) if у is payoff-equivalent with z. 
Proof. Take two players i,h G N and a strategy profile і _
г
 G Δ_,. Then, using 
Lemma 4.5, we can deduce that 
u'h(X-t\ рг(Уг)) = Uh(x-i\ Pifa)) = Uh{X-x\ J/,) = Uh{X-,\ Z.) = u'h(X-x\ p,(z,)). < 
Now we can prove the independence of inadmissible strategies for CKM-sets. For a 
pure stratgy m of player j and a set 5 С Δ, we say that m is not an admissible best 
reply against S if e™ $ B°(S). Further, we refer to Definition 2.2 and section 2.3.2 
(7) for the relevant notions. 
Theorem 4.9 (Independence of inadmissible strategies)) Let S be a СКМ-seí of 
the game Γ and let m be a pure strategy of player j such that m is not an admissible 
best reply against S. Let Γ' be the game induced by the deletion of the pure strategy 
m. Then p{S) is a СКМ-seí of Γ'. 
Proof. First of all we note that p(S) is closed and non-empty. So if we can prove 
(2) of Lemma 4.2 for p(S), we have the desired result. Take an open set V' containing 
p(S). Then p _ 1 (V ' ) is an open neighborhood of 5. Since e^1 is not an element of 
Bf(S), p~x{V') contains an open neighborhood V of S with ej" $ B?{V). Since S 
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is a CKM-set, there is a number η > 0 such that the intersection of V and fix(/J*[e]) 
is non-empty, whenever | |ε| | < η. Now take a completely mixed perturbation e' of 
Γ' with | |e ' | | < η- Take the extension ε of ε' as defined below Lemma 4.5. Then 
| |ε | | = | |ε' | | < η. So there is a fixed point ζ of β*[ε] contained in V. Obviously, 
p(z) G V'. The proof is complete if we can show that p(z) is a fixed point of /3*[ε']. 
To this end we take a strategy profile y G /?[ε](ζ) that is payoff-equivalent with z. 
(a) First we will prove that y]m = 0. Suppose that e™ is a best reply to y_j. Note 
that y_j is completely mixed since ε' is completely mixed. The sequence (zìi JiteJN 
defined by i* := (1 - £)z, + | y t (k G IN, i φ j) is therefore also completely mixed. 
Moreover, i f is payoff-equivalent with y, for each к and г φ j . So e™ is a best reply 
to i * . This contradicts the fact that e™ is not an admissible best reply to z, since 
x
k
_ -> z_j as À; -> oo. So, e™ is not a best reply to y _ r Then Lemma 2.3 shows that 
î/jm = £jm(^) = 0. 
(b) Secondly we will prove that p(y) € β[ε'](ρ(ζ)). Because of Lemma 4.6 (1) we 
know that p(y) £ Δ[ε'](ρ(ζ)). Take a strategy profile χ G Δ[ε'](ρ(ζ)). We will prove 
that pt(y,) is at least as good a reply as x, to p(z)_, in Аг[е'](р(г)). 
First note that y, ζ € Π, since y j m = 0 and ζ is payoff-equivalent with y. Then у and 
ζ are payoff-equivalent with p(y) and p(z), respectively, by Lemma 4.5. Furthermore, 
χ e Δ[ε](ζ) by Lemma 4.6 (2). So, since y G /?[ε](ζ) we get 
«UP(*)-»I Л Ы ) ="·(/>(*)_,! PtЫ) = «,(*_,I У») 
>u,(z_ t | ΐ . ) = u((p(z)_,| p,(î,)) = u,(p(z)_,| i t ) , 
where the second statement of Lemma 4.5 was used to get the last equality. Hence, 
p(y) G β[ε'](ρ(ζ)). 
(c) Finally, since у, ζ € Π, Lemma 4.7 states that p(y) and p{z) are payoff-equivalent. 
Furthermore, p(y) is an element of β[ε'](ρ(ζ)) by (b). Hence, p(z) G /3*[ε'](ρ(ζ)). о 
4.4.4 ON INVARIANCE 
In this section we will investigate the invariance of the solution concept аскм that 
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assigns to a game Γ the collection of all connected CKM-sets of Γ that are contained 
in the set of perfect equilibria of Γ. Formally, 
аскм(Т) := {S | S is a connected CKM-set contained in PE(T)}. 
We will omit the subscript CKM during the subsequent part of this chapter (except 
for Theorem 4.11) and write σ instead. 
First we need a way to extend a perturbation e of a game Γ to a perturbation ε of 
the P-extended game Γ ρ (cf. Definition 3.5). 
To this end, let Γ = {M, и) be a game and let Ρ be an extension set of Γ. Then, as 
in the proof of Proposition 3.1, the strategy space L, of player i in the P-extended 
game Tp = (L,v) can be seen as the disjoint union of M
x
 and K
x
. Let π denote the 
projection associated with P. For a perturbation ε of Γ, the extension ε of ε is the 
perturbation of the game Tp = (L, v) defined by 
(ε
α
{φ)) i f i e J l í , 
eti(z) := < [о if / e if,. 
In order to prove the invariance of σ, we need the following 
L e m m a 4.8 Let y and ζ be strategy profiles in Δ^. If y is an element of β[ε](ζ), 
then 7r(y) is an element of β[ε](π(ζ)). 
Proof. Suppose that у is an element of /3[ε](ζ). Then at least у is an element of 
Δ(ε(ζ)). So, we can calculate that, for a player i and m 6 M,, 
T(î/)*m =У,т+ Σ У,к(Рг)гт > Угт > ê , m (z) = e l T n(ir(z)). 
кек. 
Hence, 7г(у) G Δ(ε(π(ζ))). Take a strategy profile χ € Δ(ε(π(ζ))). We will show that, 
for any player г, 7т,(у
г
) is at least as good a reply to π(ζ)_, as xt. To this end, note 
that the strategy profile χ € Δχ defined by 
{ i,i if Ζ e M, 
0 otherwise 
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is an element of Δ(έ(ζ)). So v,(z-t\ yt) > v,(z-t\ xt) since y € ß[e]{z). Furthermore, 
π (χ) = χ. Therefore, using the fact that π preserves payoffs (since it is a reduction 
from Τ ρ to Γ), we can calculate that 
u,(?r(z)_,| 7г,(г/
г
)) = v t(z_,| J/,) > u,(z_,| x.) = и,(тф)_, | π,(χ,)) = u,(7r(z)_,| x,). 
Hence, 7г(т/) is an element of β[ε](π(ζ)). < 
Theorem 4.10 The solution concept σ is invariant. 
Proof. We will use the definition of invariance as it is described in Corollary 3.1 of 
section 3.3. Let Γ be an η-person normal form game and let Ρ be an extension set 
of Γ. Let π denote the projection associated with P. We will prove that σ satisfies 
properties (1) and (2) of Remark 3.5. 
(a) Let Γ be an element of σ ( Γ » . We will prove that π(Γ) e σ(Γ). 
Oviously, π(Τ) is connected, since π is continuous. Furthermore, Τ С PE(Tp). So, 
since PE(Tp) - π _ 1 (-Ρ^(Γ)) (cf. Theorem 6.3), we know that π(Τ) С РЕ(Г). 
In order to show that π(Τ) is a CKM-set we take a neighborhood U of π(Τ). Then 
7Γ_1(ί/) is a neighborhood of T. Since Γ is a CKM-set of Tp there is a number η > 0 
with 7Γ_1(ί7) Π ηχ(β*[ε]) φ φ for every extended perturbation ε with ||ε|| < η. Now 
take a perturbation ε of Γ with | |ε| | < η. Then also | | ε | | (= ||ε||) < η. So we can take 
a strategy profile ζ e π _ 1 ( ί7) Π ϋχ{β*[έ]). Clearly, π(ζ) e U. Furthermore, there 
exists a strategy profile y 6 /3[ε](ζ) that is payoff-equivalent with ζ since ζ 6 β*[ε](ζ). 
So, by Remark 3.1, π(ΐ/) is payoff-equivalent with π(ζ). Moreover, n(y) € β[ε](π(ζ)) 
by Lemma 4.8. Hence, π(ζ) is an element of β*[ε](π(ζ)). This shows that π(Τ) is a 
CKM-set of Γ. 
(b) Let 5 be an element of σ(Γ). We will show that 7r - 1(S) € σ ( Γ » . 
First we will show that π - 1 (5) is connected. Suppose that π - 1 (5) is not connected. 
Then we can write π - 1 (5) as the disjoint union of two non-empty compact sets 7\ 
and T2. Now it is straightforward to prove that 5 is the disjoint union of the two 
non-empty compact sets π(ΤΊ) and π(Γ2). This contradicts the connectedness of S. 
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Next, the perfection of all strategy profiles in π 1 (S) again follows from the fact that 
S is contained in the set of perfect equilibria of Γ and Theorem 6.3. 
Finally, the fact that π - 1 (S) is a CKM-set of Γ ρ can be seen as follows. Take a 
sequence (ек)кеш of completely mixed perturbations of Гр converging to zero. We 
will prove that statement (3) of Lemma 4.2 holds for π - 1 (5). To this end, notice 
that π can be seen as a linear map from ]Т
г
Ж · to Π ι ^ - ^ ' · Furthermore, notice 
that for every y G A¿, ek{y) 6 Г И ^ ' · So, we can define the (completely mixed) 
perturbation Sk of Г by taking for every χ 6 AM, 
¿*(*) :=π(ε*( ϊ ) ) . 
Then, by the continuity of π, we know that the sequence (<5fc)kgiN converges to zero. 
Now S is a CKM-set of Γ, so by Lemma 4.2 (3), Snlimsupfix(/J*[<5*]) is non-empty. 
к 
Say this set contains ζ G AM- Then clearly ζ G π - 1 (S). We will show that ζ G 
limsupfix(/r[e*]). 
к 
Since г G limsupfix^*^*]), we may assume w.l.o.g. that there is a sequence (zk)kçin 
к 
in AM converging to ζ with zk G ß'[Sk](zk) for each Λ € IN. Then, for each fc G IN, 
we can take a strategy profile xk in AM with xk G ß[6k](zk) that is payoff-equivalent 
with zk. Define the strategy profile xk G Δ χ, by 
_k_(4(zk) if/e if, 
Xtl
 '~ I *5 - E
m 6 *. 4η(ζ*)(ρΓ)< if ι e Mt. 
(i) First we will show that xk G A(ek(zk)). Take a player i G N. It is straightforward 
to show that that the coordinates of xk sum up to 1. Furthermore, for I G Kt, 
x
k
t = e
k
l(zk) > 0. If on the other hand l G M, then, using the fact that xkt > Skl(zk), 
we get 
*5 = 4 - Σ г*
т
(2*)(рГ)і 
те/С. 
> # ( * * ) - Σ е™(2*)(РИ« = т1(е*(2*)0і- Σ 4„(2*)(РГ)< 
= εί,(ζ*)+ Σ efm^ÍPr1)» - Σ ef
m
(2*)(pni>0. 
me/f, meif. 
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(ii) Secondly, we will show that xk e ß[ek](zk). Take a strategy profile y e Δ(ε*(ζ*)). 
Then it is straightforward to show that я(у) e Δ(ί*(ζ*)). Furthermore, notice that 
7r(i*) = χ*. Then, using the fact that π preserves payoffs we get for a player i £ N, 
vt{xk) = ut{ir(xk)) = ut(xk) > u,(i* ,| π,(νί)) = ν,(2* ,| у,). 
Hence, χ* G ß[ek](P). 
(ii) Finally, again using the fact that n(xk) = xk, we notice that x* is payoff-equivalent 
with zk by Remark 3.1. This shows that z* € ß*[ek]{zk). Now the proof is complete 
since ζk —> z. < 
Now take a game Γ. Note that minimal CKM-sets of Γ exist by Theorem 4.5, and 
that, by Theorem 4.6 and 4.7, each minimal CKM-set of Γ is connected and consists 
of perfect equilibria only. Hence, any minimal CKM-set of Γ is an element of σ(Γ). 
This leads to the final objective of this chapter. 
Theorem 4.11 The solution concept оскм has the following properties 
(1) О-САГМ(Г) is non-empty. 
(2) every element of аскм (Г) is connected 
(3) every element of аскм(Г) ώ contained in ΡΕ(Γ) 
(4) every element of аскм(Г) contains a proper equilibrium. 
(5) if S is an element of аскм(Г) ina Г' is the game induced by the deletion of 
a pure strategy m of player j with m is not an admissible best reply against 
S, then S' := {χ Ε Δ ' | χ € S} contains an element of оскм^Х') 
(6) the solution оскм is invariant. 
Proof. Only (5) requires proof. By Theorem 4.7, S Π Ρ Ε (Γ) is a CKM-set of Γ. 
So, p(Sr\PE(T)) is a CKM-set of Γ' by Theorem 4.9. Furthermore, since m is not an 
admissible best reply against S, we know that x]m = 0 for every χ e Sf~\PE(T). This 
implies that p(S П PE(T)) С S'. Then S' must also be a CKM-set of Г' by Theorem 
4.9. Therefore, by the proof of Theorem 4.5, it contains a minimal CKM-set of Г'. 
This minimal CKM-set is automatically an element of σ(Γ'). < 
Chapter 5 
From Mertens to Hillas 
The main concern in this chapter is to prove that every stable set in the sense of 
Mertens is an Η-set. The proof of this result consists of three partial results. First 
it is shown that every stable set in the sense of Mertens is a CKM-stable set. In the 
second part of this chapter a new, at first sight somewhat odd, stability concept called 
CT-stability is introduced. Then it is proved that CKM-stability and CT-stability 
are equal. Finally the equality of CT-stability and Η-stability is proved. 
At this point it has to be pointed out that some of the definitions of the various 
stability concepts occurring in this chapter are slightly different from the ones that 
are familiar to the reader. First of all, the notion of homotopy-stability is used instead 
of homology-stability in the case of stability in the sense of Mertens. It will be argued 
in the next section that this does not harm the conclusion stated above. Secondly, 
CKM-stability in this chapter is defined using the best reply correspondence β[ε], not 
(as in the previous chapter) by the use of the saturated best reply correspondence 
β* [ε]. The definition of Η-stability can be found in section 2.3.8 of this dissertation. 
The results in this chapter are based on work of Hillas and Vermeulen and Vermeulen, 
Potters and Jansen. 
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5.1 Every homotopy-stable set is CKM-stable 
In order to explain the use of homotopy-stability in this chapter, we refer to the 
following phrases: in Mertens (1989), the author writes: 
"the reader who wants to understand the thing (i.e. the definition of stability) 
in the easiest and most intuitive framework can just think in terms of integer 
coefficients - in which case the definition amounts to the elementary definition 
that the projection be of non-zero degree." 
Further on in that paper he writes: 
"Finally in (E) we show how the most encompassing definition -that involv-
ing the union over all possible coefficient modules- has a direct geometrical 
definition (...) The geometric definition involves an essentiality condition — 
that the projection should not be null homotopic — and a dimensional re-
striction — that this should remain true when restricted to some subset of the 
equilibrium graph of the same dimension as the space of perturbed games." 
Especially the second remark shows that if a set is stable under any of the types 
of implementation of stability proposed by Mertens, then it is certainly homotopy-
stable. This observation justifies the use of homotopy-stability in this case. The inter-
ested reader may compare the definition of Mertens with the definition of homotopy-
stability and construct a proof of the previous statement using e.g. Theorem 19.3 of 
Munkres (1984). 
5.1.1 HOMOTOPY STABILITY 
In this section we will introduce the notion of homotopy-stability. The definition of 
this type of stability can also be found in a recent report by Hillas (1994). 
Let /C be the set of KM-perturbations defined in chapter 2. The graph of the equi-
librium correspondence over KM-perturbations is the set £ С /С χ Δ defined by 
ε·.= {(ζ,χ)£ΐ€χΑ\χΕΕ(Γ[ζ})}. 
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The canonical projections from Κ. χ Δ onto K,. and Δ are denoted by ρκ. and рд, 
respectively. 
For η > О, /С" := {С G К | ЦСЦоо < η}· Note that 1С1 is a hypercube in K. Its 
vertices are those KM-perturbations whose coordinates are equal to either 0 or η. 
Furthermore, 3Κη := {С 6 Κη \ ζ,τη = 0,η for some г G TV, m G Mi} is the boundary 
of/С" (cf. section 10.1). 
Let 5 be a closed subset of E. For η > 0, 
S" := {(ζ,χ) G S К € /С"} (i.e. S n ^ 1 ^ " ) ) 
is the part of S above ]CV and 
Ô^S" := {{ζ,χ) e S" \ ζ e ЭК?) (i.e. 5 Π p ^ 1 (0ДС)) 
is the part of S above dK,v. Usually d
v
Sv is called the vertical boundary of Sv. 
The restriction ρη:3η -*• /С of р/с to S 4 is called relatively null-homotopic if there 
exists a continuous function HV:SV x [0,1] -» /C such that 
(1) Я"(С,х,0) =p"(C,x) for all (ζ,χ) € 5", 
(2) Я"(С,х,1) € <Ж" for all (С,χ) G 5 " and 
(3) Η*(ζ,χ,ί) G 9 £ " for ail t G [0,1] and ail (ζ,χ) G U S " . 
The function Ηη is called a homotopy for p 4 . Я 1 1 transforms p 4 in a continuous way 
into a function that only takes values in the boundary 9/C of /C, while the image 
of the vertical boundary d
u
Sv of Sv remains within the boundary 9/C of ÌCV during 
this transformation. 
The canonical projection ρκ. to 1С is called locally null-homotopic on S if there exists 
a number щ > 0 such that ρη is relatively null-homotopic for all η < η0. 
For a closed set S С S, let έη be the set S 4 \ 3
ν
3η. This is the set of points (ζ, χ) in 
Sv for which ζ is completely mixed and £¿m < η for all г and m. 
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Let S be the collection of all non-empty, closed sets 5 such that for all η > 0, S 4 is 
connected and 5 " = с1(5"). 
Definition 5.1 A closed set Τ с Е(Г) is called homotopy-stable if there exists a 
set 5 G S such that 
(1) T = {XEA Ι ( 0 , х ) € 5 } and 
(2) р/с is not locally null-homotopic on S. 
Comments. The requirement that S should be an element of S is not a nessecary 
condition for this type of stability. It is merely a way to make sure that Г is not too 
big. For instance, if we would drop this requirement then the union of a homotopy-
stable set Τ С Δ with an arbitrary closed set T' С Δ whose intersection with Τ 
is empty would also be homotopy-stable. As we will show in the next section, the 
extra conditions on S guarantee that (1) a homotopy-stable set Τ is connected, and 
therefore contained in one of the components of the set of Nash equilibria of Γ and 
(2) Τ only contains perfect equilibria since Sv purely consists of 77-perfect equilibria. 
5.1.2 THE MAIN RESULT 
Now we can prove the first result on the way from Mertens to Hillas. Recall that in 
this chapter CKM-stability and аскм refer to the stability concept generated by the 
use of β[ε], not β*[ε]. 
Theorem 5.1 If Τ is a homotopy-stable set of the game Γ, then Τ € о~скм(£)· 
Proof. Take a homotopy-stable set Τ С Δ. Then, according to Definition 5.1, there 
is a set S e S with Τ = {χ e Δ | (0, χ) e S}. 
Following the "new" definition of аскм (i-e. using β[ε] instead of β*[έ\) we have 
to prove (a) that Γ is a subset of ΡΕ(Γ), (b) that Τ is connected and (c) that for 
every neighborhood V of Γ there is an η > 0 such that for every completely mixed 
CKM-perturbation ε with | |ε| | < η we have that ίίχ(/3[ε]) П V is non-empty. 
(a) First we will show that Г С PE(T). Take χ € T. Then (0,x) £ S. So, because 
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S G S, there is a sequence (С*,х*)кепч in S converging to (0,x) with ζ1* completely 
mixed for all k. Then xk G A(£fc) is completely mixed. Furthermore, (ζ*, xk) G S С £. 
So, xk G E(T[Ck]). Then for every m G M, that is not a pure best reply to x*
 t we 
have xk
m
 = C,k
m
 < ||Cfc||oo by Lemma 2.3. So, xk is a HC^Uoo-perfect equilibrium. 
Finally, ||Cfclloo -> 0 since ζ* -> 0. Hence, χ is a perfect equilibrium of Γ. 
(b) Secondly, we will show that Γ is connected. Suppose that Τ is not connected. We 
will derive a contradiction with the connectedness of Sv for small η. 
If the compact set Τ С Δ is disconnected, it is the disjoint union of two non-empty 
compact sets ΤΊ and Γ2. Then we can find two disjoint open sets Vi Э ΤΊ and V2 D T¡. 
Consider the sets Wi := K. x Vi and W2 := К x V2. 
Suppose for all η > 0 that Sv is not contained in W\ U W2. Then there is a sequence 
(Cfcilfc)fceiN in S with ζ* -• 0 and (£fc,xfc) 0 Wj U W2. Since Δ is compact, we can 
choose this sequence to be such that xk -> χ for some χ e Δ. However, 5 is closed 
and (Cfc,xfc) e 5 for all k. So, (0, x) G 5, which implies that x G Γ = Τ
λ
υΤ2. Assume 
w.l.o.g. that χ G Tj. Then x* e Vi for large k. Hence, ((k,xk) G Wi for large k. 
Contradiction. 
So, we can take a number η > 0 such that S7* cWiö W2. Define for г = 1,2, 
Snt := 5" Π Wt = {(ζ,χ) G 5*Ί x G К}· 
First note that S"1 is the disjoint union of S? and S? since 5 4 С 5 " С Wi U W2 and 
Жі and W2 are disjoint. 
Secondly, for г = 1,2, S? = S 4 П W, and W, = /C x
 г
 is an open set in A! χ Δ. So, 
both Si and S2 are open in 5
Ч
. 
Finally, since T\ is non-empty, we can take a strategy profile x G Γι. Then (0, ι ) e S ' . 
Furthermore, Sv = cl(5'?) since 5 G S. So there is a sequence (£fc,xfe)fc
e
fj in 5 " that 
converges to (0, x). Now the fact that x G Γι implies that xk G Vj for large k. So, 
(C*,xft) G W\ Π 5 Ч = 5i for large A;. This shows that £>Ί is non-empty. By a similar 
argument, S2 is non-empty. 
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This shows that Sv is the disjoint union of two open and non-empty sets SJ7 and 5^ 
which contradicts the connectedness of Sv. Hence, Τ must be connected. 
(c) Finally we will prove that Γ is a CKM-set (using β[ε) instead οΐ β*[ε]). We shall 
derive a contradiction from the assumption that Τ is not a CKM-set. 
Suppose that Τ is not a CKM-set. Then there exists a neighborhood V of Τ such 
that for all η > 0 there is a completely mixed CKM-perturbation ε with | |ε| | < η and 
fix(/3[e]) Π V is empty. 
Choose such a neighborhood V of T. Then an argument similar to the one we used 
in (b) yields a number η0 > 0 with S7*0 С ICxV. Take a number η € (0,η0). Let ε be 
a completely mixed CKM-perturbation such that | |ε| | < η and ηχ(/3[ε]) Π V is empty. 
We will show that ρη is relatively null-homotopic. So we have to find a homotopy Ηη 
for ρη. Take a fixed (ζ,χ) £ 5" . 
Claim 1. ε(χ) φ ζ. 
Suppose that ε(χ) = ζ. Then on one hand, we know that χ £ Ε(Γ[£]) = Ε(Γ[ε(χ)]). 
So, χ is a best reply to itself in the KM-perturbation ε(χ). Hence, χ £ β[ε](χ) and χ 
is a fixed point of β[ε]. 
On the other hand, we know that S ^ c S ^ c K x V. So, PA(SV) is a subset of V. 
Then, (ζ,χ) £ Sv implies that χ = ρ&(ζ,χ) € V. Combined, these two remarks show 
that χ is an element of ηχ(/3[ε]) Π V. This however was the empty set. Contradiction. 
We will now use claim 1 to construct a function pv:Sv —>• dlC with the property that 
ρ
η
 equals p 4 on d
v
Sn. 
By claim 1 we know that ε(χ) φ ζ. Furthermore, it is easy to see that ε(χ) € Κη\δΚη, 
since ε is completely mixed and ||ε(ι)||οο < | |ε| | < η. Therefore there is a unique 
number β(ζ, χ) G [0, оо) such that С + S(C> χ){ζ ~ είχ)) i s axi element of дКР. 
So, we can define ρη: 5" -^ дКЛ by taking for all (C,a;) € S", 
ρ
τ>(ζ,χ):=ζ +
 8(ζ,χ)(ζ-ε(χ)). 
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Claim 2. The function ρη is continuous. 
It is clearly sufficient to show that 5:5'' -* [0, oo) defined by s:(C,x) ·-*· s(Ç,x) is 
continuous. To show this, take a sequence (£*, х*)*еи in iS4 converging to (ζ, ι ) £ S 4 . 
To show: (s(Cfc,x*))fc€iN converges to s(£,x). 
First of all we note that there exists a number μ > 0 with | |ζ* - e(xfc)||oo > μ. If 
this is not the case, then we can find a subsequence ((a^m\xa^)meiN with | |£ a ( m ) — 
ε(χα^ )||οο < i . This would imply \\ζ - ε(χ)||«, = 0. Then ζ = e(x), which is 
impossible by claim 1. 
Secondly, we can calculate that 
s(Ck,xk)Kk - е(хк)\\
х
 = \\р»(Ск,хк) - C*||cc < ||рч(С*,**)||оо + HC'IL < 2η. 
Then from the above inequality | |£* -ε(χ*)| |οο > μ we get s(Ck,xk) < 2ημ_1 and the 
sequence (s(Ck,xk))kçiN is bounded. 
Now take a cluster point t > 0 of the bounded sequence (s(C*,sfc))fceiN· Then there 
is a subsequence (s(CQ(m),ze(m)))meiN converging to t. So, (0 ч (С а ( т ) ,а : а ( п , ) )тею 
converges to ζ + ί(ζ — e(x)). Furthermore, since ρη(ζα(·πι\χα^) e ö/C for every m 
and дІС is closed, we know that ζ + ί(ζ — ε(χ)) 6 9JC. However, s(C,x) is the unique 
number s > 0 for which ζ + β(ζ — ε(χ)) ε ô/C4. Hence, t must be equal to s(£,x). 
This proves claim 2. 
Finally we define the function Я " : 5 4 χ [0,1] -4 /С" by 
Я"(С,і,0 := V(C,z) + (1 - t)p"(C,x). 
Left to show: Hv is a homotopy for ρη. Clearly, Ηη is continuous since ρη is continuous 
by claim 2. So we only have to check the three requirements from the definition of 
homotopy. It is simple to check the first requirement. The second requirement follows 
from the facts that Ηη{ζ, χ, 1) = ρη(ζ,χ) and that ρη only takes values in ¿MC. 
The third requirement can be checked as follows. Take some t G [0,1] and some 
(C,x) 6 dvSv. Then ζ is an element of ¿MC. So, 0 is the unique number s > 0 for 
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which С + s(C - ε{ζ)) is an element of dlC. Therefore, s(C, x) = 0 and ρη(ζ, χ) := ζ + 
3(ζ,χ)(ζ-ε(χ)) = ζ- Hence, Η"(ζ,χ,ί) := íp"(C,x) + ( l- í)p"(C,x) = *С+(1-*)С = С 
is an element of dKv. < 
5.2 (C)T-perturbations 
In section 4.3 it was argued that every Η-set is a CKM-set. Although we used the 
definition of CKM-sets involving β*[ε] in that section, the same arguments hold for the 
definition involving β[ε]. In the next sections we will show that the converse statement 
is also true. First we will introduce a new (somewhat awkward) type of perturbations, 
called CT-perturbations, in this section. They will function as a stepping stone: in 
subsequent sections it will be shown that every CKM-set is a CT-set and that every 
CT-set is an Η-set. Combined these two facts give the result desired. 
Let Γ = (M, и) be a fixed η-person normal form game. We will assume that there 
are at least two players (i.e. η > 2) and that every player has at least two strategies 
(i.e. for all i 6 Ν, \М
г
\ > 2). As a result of these assumptions we know that, when 
we define D := X),
e J V | M | , we have the inequalities 
D<\M\ and max|M,| < \M\. 
1 
Notice that the games excluded by these assumptions are either very simple games 
(n = 1) or can easily be reduced to a games that are not excluded by the assumptions 
(by eliminating players with only one pure strategy). 
π 
For notational convenience, elements of M := FJ M, will be written as к = (к
г
)
іе
м 
t = l 
and m = (m,),gjv. 
Definition 5.2 A Τ-perturbation is a function r: Μ -> Δ. The collection Δ Μ of 
T-perturbations is denoted by T- For t G Τ, U(t) := ch{t(m) | m e M} is the 
r-perturbed strategy space. For t £ Τ and χ € Δ, 
ß{t,x) := ch{í(m) | m e PB(x)} 
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is the set of i-perturbed best replies to x. Note that ß{t,x) is not the collection 
of points in Π(ί) where the payoff vector induced by χ € Δ attains its maximum. 
Furthermore, we define for all t,t' e Τ, 
d{t, t') := max{||i(m) - i'(m)||oo | m G M}. 
It can easily be checked that d is a metric on T. Next, we define ω e Τ by 
w(m) := (e|™')tew for all m = (m¿)t€;v € M. 
Note that for all χ £ Δ, ß(w, χ) = β{χ). So, if we view Τ as a space of perturbations 
for Γ, then w € Τ can be identified with the original game Γ. Therefore, a T-
perturbation t 6 Τ is considered t o be small if d(t, w) is small. 
Example 5.1 In this example we will try to give a first impression of the intuition 
behind this definition. Suppose that we have a game Γ with two players. Suppose 
further that each player has two pure strategies, say Mi = M^ = {1,2}. Then 
M = {(1,1)(1,2)(2,1)(2,2)}. Furthermore, the space Δ = Δ 2 x Δ 2 of strategy pairs 
is the convex hull of the pure strategy pairs w(l, 1) = (ei,ei), w(l,2) = (еі,ег), 
w(2,1) = (e 2,ei) and w(2,2) = (e 2,e 2) as indicated in the picture below. The 
strategy space of the first player is depicted on the horizontal axis, the vertical axis 
represents the strategy space of player two. 
Δ 
Δ(0 - . 
Π(ί) 
( e i , e2) (ß2 e 2 ) 
(еьеі) 
i(2,l) 
(ег.еі) 
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For a KM-perturbation ζ = (СъСг) of the game Г, the ^-perturbed strategy space 
Δ(£) is represented by the smaller rectangle. Notice that this space still has a product 
structure w.r.t. the players since it is the product of the spaces Δχ(ζι) and Δ 2 (£ 2 ) · 
Now take a T-perturbation t e Τ of the game Γ. In this two-person example, the T-
perturbation t is a function that assigns a point in Δ to each of the four pure strategy 
pairs (1,1), (2,1), (2,2) and (1,2). The point t(2,1) is indicated in the picture. The 
perturbed strategy space Π(ί) С Δ, indicated by the fat lines, is the convex hull of the 
points t ( l , l ) , ¿(2,1), ¿(2,2) and ¿(1,2). Notice that the Hausdorff distance between 
Δ and Π(ί) is small whenever d(t, w) is small. Further notice that Π(ί) does not need 
to have a product structure w.r.t. the players. 
In order to give an impression of the structure of the i-perturbed best replies, suppose 
that we have a strategy pair χ = (χχ,χ2) in Δ and ΡΒχ{χ2) — {2}, ΡΒ2(χι) = {1,2}. 
Then β(χ) is the convex hull of the strategy pairs w(2,1) = (e2,ei) and ги(2,2) = 
(e2,e2) while ß(t,x) is the convex hull of i(2,l) and i(2,2). 
(ei,e2) (e2,e2) 
Δ 
ГОД 
(ei,ei) (e2,ei) 
In this example it can clearly be seen that the set of i-perturbed best replies ß(t, χ) 
need not be parallel to the set of unperturbed best replies β(χ), contrary to the 
situation for the set β{ζ,χ) of ^-perturbed best replies for a KM-perturbation ζ. < 
ß(t,x) 
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Definition 5.3 A CT-perturbation is a continuous function r: Δ —¥ T. The per­
turbed best reply correspondence β[τ]: Α-»Δ is defined by, for all χ € Δ, 
β[τ](χ) := ß(r(x),x). 
A strategy profile χ G Δ is called a fixed point of β[τ] if χ e /?[τ](χ). The collection 
of fixed points of β[τ] is denoted by fix(/3[r]). 
Obviously, the CT-perturbation ω:Δ—»Δ defined by u>(x) := w for all χ € Δ can 
be identified with Γ. So, a CT-perturbation r is considered to be small if | | τ | | := 
max d(r (x), w) is small. This naturally leads to 
X 
Definition 5.4 A closed, non-empty set 5 С Δ is called a СТ-seí if for every open 
neighborhood V oí S there exists a number η > 0 such that fix(/3[r]) Π V is non-empty 
whenever | | r | | < η. 
After these preparations we come to the main goal of sections 5.3 till 5.7, which is to 
show that every CKM-set (in the "new" sense, involving β[ε] instead of β*[ε\) is also 
an Η-set. We already observed that every Η-set is also a CKM-set in the new sense. 
The proof of the converse statement will be given in two steps. First it is shown that 
every CKM-set is a CT-set. Then we will show that every CT-set is an H-set. 
Outl ine of t h e first s tep. The heart of this step is the constuction of a CKM-
perturbation ε for each sufficiently small CT-perturbation τ such that | |ε| | < 2<ί(τ,ω) 
and fix(/3[e]) С fix(/3[r]). In section 5.6 it is shown how this construction leads to the 
result desired. 
Given a small CT-perturbation r, the construction of the CKM-perturbation ε uses 
a continuous function ζ: Τ* x Δ -> /С, where Τ* is a neighborhood of w € Τ in which 
the T-perturbations are well-behaved (considering our purposes) and К is the space 
of KM-perturbations. T* is defined and investigated in section 5.3. 
In fact, given a CT-perturbation r, we will define the corresponding perturbation ε 
in section 5.5 by ε(χ) := С(т(х),х). It is clear from this definition that ζ has to 
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have certain nice properties for our purposes. These properties will be described and 
proved in section 5.5. 
The construction of ζ is subdivided in two steps. First ζ is defined on the space 
Ζ С Τ* x Δ of points (t, χ) with χ € dU(t). Then ζ is extended to the whole space 
Τ* χ Δ. The properties of Ζ needed in the proof axe elaborated in section 5.4. 
5.3 The definition of T* and a property 
In order to prove that CKM-stability implies CT-stability, we will use the fact that 
sufficiently small T-perturbations are fairly well-behaved. As a formalization of this 
we will introduce a neighborhood T* of w in Τ in this section and prove a property 
of the elements of this neighborhood. 
The set T* is defined as the collection of T-perturbations t GT with 
d(t,w) < minilMI^D-^IMr1}, 
wherein D := Σ "
=
ι |Λί,|. It is easy to see that T* is a neighborhood of w in T. 
Define i e Δ by ztm := | M t | - 1 . Clearly, z = J2m€M |M| -1u>(m). Define the fixed 
KM-perturbation ξ 6 К, by £,
m
 = | M | _ 1 . It is straightforward to check that Δ (ξ) is 
full-dimensional and i £ Δ(£). 
Lemma 5.1 Let t € T*. Then Δ(ξ) С Π(ί). 
Proof. Suppose that Δ(ξ) <£ Π(ί). Take a strategy profile у € Δ(£) \ U(t). Let χ 
be the unique strategy profile in Π(ί) with ||x — у||г < | | i ' — у||г for all x' € Π(ί). 
Clearly, χ фу. So we can define г € Δ by 
z := у + \0(y — x) with λο := тах{Л > 0 | у + \(y — χ) G Δ}. 
Then ||z — уЦоо > |Л^І_ 1 since at least one of the coordinates of z equals zero, while 
the fact that y e Δ(ξ) implies that ytm > £ t m = | M | _ 1 for all г € ./V and m e M,. 
Now it is also clear that λ0 > 0 and we can calculate: 
IN - ill« = 11^(1 + Ao)(z - y)U = (i + λο1)!!* - y|U > IMI"1. 
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Furthermore, χ is also the unique point in Π(ί) with ||z - i | | 2 < ||г — х'Цг for all 
x' G Π(ί). So, for all x' G U(t), 
\\z - x'\\l > D-11|« - x'\\l > I»" 1 \\z - x\\l > D-i\\z - х\Ц > D~'\M\~\ 
This implies that ¿#(Π(ί),Δ) > D~i\M\~1. This however contradicts the fact that 
dtf(n(i),A) <d(t,w)<D-?\M\-1. < 
5.4 The boundary of U{t) 
The next (and very crucial) step in the proof is the investigation of the properties of 
the space Ζ of points (t,x) е Т ' х Д with x G 9Π(ί). This space will function as 
the base for the definition of ζ in the next section. We start with some preliminary 
definitions and results. 
For t € Τ*, the boundary dU(t) of Π(ί) is the collection of strategy profiles χ e Π(ΐ) 
with the property that every neighborhood U of χ has a non-empty intersection with 
ah(n(i)) \ Π(ί) (cf. section 10.1). 
Notice that for every t € T* we have that Δ(£) С Π(ί) by Lemma 5.1 and that Δ(£) 
is full-dimensional in Δ. So, the affine hull ah(II(<)) of Π(ί) is simply 
ah(A) = {z e J | IRM· | ^ z
m
 = 1 for all г € І }. 
Now take a pair (t, x) € T* x Δ with χ £ Π(ί). Using the terminology of section 10.1, 
a vector ν G Υ\
τ
€
Ν
 HlM ' is said to support U(t) in χ if for all y £ Π(ί) 
{υ,χ) < (ν,y), 
while the inequality is strict for at least one y G Π (f). 
Now, for a T-perturbation t G Τ* and a strategy profile x G 9Π(ί), the supporting 
hyperplane theorem (Theorem 10.1) states that there exists a vector υ G ГЬелг ^ M ' 
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that supports Π(ί) in x. We will first show that in this special case there is always a 
supporting vector ν with some additional property, called regularity. 
Definition 5.5 A vector η G Π
ι
€
Ν
 Н
М
' is called regular if 
(i) Unii» = ι 
(2) for all ieN, Σ ntm = 0. 
тем. 
L e m m a 5.2 Let χ be a strategy profile in dU.(t). Then there is a regular vector η 
that supports H(t) in x. 
Proof. Take a strategy profile χ G 9Π(ί). Then Theorem 10.1 (the supporting 
hyperplane theorem) yields a vector ν G Π ^ ' w i * n f° r all г/ G Π(ί), 
«eiN 
(υ,χ) < (v,y), 
while the inequality is strict for at least one y. However, this vector υ need not be 
regular. We will now construct a regular vector η that supports Π(ί) in x. For a fixed 
player j G N, define <9 G П.еіч ^ ' ЬУ 
(c'jtm : = < 
10 іііфі-
Define υ' := υ — \>cP, where Χ3 := ΣιεΜ vji- Since for all y G Δ, (e7,y) = | M j | _ 1 , 
we can easily deduce that for all y G Π(ί), 
(ν',χ) < (ν',y), 
while the inequality is strict for at least one y. Moreover, we have 
Σ4'= Σν*-χ3 Σ № = Σβ*- λ , = °· 
іем, i€M, іем, /ем, 
while for each i φ j , Σΐς-м νΊι = Хлем υ«'· Therefore, if we repeate this procedure 
for each player j get a vector v* with for all y G Π (f), 
(v\x)<(v*,y), 
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while the inequality is strict for at least one y, and $2fgM v]i = 0 f° r ^ players j . In 
particular, υ* is non-zero, because of the strict inequality for at least one y. Hence, 
n : = || *||те 'v* satisfies all properties desired. < 
First of all, we will use this result to prove that the graph of the boundary correspon­
dence is closed. 
Definition 5.6 The graph of the correspondence 11-> dU(t) over T* is defined by 
Z:={(t,x)£V χ Δ \x£dU(t)}. 
T h e o r e m 5.2 Ζ is a closed subset ofT* x Δ. 
Proof. Take a sequence (ί',χ')ίεΐΝ in Ζ that converges to (t,x). We will prove that 
(t, χ) £ Ζ. First of all, notice that xl £ Π(ί') for all /. Then the continuity of the 
correspondence t •-»• Π(ΐ) guarantees that χ £ Π(ί). 
Now take η > 0 and define Β
η
 :— {у £ аЬ(Д) | Ці-уЦоо < η}- The proof is complete 
if we can show that there is a strategy profile у £ Β
η
 that is not contained in Π(ί). 
By Lemma 5.2, there is a regular vector n' that supports Π(ί') in xl. Define the 
strategy profile yl £ ah(A) by yl := xl — \ηηι. 
(a) We will show that yl £ B
v
 for large /. Using the fact that n' is regular and 
Definition 5.5 (1), we can calculate that ||x' - yl\\oo = j^ll^'lloo = \Ή· Furthermore, 
| |я - z'Hoo - I7? *°г l a r g e ' because xl -> χ as / -> со. So, | | i — у'Цоо < Ή f° r large I 
because of the triangle inequality. Hence, yl £ Β
η
 for large /. 
(b) We will show that yl is not contained in Π(ί) for large /. Take a strategy profile 
ζ £ Π(ί')· The calculation 
\\z - yl\\l = \\z -xl + è V l l l = \\z - ΑΙ + η(πι,ζ - χ') + ìq'lln'H» > \η2\\η1\\1 
shows that ||x' - y% (= | η | | η ' | | 2 ) < \\z - y%. So, for every ζ £ Π(ί'), 
II*-s ' i l«, > Ό-Цг -y% > D-i\\xl -y% > D-ï\\xl - г/Ц« > Ιχ?-*ι,. 
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This shows that ан(у1, Π(ί')) > \D ?η. Now the triangle inequality for the Hausdorff 
distance yields dH(yl,U^)) < dH(yl,U(t)) + dH{n(t),U(t1)). So, 
dH(yl,n(t)) > | £> - і т , - а я ( П ( 0 , П ( < ' ) ) . 
Then the fact that Tl(tl) dA Π(ί). shows that d
w
(y',II(i)) > 0 for large I. < 
Now, for a pair (¿,m) with г e TV and m G M,, consider the facet 
Δ - " 1 := {x € Δ | x
m
 = 0} 
of Δ. The set Δ-"™ is the set of strategy profiles where player i plays his pure strategy 
m with minimal weight. Furthermore, it is clear that 9Δ is the union of the sets Δ _ , τ η 
over all pairs (г, τη). For our purpose we need to have a similar decomposition of the 
boundary dU(t) of a T-perturbation t in sets where player г plays his strategy m with 
"small probability". We used the quotation marks to indicate that the analogy (in 
our formalization of this idea) with the unperturbed case is not completely correct. 
However, it is useful to keep the analogy in mind when the reader wants to get a good 
understanding of the techniques we use in the subsequent sections. 
Definition 5.7 For a pair (i,m) with г G N and m 6 M,, the subset G~im of Ζ 
is defined by 
Q-гт ._ {(tiX) g ζ I there is a regular vector η 
with n ,
m
 > γ—- that supports Π(ί) in x}. 
Notice that a set G~tm is in fact a subset of the graph of the correspondence t н+ dU(t). 
There are some technical reasons why we prefer to work in the product space Τ* χ Δ. 
However, it is useful for the understanding of this definition when one thinks of the 
set G-tm(t) := {x £ U(t) | (t,x) G G~tm} as the substitute of Δ " " " in Π(ί). In fact, 
this is not too far beside the truth; e.g., realize that G~tm(w) = A~tm and that a 
similar formula holds for every "KM-perturbation" in T*. 
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Theorem 5.3 For every pair (i,m), G~im is a non-empty and closed set. 
Proof. Take a fixed pair (j, k) with j £ N and к € M}. 
(a) First we will prove that G~]k is non-empty. Take a strategy profile χ € Δ - · 3 * . We 
will show that (w, x) € G~3k. To this end, note that χ is an element of 9 Δ = <Ш(ш). 
So, (it), x) Ç. Z. Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that the regular vector η 
defined by 
- \M\-I i f * = J ^ τη φ к 
"tro : = \ 1 if i = j and m = к 
.0 if i φ j . 
supports Δ in χ, and n0k = 1 > тщ- Hence, (w,x) e G~lk. 
(b) In order to prove that G~}k is closed, take a sequence (i',x')i
e
iN in G~jk with 
(i*,!1) ->· (i, x) as / -^ oo. We will prove that (t,x) € G~3k. 
Since for all / e IN we have ( ί ' , ι ' ) e G _ J * С Ζ, Theorem 5.2 implies that (t,x) € Z. 
So the proof is complete if we can show that there is a regular vector η with n3k > тщ 
that supports Π(ί) in x. 
Take regular vectors (п')г
е
і\ such that n' supports Π(ί') in xl and nljk > тщ- Assume 
w.l.o.g. that n' -> n. It is straightforward to prove that η is a regular vector with 
n}k > тщ- In order to prove that η supports Π(ί) in x, take a y e Π(ί). Since 
n(i ' ) -4 Π(£), there is a sequence (j/')ieiN that converges to у with y' e Π(ί') for all 
I. Since n' supports Π(ί') in x', we know that (nl,yl) > (nl,xl). Then the continuity 
of the inner product yields (n,y) > (n,x). < 
In analogy to the fact that dà. equals the union of the sets Δ - " " over all pairs (¿,m), 
we will prove 
Proposi t ion 5.1 {G~tm | г 6 N, m G M J covers Ζ. 
Proof. Take (ί,χ) e Ζ. Then χ 6 9Π(ί) by the definition of Ζ. So, there is a 
regular vector η that supports Π(ί) in χ by Lemma 5.2. 
We only have to prove that there is a pair (i,m) with n ,
m
 > щт. Since η is a regular 
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vector, we know that ИпЦ«, = 1 (cf. Definition 5.5 (1)). So, there is a pair (j,l) 
with |TIJ{| = 1. If Tiji = 1, we take (i,m) = (j,l). If n}i = —1, the assumption that 
nJtn < тщ for all m € M-, leads to 
Л п
зт
=п,і+ Σ njm <-1 + \M\IM\-
1
 = 0, 
тем, т€М,\{1) 
contradicting the assumption of Definition 5.5 (2) that £3meAi nJ"» = 0- H e n c e i al8 0 
in this case, there is a pair (i,m) with ntm > тщ. < 
We will now prove that, for a point (t, x) 6 G~%m, the strategy profile χ uses the pure 
strategy m of player г with "minimum weight" in Π(ί). However, since U(t) does in 
general not have a product structure w.r.t. the players, we cannot formalize this idea 
in the classical way. In fact we will prove that, if the strategy profile χ can be written 
as a positive convex combination of a collection {i(k) | к e К} of "í-perturbed pure 
strategy profiles" for some subset К of M, then there is no pure strategy profile к in 
К with k, = m. 
Definition 5.8 For a pair {i,m) with i ε N and m € M t, 
K~im := {к e M I к, φ m}. 
Theorem 5.4 Let (t,x) € G~tm. Suppose for a subset К of M that we can write 
the strategy profile χ as a positive convex combination of the collection of strategy 
profiles t(k) with keK. Then К С K~m. 
Proof. Take an m € M with m t = m. The theorem is proved if we can show that 
m£ K. So, suppose that m e К. We will derive a contradiction. 
Since (t, x) e G~im, there is a regular vector η with n ,
m
 > щ that supports Π(ί) in 
x. In particular, (n,x) < (n,y) for all у € Π(ΐ). 
(a) First we will show that for all у € Π(ί) we have 
(n,t(m)> < (n,y). 
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Suppose that there is a strategy profile y* G Π(ί) with (η, y*) < (n,í(m)). Then 
(η,ι) < (n,y*) < (n,t(m)). 
Furthermore, for all к £ ff, we have (η,χ) < (n,í(k)). Write χ = ^келг ^(k)t(k), 
with X(k) > 0 and Y^keK A(k) = 1. Then we can deduce that 
(n,rc> = £ X(k)(n,x) < Σ A(k)(n,í(k)> = (η, £ A(k)t(k)> = (η,χ). 
к£К келг keif 
Contradiction. Hence, (n,í(m)) < (η,у) for all у € Π(ί). 
(b) Next, we will show that there is a pure strategy profile к e M with 
(n, t (k))<(n, t(m)>. 
To this end, recall that n t m > jL·. Assume that for all l e Мг, пц > — щтт· Then 
we have 
Σ n„ = «,„,+ Σ п * г > щ-і м ій?р = 0 · 
І6М, іем,\{т} ' ' ' ' 
This contradicts the fact that Σ пгі — 0· Hence, there is a pure strategy k £ Mt 
l£Mx 
with n%k < — гщт· Define к e M by 
k,:= 
' m , if j φ i 
k ïî j = г. 
Then we can write 
(n , í (m)) - (n , í (k )> = ( n ) í ( m ) - i ( k ) > = Σ n j i (*(m)j i-*(k) j i) · 
We will derive an underestimation for each of the terms in this summation. 
(i) For the pair (i,k). First of all, we know that ntk < - щ р . Secondly, i(k)tjfe > 
l-d(t,w), since iu(k)tfc = 1 and | i(k) t f c -u;(k) t f c | < d(t,w). Thirdly, t(m), f c < d(t,w), 
since w(m)lk = 0 and |i(m)jfc — w(m)tfc| < d(t,w). Therefore, 
n .*( t (m) t t - i(k) t f c) > щ-{1 - 2d(t,w)). 
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(ii) For the pair (i,m). We know that n ,
m
 > щ . Furthermore, similar to (i), 
¿(k) tm < d(t,w) and i(m)lTO > 1 - d(t,w). Therefore, 
n , m ( i (m) t m - i(k) t m) > — ( 1 - 2d(t,w)). 
(iii) Forapair (j,l) φ (г,к),(i,m). We know that the numbers t(m)ji and i(k)jj both 
are elements of either the interval [0, d(t, w)] or the interval [1 - d(t, w), 1] (depending 
on whether ш(т).,і = w(k)jf = 0 or w(m)j¡ = u>(k).,j — 1, respectively). Therefore, 
\t(m)ji — Í(IC)JÍ | < d(t, w). So we get the inequality 
η]ΐ{Κ™))ΐ — *(k)ji) > -Κζ | | (*( ιη), ί - í(k)ji)| > -d(t,w). 
Now from the inequalities in (i), (ii) and (iii) and the assumption that D < \M\ 
(all players have at least two pure strategies) we can deduce that that the above 
summation is larger than or equal to 
-\M\d(t,w) + p l j ( l - 2d(t,w)) + щ{і - 2d(t,w)). 
Using the facts that d(t,w) < щ^· (since i £ Τ*) and \M\ > 3 (since there are at 
least two players, each having at least two pure strategies), it is easy to calculate that 
this number is larger than zero. Hence, (n,t(k)) < (n,t(m)). This contradicts the 
conclusion in (a). < 
Corollary 5.1 Let {t,x) e G~lm. Then x
m
 < d(t,w). 
Proof. Since χ e Π(ί), there is a subset К of M such that χ can be written as a 
positive convex combination χ = ]CkeÄ- A(k)í(k). Take a pure strategy profile к G К. 
By Theorem 5.4 we know that к, φ т. So, iu(k),
m
 = {e*')
m
 = 0. Then the fact that 
| i (k),
m
 — w(k)im\ < d(t,w) implies that i(k), m < d(t,w). Hence, 
*,m = Σ MkMk)>m < Σ Л ( к ) Ф ' w ) = d(*> w)- « 
keif k€K 
From Mertens to Hillas 
5.5 The construction of ( 
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In this section we will construct a continuous function ( : Τ ' χ Δ -> )C with the 
following properties: for all (i,x) e Τ* x Δ, 
(1) ||C(*,as)||oo <d(*,w) 
(2) if ι e Δ ( ζ ( ί , ι ) ) , then x G Π(ί). 
(3) if χ G Π(ί) and C{t,x)im = Xim, then (t,x) € G~tm. 
In the first place we specify the values of ζ on the subspace Ζ of Τ* χ Δ as follows. 
By Theorem 5.3, we know that G~tm is non-empty. So we can introduce the function 
C*: Ζ -> К defined by, for all (t,x) € Z, 
C*(i,a0.m := d(*,tu) Л [x i m - d f f ( ( i , i ) , G ~ t m ) ] + · 
Next we will extend the function ζ* defined on Ζ to a function ζ defined on the 
whole product space Τ* χ Δ. This extension is obtained as follows. To every (t, x) e 
Τ* x (Δ \ {i}) we will assign a point z(t, x) e Ζ. The value of ζ* in z(i, x) is then 
used to define the value of ζ in (f,x). Points (i, z) are treated separately. We will 
first explain the geometrical intuition behind the construction of this function z. 
Example 5.2 Consider the two-person game Γ from Example 5.1. The perturbed 
strategy space Δ (ξ) of the KM-perturbation ξ (defined in section 5.3) is represented by 
the smaller square. In its interior the strategy tuple (pair, in this case) z is indicated. 
(ei,e2) (ег,е2) 
Δ _ 
z(t,x) 
*(2,1) 
(ei.ei) (ег,еі) 
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Now take a point (t,x) e Τ* χ (Δ \ {ζ}). Since χ φ ζ, we can consider the half 
line with origin ζ through x, indicated by the line from i to ж in the picture. Since 
ζ e Α(ξ) С Π(ί) by Lemma 5.1, this half line intersects the boundary of Π(ί) in 
exactly one point. This point is defined to be z(t,x). The positive number \(t,χ), 
the unique number for which z(t,χ) = ζ + λ(ί,χ)(χ — i ) , will also be used in the 
definition of ζ. Clearly, λ(ί,χ) is the largest number λ for which i + λ(χ — ζ) is still 
an element of Π(ί). 
Finally, points (t, z) will be treated separately. In the definition of ζ for these points, 
we will use the fact that λ(ί, χ) is large when χ is close to z. In the picture it 
can easily be seen why, for any sequence (tk,xk)keTN in f * χ Δ \ {ζ}, we have that 
λ(ί*,χ*) -*• oo whenever x* -+ z. Take a fixed number Λ > 0. Since x* -¥ z, it is 
clear that ζ -4- Λ(χ* — ζ) is an element of Δ(£) for large к. So, z + Л(х* — ζ) will 
certainly be an element of Π(ί*) for large к, since Δ(£) С Π(ί*) for all к. Hence, 
X(tk,xk) > A for large A;. < 
The functions λ and z can thus be defined as follows. 
The function λ: Г* x (Δ \ {ζ}) -4 1R+ is defined by 
λ(ί, χ) := max{A > 0 | ζ + λ(χ - i ) e Π(ί)}. 
R e m a r k 5.1 We will show that λ(ί, x) > 0. First of all, notice that max¿ |M¿| < 
\M\ since, by assumption, there are at least two players, each player having at least 
two pure strategies. So, [0,1 - | M | - 1 max¿ |M¿|] is an interval. Take a (non-negative) 
number μ in this interval. Then 
¿im + M(x«m - Zim) > |M¿| - 1 - / i |M¿| - 1 
^ І М І Г
1
 - (1 - ІМГ1 maxIMiDIMil"1 > \Μ\^. 
І 
ч 
So, by Lemma 5.1, z + μ{χ - ζ) 6 Δ (ξ) С Π(ί). Hence, for all (ί, χ) e Τ* x (Δ \ {ζ}), 
λ(ί,χ) >μ> \Μ\~ι > 0 . 
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Now we can define z: T* x (Δ \ {i}) -)• Δ by 
z(t,x) := ζ + \(t,x)(x - z). 
Note that (t, z(t, x)) Ç. Ζ since z{t, x) € П(г) and that, for all μ > X(t, χ), ζ+μ(χ—ζ) € 
аЬ(Д)\П(г). 
L e m m a 5.3 Both λ and ζ are continuous and λ(ί ' ,χ ') -¥ oo whenever xl -> z. 
Proof. Since z(t, χ) := ζ + Α(ί, x)(x — ζ), the continuity of ζ is a direct consequence 
of the continuity of λ. To prove the continuity of λ, take a sequence (i',x')ieiN in 
T* x (Δ \ {¿}) converging to (t, x). 
(a) Assume that χ φ ζ. Then ||x' - i||oo > \||x - ¿||oo (> 0) for large /. So, for large 
/ we have 
1 > \\z(tl,xl) - z\\x = X(tl,xl)\\xl - ¿у«, > ±\(tl,xl)\\x - z\U 
Hence, {λ(ί',χ') | l G IN} is a bounded set. 
Take a subsequence \{tk,xk)kçiN converging to some (non-negative) number μ. We 
will show that μ = X(t, x). To this end, note that z(tk, x*)teiN converges to ζ+μ(χ—ζ). 
So, I + μ(χ — ζ) e Π(ί) and then λ(ί,χ) > μ. Now assume that λ(ί,χ) > μ. Then 
λ ( ί , χ ) - 1 μ e (0,1). So, the fact that we can write 
ζ + μ(χ - ζ) = λ(ί, χ ) _ 1 μ ζ ( ί > χ ) + (1 _ λ(ί, χ)~ιμ)ζ 
shows that ζ + μ(χ — ζ) is a positive convex combination of z(t, x) and z. Then, using 
Lemma 5.1, λ ( ί , χ ) _ 1 μ ζ ( ί , χ ) + (1 — λ( ί ,χ) _ 1 μ)Δ(ξ) is a neighborhood of ¿ + μ(χ — ζ) 
in Π(ί). Hence, (t,z + μ(χ — ζ)) $ Ζ. 
On the other hand, we know that (tk,z{tk,xk)) Ε Ζ for all k, that (tk,z(tk,xk))k^iN 
converges to (ί, ζ + μ(χ — i ) ) , and that Ζ is closed by Theorem 5.2. This implies that 
(t,ζ + μ(χ — ζ)) e Ζ. Contradiction. Hence, μ = λ(ί,χ). 
So, every convergent subsequence of \(t', x')jeiN converges to λ(ί, χ). Then the bound-
edness of {λ(ί',χ') | l e IN} guarantees the convergence of (A(í',x'))¿€iN to λ(ί,x). 
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(b) Assume that χ = ζ. Take a natural number I € IN. Since (tl,z(tl,x1)) e Ζ we 
know by Proposition 5.1 that there is a pair (i,m) such that ( ί ' ,ζ(ί ' ,χ ')) 6 G~tm. 
Then, using Corollary 5.1 and the fact that f' (Ε Τ*, we can deduce that z(tl,xl)tm < 
d(tl,w) < тща- Then we can also deduce that 
W\ ~ W - i t m ~ z( i',I,),m - ||г(*',хг) " г | | о° = AC·*')"*' - ¿n~· 
Hence, λ(ί ' ,χ ') > ( г щ - щ р ) • ||х' - іЦ" 1 and λ(ΐ ' ,χ') -• со as ι ' ->· i . < 
Now we can define ζ: Τ* x Δ —• 1С by 
[ ( λ ί ί , ι ί ^ Λ ί Κ ' ί ί , ζ ί ί , ι ) ) i f x ^ i Ç(t,i) := ^ 
l 0 if ι = ζ. 
In the next theorem we will prove that ζ is continuous and satisfies the properties 
mentioned at the start of this section. 
Theorem 5.5 The function ζ is continuous and satisfies properties (1) till (3). 
Proof. (0) Continuity. Take a sequence (ί',χ')ιεΐΝ in Τ* x Δ converging to (t,x). 
Assume that χ φ z. Then χ1 φ z for large Í. So, in this case, the continuity of ζ in 
(t, x) follows from the continuity of λ, ζ* and z in the point (t, x). If on the other 
hand χ = z, then we may assume that χ' φ z for all I. So, λ(ί ' ,χ') -¥ co by Lemma 
5.4. Now the fact that C* is bounded implies that 
C(i',x') := ( λ ( ί ' , χ ' ) - 1 Λ l)C(tl,z(tl,x1)) -> 0 =: C ( U ) = C{t,x). 
In order to prove the properties (1) till (3), take a fixed point (t,x) € Τ* χ Δ. 
(l) | |C(t,x)| |oo <d(t ,w) . 
If χ = z then | |ζ(ί,ι) | |οο = |IC(M)||oo = 0 < d{t,w). If χ φ z then the definitions of 
С and ζ* show that ||C(i,x)||oo < ||C*(*.*(*»*))lloo < d(t,w). 
(2) If χ € Δ(ζ(ί ,χ)), then χ e Π(ί). 
Assume that χ £ Π(ί). Then χ φ z by Lemma 5.1. We will show that χ $ Δ(ζ(ί,χ)). 
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(i) Take a number μ > 1. If ζ + μ(χ — ζ) e Π(ί), then χ can be written as the convex 
combination 
χ = μ~ι{ζ + μ(χ - ζ)) + (1 - μ _ 1 ) 2 , 
of the strategy profiles ζ and ζ + μ(χ — ζ) in Π(ί). Then χ would also be an element 
of Π(ί). Hence, ζ + μ{χ - i) £ Π(ί), so λ( ί , ι ) < 1. 
(Π) Furthermore, we know that (t, z(t,x)) € Ζ. So by Proposition 5.1 we can take a 
pair (i,m) such that (t,z(t,x)) e G~tm. Then, by Corollary 5.1, z ( i , i ) t m < d(t,w). 
Hence, we get 
C M . m = ( λ Μ Γ 1 Λ l)C(t,z(t,x))
m
 = C(t,z(t,x))tm 
= d(t,w) Λ [z{t,x)im - dH((t,z{t,x)),G-tm)}+ 
= d{t, w) Л z{t, х)
гт
 = z(t, x)im, 
where the conclusion λ(ί,χ) < 1 was used to get the second equality. Now the fact 
that z(t, x)im < d(t,w) also implies that z(t,x)tm < zim. So, 
xim = zim τ λ(ΐ,Χ) \Z[t,X)irn — Ztm) < Zlm. 
Then, using the fact that λ(ί , ι) < 1, we can calculate that 
(,{.t,X)i
m
 =
 Z(t, X)im = %im ~t" \* ~ ^\С,Х))\І1т — XlTn) -> 34m· 
Hence, χ $ Δ(ζ(ί,χ)). 
(3) If χ Ε Π(ί) and C(t,x)tm = xtm, then (t,x) e G~m. 
Suppose that χ ε Π(ί) and C(t,x)tm = x t m for some pair (i,m). We will prove that 
(t,x)eG-tm. 
(a) We will first show that \(t,x) = 1 and z(t,x) = x. Clearly, χ φ ¿, since ζ(ί, z)
xm
 = 
0 ,έ | М
г
| _ 1 = i i m . So λ(ί,χ) is defined. Furthermore, X(t,x) > 1 since χ G Π(ί). So, 
xim = ζ(ί,χ)ιτη = \(t,x)~1Ç*(t,z(t,x))im- Then we can calculate that 
C(t,z(t,x))tm < z{t,x)tm = ztm + X(t,x)(xtm - zim) 
= ztm + X{t,x)[\(t,x)-lC(t,z(t,x))tm -ztm] 
= (1 - λ( ί ,x))z i m + C ( i , z ( t , х ) ) г т , 
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where the inequality easily follows from the definition of ζ*. Now we have that 
(1 - A(t,x))i t m > 0, which shows that λ(ί,χ) < 1. So, X(t,x) = 1, and z(t,x) = 
z + λ(ί, x)(x — z) = z + ( ι — i) = x. 
(b)(i) Assume that xtm = 0. From (a) we know that z(t,x) = x. So, (t,x) = 
(t,z(t,x)) 6 Z. Then the vector η 6 Ц Н м ' defined by 
»елг 
—
 lAfJ-i if J = г and к φ m 
rijk : = s 1 if j = г and к = m 
.0 изФі 
is a regular vector that supports П(і) in x, and clearly n t m > тщ. Hence, (t,x) € 
G _ , m in this case. 
(b)(ii) Assume that х
гт
 > 0. Further, suppose that dtf((i,x),G~'m) > 0. We will 
derive a contradiction. On one hand, since (t,x) € Z, we can deduce that 
Хгт > [Хгт - dH((t,x),G-,m)]+ > d(t,w) Л [xtm - dH{{t,x),G-,m)]+ = C{t,x)im. 
On the other hand, we know that χ φ z. Furthermore, by (a), λ(ί,χ) = 1 and 
z(t,x) = x. Hence, since we assumed that xtm = C(t,x)tm, we get 
xtm = C{t,x)tm = (λ( ί ,χ)- 1 Λ l)C(t,z(t,x))m = C(t,z(t,x))m = C{t,x)im. 
Apparantly, the assumption that d¡{{(t,x),G~tm) > 0 leads to a contradiction. So, 
dH({t,x),G'im) = 0. Hence, (t,x) € G _ , m , since G~,m is closed by Theorem 5.3. < 
5.6 Every CKM-set is a CT-set 
Theorem 5.6 Let S be a CKM-set of the game Γ. Then S is also a CT-set of Γ. 
Proof. Suppose that S is a CKM-set of Γ. Let V be a neighborhood of S. Then there 
is a number μ > 0 such that ϋχ(/9[ε]) Π У is non-empty for every CKM-perturbation 
ε with | |ε| | < μ. 
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Take a CT-perturbation τ with d(r, ω) < μ and τ{χ) G Τ* for every χ € Δ. We will 
show that fix(/?[r]) Π V is non-empty. 
Consider the function ε: Δ -> £ defined by, for all ι € Δ, 
e(i) :=ζ(τ(χ),χ). 
By Theorem 5.5 (1) we know that for every χ e Δ, 
IKaOlloo = ІІС(т(х),я)||оо < d(T(i),iü) < ¿(τ, ω) < μ. 
Furthermore, ε is continuous because of the continuity of τ and, by Theorem 5.5, the 
continuity of ζ. Hence, ε is a CKM-perturbation with | |e| |T O < μ. So we can take a 
strategy profile y 6 fix(/?[e]) Π V. Clearly, y GV. We will show that y G βχ(/?[τ]). 
Since y € ίίχ(/3[ε]), at least we know that y e Δ(ε(2/)) = А(((т(у)),у)). So by 
Theorem 5.5 (2) we know that y € П(т(у)). So, there is a subset К oî M such that y 
can be written as a positive convex combination of the collection of strategy profiles 
т(у)(к) with k e i f . 
First we will show that К С PB(y). Suppose that (г, m) is a pair with m $ PBt(y-t). 
Since y e Е(Г[е(у)]), we know by Corollary 2.1 that ytm = etm{y) = C{r(y),y)im. 
So, by Theorem 5.5 (3), (т(у),у) € G~%m. Now Theorem 5.4 states that К С K~im. 
Since (¿,m) was an arbitrary pair with m £ РВ
г
(у^
г
), we get that 
КС f | K~m = PB{y). 
(z,m) mgPB,(y_.) 
So, 
у e ch(T(î/)(/0) С ch(T(y)(PB(y))). 
Hence, ye β (τ (y), y) = β[τ) (y). < 
5.7 Every CT-set is an H-set 
The techniques involved in the proof of this statement are similar to the techniques 
used in the proof of backward induction for CKM-sets (and for stable sets in the sense 
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of Mertens for that matter). Note that the theorem of Govindan (1995) is a direct 
consequence of this statement, together with the results of the previous sections of 
the chapter. 
First some preliminary results will be proved. Notice that especially Lemma 5.6 
highlights the usefulness of the (odd) choices of Τ and ß(t, χ). 
Lemma 5.4 Let χ be a strategy profile in Δ. Then there exists a number и > 0 
such that 
ß(t,y)cß(t,x) 
for all (t,y) G Τ x Δ with \\χ - уЦ«, < v. 
Proof. Take a strategy profile χ G Δ and a real number ν > 0 such that for all 
strategy profiles y G B„{x), 
PB(y) С РВ(х). 
Then for all t G Τ and у e B
v
(x), 
ß(t,y) := ch{í(m) | m G PB(y)} С ch{í(m) | m G PB{x)} =: ß(t,x). 
This concludes the proof. < 
Lemma 5.5 Let t° and t1 be elements ofT,a€. [0,1] and χ a strategy profile in 
Δ. Then ta := at1 + (1 - a)t° € Τ and 
ß(ta,x) С aß(t\x) + (1 - a)ß(t°,x). 
Proof. Clearly, ta G T. Take a strategy profile y G ß(ta,x). Then there are 
non-negative real numbers (Л(т))
т е
рв(з.) summing up to one such that 
y= £ А ( т ) Г ( т ) = Σ Чгп)[а^(т) + (1-а)^(т)] 
mÇPB(x) mgPfl( i ) 
= α Σ А ( т ) ^ ( т ) - | - ( 1 - а ) ^ *(m)i°(m). 
теРВ(х) теРВ(х) 
Finally, note that Y,m€PB(x) A(m)tJ(m) G β{Ρ,χ). for j = 0,1. < 
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Lemma 5.6 Let χ be a strategy profile in Δ and let С С A be non-empty, compact 
and convex. Then there is α Τ-perturbation t e Τ with ß(t, χ) С С and 
d(t,w)<dH(C,ß(x)). 
Proof. Let χ be a strategy profile in Δ and let С be a subset of Δ as described in the 
lemma. First note that the set of best replies β(χ) to χ equals ch{u>(m) | m 6 PB(x)}. 
So, by definition of Hausdorff distance, and the compactness of C, we can choose for 
each pure strategy profile m € PB (χ) a strategy profile y(m) € С with 
| M m ) - i/Cm)!!«, < d
w
(/?(z),(7). 
Define the T-perturbation t € Τ by 
f î/(m) if m 6 PB{x) 
t(m) := { 
[w(m) i f m ^ P B ( i ) . 
Then clearly d(t, w) = max{||i(m)-u;(in)||00 | m € M} < <ί#(/3(χ),(7). Furthermore, 
ß(t,x) = ch{í(m) I m G PB{x)} = ch{y(m) \ m G PB{x)} С С. 
The inclusion follows from the convexity of С and the fact that y(m) g С for all 
m e PB(x). < 
T h e o r e m 5.7 Every CT-set is an H-set. 
Proof. Suppose that 5 is a CT-set of Г. Let V be a closed neighborhood of S. 
Then there is a number η > 0 such that fix(/3[r]) Π V is non-empty for every CT-
perturbation with | | τ | | < η. Take a perturbation φ e Η with ά^ψ,β) < η. We will 
show that fix(y) Π V is non-empty. 
Take an arbitrary number 7 > 0. We construct the CT-perturbation r as follows. 
Choose for each χ £ A a number u{x) < 7 as in Lemma 5.4. Then {B
v
^
x
){x) \ χ £ Δ} 
is an open cover of the compact space Δ. So we can choose χ 1 , . . . , χ * such that 
B1 := Bl/^xi)(x1),... ,B" := Bv(x.^{xs) still covers Δ. Then by Lemma 4.4 there 
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is a partition of unity α 1 , . . . , α " subordinate to this finite cover of Δ. Notice that 
each ψ(χι>) is a non-empty compact and convex set. So, by Lemma 5.6 there is a 
T-perturbation tk G Τ with d(tk,w) < dH(<p{xk),ß(xk)) < ¿^(φ,β) and ß{tk,xk) С 
<p(xk). We define r: Δ —• Τ by 
T ( y ) : = ¿ Q * ( y ) t * . 
Since each afc is continuous, τ is a CT-perturbation. Furthermore, using the fact that 
a
1
,..., a
8
 is a partition of unity in the second and third equality and the triangle 
inequality in the first inequality, we get 
| |T | | = max{d(r(y),w) | y G Δ} 
= max{d(53a*(»)t*,53a*(tf)i i;) | y G Δ} 
fc=l * = i 
< тах(У2ak(y)d(tk,w) \ y € Δ} = maxídíí*,«;)} ^ά^φ,β) <η. 
' ^ к 
So, if we repeat this procedure for each element 7' of a sequence (7')igjN of positive 
real numbers converging to zero, we get a sequence (т')/
е
нч of CT-perturbations with 
«(I) 
and | | τ ' | | < η. So, for each I we can take a strategy profile yl £ fix(/3[r']) Π V by the 
choice of 77. We may assume w.l.o.g. that yl -* у as I ->• 00 for some y G A. Then 
y G V, since V is closed. We will show that y G ч>{у). 
Take an arbitrary real number μ > 0. Since у is upper semicontinuous in y, we can 
choose a real number ρ > 0 such that 
p(z) С Βμ(φ(ν)) for all ζ G ЗД). 
Take a natural number L with y1 G ß i p (y ) and У < \p whenever I > L. Take a 
fixed I > L and an index Jfe, 1 < к < s{l) with alk{yl) > 0. Then y1 G В
 {хч.){х1к) С 
By{xlk) (since i/(i'fc) < 7' < lp) . So, 
\Wk - Vila. < II*'* - »ΊΙ00 + II»1 - Vlloo < \P + \P = P-
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Hence, for every I > L and к, 1 < к < s(l) with alk(yl) > 0, 
ß(tlk,yl) С ß(tlk,xlk) С φ(χ1") С Βμ{ψ{ν)). 
The first inclusion holds because \\xlk — у1\\
ж
 < u(xlk) and Lemma 5.4. The second 
one follows from the construction of tlk and the third one follows from ||a;'fc — y||oo < Ρ 
and the choice of p. Now we can derive for I > L that 
yl e ß[r]{yl) = ß(r(yl),yl) 
.(I) 
= ß{ 5>'V)í'*,í/ ) С £ alk(yl)ß(tlk,yl) С Я„М»)). 
k=l к:а,1'(у,)>0 
The first inclusion follows from Lemma 5.5. The second one follows from the previous 
argument and the fact that Βμ{φ^)) is a convex set. 
So, у e с1(Бд(у>(у))). Now recall that μ > 0 was arbitrary. Therefore, у € cl(tp(y)). 
Hence, у € <p(y), since <p(j/) is closed. < 
This concludes the last step on our way from Mertens to Hillas. In section 5.1 we have 
shown that every stable set in the sense of Mertens is a CKM-stable set. In sections 
5.2 till 5.7 we have shown that every CKM-set is an Η-set. So, every stable set in 
the sense of Mertens is an Η-set (since every CKM-stable set is certainly a CKM-set). 
Hence, every stable set in the sense of Mertens contains an Η-stable set. 
The relations between various stability concepts are displayed in the diagram below. 
The definitions of F-stability used in the diagram (in both the sense of Kohlberg-
Mertcns and Hillas) do not occur in this dissertation. The definitions can be found 
in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Hillas (1990), respectively, under the name of 
full stability. The definition of CQ-sets is completely analogous to the definition 
of CKM-sets and CT-sets, using Q-perturbations insead of KM-perturbations or T-
perturbations. In the diagram "A-set —У B-set" means: if S is an Α-set then it is 
also a B-set. If we define an A-stable set (B-stable set) to be a minimal Α-set (B-set), 
then the arrow also implies that every A-stable set contains an B-stable set. 
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F-set 
(Kohlberg and Mertens) 
KM-set 
Q-set 
CKM-set 
(= CQ-set) = 
H-set = CT-set 
homotopy-stable set 
stable set in the 
sense of Mertens 
essential set 
F-set 
(Hillas) 
Chapter 6 
Invariance of solution concepts 
In chapter 3 we have introduced two types of invariance for solution concepts, namely 
weak invariance and invariance. In the first part of this chapter, we investigate to 
what extent several solution concepts are invariant in any of these two senses together 
with a third type of invariance, called admissiblc-best-reply (abr-)invariance. 
Section 6.1 deals with some Nash-related concepts. In section 6.2 we focus on perfect 
and proper equilibria. The next section is devoted to the solution concept оцм-
In section 6.4 we study three concepts related to persistent retracts. Rationalizable 
strategies and curb sets play a role in section 6.5. Finally, in section 6.6, OES and GQ 
are proved not to be invariant in any sense. 
In the second part of this chapter, we introduce the class of so-called projection stable 
solution concepts and describe a method to make such concepts weakly invariant. 
The resulting concept is called the modified solution concept. The main property 
of a projection-stable solution concept is that the projection of a solution for an 
extension of a game is a solution for the original game. In section 6.8, GES, O~H and 
°~Q appear to be examples of projection-stable solution concepts. In the last section 
of this chapter, we show that if a projection stable concept satisfies a property of the 
Kohlberg-Mertens program, then the modified concept has the same property. 
The first part of this chapter is based on Vermeulen and Jansen (1995). The second 
part is based on Vermeulen, Jansen and Potters (1995). 
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6.1 Some Nash-related solution concepts 
In this section we are concerned with the invariance of the solution concept OE that 
assigns to a game its set of equilibria. Further we investigate the solution concept a co 
(стлг) assigning to a game the collection of its components (maximal Nash subsets). 
Therefore we need the following result, which is the same as Remark 3.1. Because it 
will be used frequently in this section, we repeat it here. 
L e m m a 6.1 Let Ρ be an extension set for a game Γ. Then ζ is a best reply to χ 
in the game Τ ρ if and only ifn(z) is a best reply to π ( ι ) in the game Γ. 
Corollary 6.1 If Ρ is an extension set for the game Γ, then E(Tp) = π - 1 (E(T)). 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) have shown that the set of equilibria of a game is 
the finite union of pairwise disjoint, closed and connected sets (cf. Theorem 2.2). 
Obviously, these sets are the maximal connected sets - called components - of the set 
of equilibria. In order to prove that the solution concept uco that assigns to a game 
the collection of all components is invariant we need 
T h e o r e m 6.1 Let Ρ be an extension set for a game Γ. Then С is a component 
of the game Г if and only if 7r - 1(C) is a component of the game Γρ. 
Proof. (a) If C\,..., CT are the components of Ε(Γ), then 
E(rP)=n-1{E(r))=v-1({JCk) = {J*-l(Ck). 
к к 
(b) If С is a component of the game Г, then the continuity of π implies that π _ 1 ((7) 
is a non-empty, closed subset of E(Tp). In order to show that π - 1 ((7) is connected, 
we suppose that 7Г_1(С) = 5 U Г, where S and Τ are non-empty, closed and disjoint 
sets. 
Assume that π(5) П π(Γ) φ φ. For an ι e π(5) Л π(Γ), the sets G := π - 1 ( ι) Π S and 
Η := π
- 1
 (χ) Π Τ are non-empty, closed and disjoint. Furthermore, π - 1 (χ) = G U H, 
since π - 1 (χ) С π - 1 (С) = SUT. This contradicts the fact that π - 1 (χ) is convex and 
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therefore connected. Hence, 7T(S) Π π(Τ) = φ and С is the union of the non-empty 
and disjoint sets π(5) and 7г(Т). Furthermore, 7r(S) and 7г(Г) are closed (since S and 
Τ are closed, Δ ' is compact and Δ is Hausdorff). This is impossible in view of the 
connectedness of C. 
(c) Since 7T-1(C") Π π - 1 (С") = φ, for two different components C' and C" of the 
game Γ, part (a) implies that 7Г-1(С) is a component of the game Гр if and only if 
С is a component of the game Г. < 
The following result is an immediate consequence of Corollary 6.1 and Theorem 6.1. 
Corollary 6.2 Both the solution concept OE that assigns to a game its set of 
equilibria and the solution concept σοο that assigns to a game the collection of its 
components are invariant. 
For a two-person game Γ a subset S of E(T) is called a Nash subset of the game Γ if 
S = Si x S2, where 5¿ is a nonempty subset of A¿ for i = 1,2. A Nash subset not 
properly contained in another Nash subset is called maximal. It is well known that 
E(T) is the union of a finite number of maximal Nash subsets (cf. chapter 9). 
Theorem 6.2 The solution concept σ^ that assigns to a two-person game the 
collection of its maximal Nash subsets is invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for a two-person game Γ. 
(a) If S' & O~N(TP), then Corollary 6.1 implies that π(5") is a Nash subset of the game 
Γ. Suppose that TT(S') С Τ with Γ £ σ
Ν
(Τ). Then, by Corollary 6.1, Τ' := π - 1 (Τ) 
is a Nash subset of the game Γρ. Since 5' С Г' and S' is maximal, S' = T' and 
π(5') = 7г(Г) = Τ e σ,ν(Γ). 
(b) If Τ e стлг(Г), let Τ' := π _ 1 ( Τ ) . Then Τ' is a Nash subset of the game Γ
Ρ
. 
Suppose that S' is a Nash subset of the game Гр containing T'. Then π(5') D π(Τ') = 
Τ is a Nash subset of the game Γ. In view of the maximality of T, n(S') = π(Τ'). 
For an χ e S', π(χ) e π(5') = π(Τ') = Τ, which implies that χ e π'1 (Τ) = Τ'. 
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Therefore 5 ' С Τ' and by symmetry T' С S'. So we may conclude that S' = T'. 
Hence T' e σ
Ν
(Γ
Ρ
). ' « 
The third type of invariance studied in this chapter captures the independence of 
a solution concept of changes in inadmissible strategies. It was defined by Mertens 
(1987) as a tool in the characterization of the so-called ordinality of solution concepts 
(cf. Theorem 2 and subsequent note in Mertens (1987)). Together with invariance, 
the abr-invariance of a solution concept r implies the ordinality of r. 
Definition 6.1 Two η-person normal form games Γ = (M, и) and Г* = (M, и*) 
having the same space of strategy profiles Д м are called admissible-best-reply equiva­
lent (abr-equivalent) if for all strategy profiles χ 6 Д ^ and any player i the collection 
of admissible best replies against χ is the same in both games Γ and Γ*. 
A solution concept r is called abr-invariant if for all abr-equivalent games Γ and Γ* 
we have 
τ ( Γ ) = τ ( Γ · ) . 
In the next example we show that the three solution concepts considered in this 
section are not abr-invariant. 
E x a m p l e 6.1 The 2 χ 2-bimatrix games 
Γ = 
1,0 1,0 
1,0 0,0. 
and Γ = 
1,0 1,0 
.0,0 0,0 
are abr-equivalent since, in both games, only the first pure strategy of player 1 is 
admissible. However, E(T) = {ei} χ Δ 2 U Δ 2 x {ei} and EÇT") - {ei} χ Δ 2 . < 
6.2 Perfect and proper equilibria 
In this section we will investigate the (abr-)invariance of the solution concept σρε 
(еря) that assigns to a game its set of perfect (proper) equilibria. In Mertens (1987) 
it was noted that арв is an invariant solution concept. We will prove an even stronger 
result than invariance (cf. Theorem 6.3). 
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Since KM-perturbations are used to define both perfection and the solution concept 
introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens, we will first investigate - in three technical 
lemmas - the relations between the KM-perturbations of a game Γ and those of an 
extended game Γρ. 
Let Γ = (M,и) be a fixed η-person game and let Γ ρ = (M',и'), where Ρ is a fixed 
extension set for the game Γ. If С is a KM-perturbation of Γρ, then π (ζ) is a KM-
perturbation of the game Γ. Here we have considered π, as a linear map defined on 
IR M · . Furthermore 
Lemma 6.2 Δ ( π ( 0 ) = τ ( Δ ' ( 0 ) · 
Proof. (a) If ζ 6 Δ'(ζ), then for all i and к 
іелг, ¡ск. 
Hence, π (ζ) G Δ ( π ( 0 ) . 
(b) If ι G Δ(π(ζ)), then consider the strategy profile ζ defined by 
ƒ& if/ел:, 
Z
" I *« - Σ
Λ 6 * . CM)I if ι e Mt. 
Obviously, z G Δ'(£) and π(ζ) = χ. < 
Corollary 6.3 If ζ is a KM-perturbation of the game Γρ, then 
Ε(Τ
Ρ
[ζ})=π-1{Ε(Γ[π(ζ)]))ηΑ'(ζ). 
Lemma 6.3 If ξ is a completely mixed KM-perturbation of the game Γ, then there 
exists a completely mixed KM-perturbation ζ of the game Γρ such that π(ζ) = ξ and 
KL· < llílloo. 
Proof. Let for i e N and l e M[ 
U if ι e Ktt 
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where О < η < ||£||οο· In order to show that Δ(ζ) φ φ for small η, let χ G Δ(£). Then 
ζ G Δ'(ζ), wherein 
f хгі - ίΣκκ,&ϊ)' i f / e M, 
ztí := < 
U if J e A:,. 
Obviously, for small η, ζ is completely mixed, π(ζ) = £ and ЦСІІоо < ||£||<χ>· 4 
Lemma 6.4 There exists a constant D such that for every KM-perturbatwn ζ of 
the game Tp, every z* G Δ' and every x* G Δ(π(ζ)) there exists a y* G Δ'(£) such 
that π(ι/*) = x* ana ||¡,· - z i « , < £>max{||C|U ||x* - Ч О П » } · 
Proof. Let Q be the set of pairs (χ,ξ), where ξ is a KM-perturbation of Γ ρ and 
χ G 7τ(Δ'(£)). For a pair (χ,ξ) € <? we introduce the (non-empty) set 
φ(χ,ξ):={ζ£Α'(ξ)\π(ζ)=χ}. 
Note that z G φ(χ,ξ) if and only if, for any ι, the strategy z, satisfies 
' Smew; 2»"> = * 
< 2 i m > £,m for all m G M,' 
, π ^ ζ , ) = x,. 
Hence, there exist a matrix A and a linear function b on Q such that for all (x, £) G Q 
φ(χ,ξ) = {* e YIJ&K\ Az < Ь{х,0). 
So, by Remark 10.1, φ is Lipschitz continuous with, say, constant D. Now notice 
that, by Lemma 6.2, (x*,C) and (π(ζ*),0) are elements of Q. So, in particular, 
dH(*>(*(*·),0),¥>(**,0) < 0||(π(ζ*),Ο) - (*·,011οο· 
Therefore, since z* G (^(π(ζ*),0), there exists a y* G <¿>(x*,C) with 
IN* - » loo < Ρ | | ( Τ Γ ( * * ) , 0 ) - (ι',ΟΙΙοο = ümax{||x* - *(z')\U ||C|U}. 
Now the proof is complete, since y* G φ(χ*,ζ) yields j / * G Δ'(£) and n(y*) =x*. < 
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Corollary 6.4 Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ = (M, и) and let Гр = 
(L, υ) be the Ρ-extended game. Then the map π: Δ/, —> AM is open. 
Proof. Let U be an open set of Δ/, and suppose that π(ΙΙ) is not open. Then there 
exists a sequence (rr^jtgiN in AM \ π(ΐ7) that converges to some χ £ π({7). 
Since χ £ 7г(С7), there exists some ζ £ U with π(ζ) = χ. Now using Lemma 6.4 with 
0 in the role of the KM-perturbation ζ, z in the role of z* and xk in the role of x* 
we get a strategy profile yk with n(yk) = xk and \\yk - z\\oo < D\\xk — x||oo· So, 
the sequence (yk)keiN converges to z. Furthermore, yk ^ U because n(yk) = xk and 
x
k
 ^ 7r(í7). This contradicts the fact that U is an open set containing z. < 
Theorem 6.3 If Ρ is an extension set for the game Γ, then 
ΡΕ{Γρ)=π-1(ΡΕ(Τ)). 
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. 
(a) First we show that PE(TP) С π - 1 {Ρ Ε (Γ)). Let z e ΡΕ(ΓΡ). Then, by Theorem 
2.3 (cf. van Damme (1987)), there exists a sequence ζ1,ζ2,... of completely mixed 
KM-perturbations of Γ ρ converging to zero and a sequence zl, z2,... in Δ' converging 
to z such that zk £ Е(Гр^к]) for all k. Then π(ζ1),-κ(ζ2),... is a sequence of com­
pletely mixed KM-perturbations of Γ converging to zero. Furthermore the sequence 
π(ζ1),π(ζ2),... converges to π(ζ) and, in view of Corollary 6.3, π(ζ*) G £(Γ[π(ζ*)]) 
for all к. Hence, π (ζ) € PE{T). 
(b) Conversely, we show that PE(TP) D π - 1 (PE(T)). Let ζ 6 Δ ' be a strategy profile 
with π (2) G PE(T). Then, again by Theorem 2.3, there exists a sequence ξ1, ξ2,... of 
completely mixed KM-perturbations of Γ converging to zero and a sequence i 1 , x2,... 
in Δ converging to π(ζ) such that xk G £J(r[ífc]) for all k. By Lemma 6.3 there is a 
sequence ζ1, ζ2,... of completely mixed KM-perturbations of Гр converging to zero 
such that 7г(С*) = ξ* for all it. Since xk £ Е(Г[£к]) = Е(Т[к(Ск)]), the foregoing 
lemma implies the existence of a yk £ A'(£fc) and a constant D such that n(yk) = xk 
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ала \\ук - ζ||αο < DmaxdlC^lloclli* - i"(z)lloo}· Hence, the sequence у1,у2,... 
converges to ζ and, by Corollary 6.3, yk e E(YP[(,k]) for all k. So ζ 6 PE{TP). < 
Obviously, by Remark 3.5, Theorem 6.3 implies 
Corollary 6.5 The solution concept aps that assigns to a game its set of perfect 
equilibria is invariant. 
The (simple) proof of the following lemma is left to the reader. 
Lemma 6.5 Let Γ and Γ* be two abr-equivalent games and let x-¡ e Δ_, be 
completely mixed. Then a strategy у
г
 is a best reply to i _ t in the game Г if and only 
if J/J is a best reply to x_, m the game Г*. 
Let ζ be a completely mixed KM-perturbation of the abr-equivalent games Γ and 
Γ*. Then, for an ι e Δ ( 0 , Lemma 2.3 implies that χ € Ε(Γ[ζ]) if and only if 
Οζ(χ) С PB(x). So, Lemma 6.5 leads to 
Corollary 6.6 Let Г and Г* be two abr-equivalent games and let ζ be a completely 
mixed KM-perturbation. Then Ε(Γ[ζ\) = Ε (Γ* [ζ]). 
Theorem 6.4 The solution concept σρΕ that assigns to a game its set of perfect 
equilibria is abr-invariant. 
Proof. We will only show that РЕ(Г) с РЕ(Г*) for two abr-equivalent games 
Г = (М,и) and Г* = (M,u*). 
Let χ e PE(T). Then, by Theorem 2.3, there exists a sequence (Cfc)*ew of completely 
mixed KM-perturbations converging to zero and a sequence (i*)/teiN of strategy pro­
files in Δ converging to χ such that, for all к € IN, we have xk € Β(Γ[ζ*]). Then by 
Corollary 6.6 we have that xk e Е(Г*[Ск]) for all λ e IN. Hence, again by Theorem 
2.3, ι 6 PE{T'). < 
For proper equilibria the situation appears to be completely different. The following 
example of Myerson (1991) shows that the solution concept арц that assigns to a 
Invariance of solution concepts 121 
game its set of proper equilibria is not (weakly) invariant. For a similar example see 
van Damme (1987). 
Example 6.2 For the 3 x 2-bimatrix game 
"6,0 6,0-
Γ = 8,0 0,8 
.0,8 8,0. 
we consider the extension set Ρ := {( | ,0, | ) } . Then 
"6,0 6,0-1 
Tp = 
8,0 0,8 
0,8 8,0 
3,4 7,0J 
The unique proper equilibrium of the first game is (ei, ( | , | ) ) , while (ei, ( ^ , ^¡)) is 
the only proper equilibrium of the second game. < 
The solution concept OPR is not abr-invariant as the following example shows. 
Example 6.3 The 3 χ 2-games 
Γ = 
f6,0 6,0 
8,0 0,8 
L0,8 8,0 
and Γ* = 
'6,0 6,0 
8,0 0,8 
L3,8 7,0J 
are abr-equivalent. However, ( e i , ( | , | ) ) is the only proper equilibrium of the first 
game and (ei, (y^, ^ ) ) is the unique proper equilibrium of the second game. <з 
6.3 KM-stable sets 
In this section we consider the invariance of the solution concept σχΜ that assigns to 
a game the collection of minimal KM-sets. In order to show that this solution concept 
is invariant we need the following result. 
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Lemma 6.6 Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ and let z* G Δ'. Then there 
exists a map Ι: A —• Δ ' such that 
(1) z* e 1(A) 
(2) π: 1(A) —l· A is a homeomorphtsm with inverse I. 
Proof. Let i G N be fixed. We will construct a map lt: At -> Δ^. Κ Ι , Ε Α , and 
i t φ q* := 7rt(z*), then there is at least one m G Mt such that q*m > xtm. Hence, the 
number 
λ(ι,) := min/ Xtm | gt*m > i i m } 
1
 Я
гт
 -
 х
гт > 
is well-defined. It is easy to show that r(xt) := (l + X(xl))xl — A(i,)qi* is an element 
of А
г
 and \(xt) - к » as i , -> g*. Now we consider the map lx: Δ, —• Δ( defined by 
l < ifx, = 9;, 
where r(x t ) is the lift of r(xt). Obviously, z* G lt(At) and π,(ί,(2;,)) = ι, for all 
i t G Δ,. Since Іг is continuous (due to the fact that X(xt) —¥ oo as xt —> g*), the 
proof is complete. < 
Lemma 6.7 Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ and let Τ be a КМ-seí of 
the game Γ. If U is a closed set with n(U) = T, then U is a KM-set of the game Γρ. 
Proof. In order to show that U is a KM-set, let (ζ*). _j be a sequence of completely 
mixed KM-perturbations of the game Τ ρ that converges to zero. Then ( π ( ζ * ) )
Λ ε
^ 
is a sequence of completely mixed KM-perturbations of the game Γ that converges 
to zero. Since Τ is a KM-set, we can find a sequence ( l f c ) t
e ] N with
 a
 cluster point 
χ in Τ such that xk G £(Г[тг(С*)]) for all fc. Since π(ί/) = Τ, there is a ζ G U 
such that 7T(Z) = x. Using Lemma 6.4 - with ζ and xk in the role of z* and x*, 
respectively - we can find a yk G Δ'(£*) and a constant D such that тг(ук) = xk and 
\\yk —z||oo < -CniaxlllC*!!«,, \\xk -x||oo}· Since D does not depend on k, the sequence 
(yk)k€TN converges tozeU. Since, by Corollary 6.3, yk G Е(Г
Р
[Ск]), for all k, U is 
a KM-set of the game Γρ. < 
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T h e o r e m 6.5 The solution concept акм that assigns to a game the collection of 
minimal KM-sets is invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. First we will prove a preliminary 
result. 
(a) Let 5 be a KM-set of the game Γρ. In order to show that n(S) is a KM-set of 
the game Г, let V be an open set containing π(5). Then V' := 7г_1( ) is an open set 
containing S. Since S is a KM-set, there is a number η > 0 such that Е(Гр[С])П ' φ φ 
for any completely mixed KM-perturbation ζ of Tp with ЦСІІоо < Ц- For a completely 
mixed KM-perturbation ζ of Γ with ||£||oo < Ή we consider the KM-perturbation 
ζ of Tp as described in Lemma 6.3. Then π(ζ) = ξ and ||ζ||οο < Hf II» < V- So 
Я(Гр[С]) П ' фф and, by Corollary 6.3, 
Ε(Γ[ξ]) nV = £(Г[тг(С)]) nV = π{Ε(Γ
Ρ
[ζ])) Π π(ν") D η(Ε(Γ
Ρ
[ζ]) Π V') φ φ. 
(b) Let Γ 6 σ
ΚΜ
{Τ) and z* G π - 1 (Τ). We will show that there exists an 5 e 
σκΛί(Γρ) with ζ* e S and π(5) = Г. 
Let S := ¿(Τ), where Ζ is the map described in the foregoing lemma. Then 5 is a 
closed set containing z* with TT(S) = T. In view of the foregoing lemma, 5 is a KM-set 
of the game Γρ. 
Now suppose that S is not minimal. Then there exists a KM-set S' С S of the 
game Гр with S' Φ S. Then part (a) implies that π(5') is a KM-set of the game 
Γ. Furthermore, since π is a bijection from 1(A) to Δ, π(5') is a subset of Τ and 
π(5') Φ T. This however is impossible since Τ is a minimal KM-set. 
(c) Let S e σκΛί(Γρ). By part (a) π(5) is a KM-set. We will show that π(5) G 
σκ-Λί(Γ). Let Τ С π(5) be a KM-set of the game Γ. Let U := π - 1 ( Τ ) П 5. Then 
TT(U) = π ( π _ 1 (Γ) Π S) С Г Л ir(S) С Г С тг([/), 
where the last inclusion can be proved as follows. If χ e Τ, then χ £ π(5). So there 
is a ζ £ S such that π (ζ) = XGT. Hence, z e π - 1 (Γ) Π 5 = U. 
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The fact that n(U) = Τ implies in combination with the foregoing lemma that U 
is a KM-set of the game Γρ. Then however, U = S and S С π - 1 (Τ). Hence, 
π(5) С Γ С π(5) and π(5) is a minimal KM-set. < 
T h e o r e m 6.6 The solution concept ацм that assigns to a game the collection of 
minimal KM-sets is abr-invariant. 
Proof. We will only show that акм{£) С окм{Г') for two abr-equivalent games 
Г = (M,u) a n d r * = (M,u*). 
(a) Let 5 be a KM-set of the game Г. In order to show that 5 is a KM-set of the 
game Г*, we take an open set V containing S. Then there exists an η > 0 such that 
jE(r[C]) Π V Φ φ whenever ζ is a completely mixed KM-perturbation with HCIloo < V-
Then, in view of Corollary 6.6, also £(Г*[£]) П V φ φ for any completely mixed 
KM-perturbation С with HCIloo < V- Hence, 5 is a KM-set of the game Г*. 
(b) Let 5 be an element of окм{^)· In view of part (a), 5 is a KM-set of the game 
Г*. If Τ is a KM-set of the game Γ* contained in 5, then - by part (a) - Τ is also a 
KM-set of the game Γ. Since S is minimal, S — T and S € σκΜ(Γ*). < 
6.4 Persistent equilibria 
In this section we investigate persistent equilibria (retracts) as introduced by Kalai 
and Samet (1984). We start with some definitions. 
Definition 6.2 A subset R of Δ is a retract if R = njLjiZ», with each Ri a non­
empty, closed and convex subset of A¿. A retract is called absorbing if there is an 
open neighborhood V of R, such that R absorbs V, i.e. for every χ € V there is 
a ζ € R such that г is a best reply to x. (An equilibrium contained in) a minimal 
absorbing retract is called persistent. 
T h e o r e m 6.7 The solution concept OPRE that assigns to a game Г the collection 
of persistent retracts of Г is weakly invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. 
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(a) Suppose that R' is an absorbing retract of the game Γρ and let V be an open 
neighborhood of R' absorbed by R'. In view of Corollary 6.4, 7r(V) is open. In order 
to show that R := TT(R') is an absorbing retract of Г, we will show that the open set 
7r(F) is absorbed by R. Take χ G тг( ). Then there exists an x' G V with π (χ') = χ. 
Because R' is absorbing, there is a ζ G R' such that ζ is a best reply to x'. Then, by 
Lemma 6.1, π(ζ) G R is a best reply to n(x') = x. Hence, R is an absorbing retract 
of the game Γ. 
Now suppose that R' is even a persistent retract of Γρ and that 5 С 7г(Д') is an 
absorbing retract of Г. Then 
S' := {x G ñ ' | Φ) € S) 
is a retract of Γρ, since π, is a linear function for each i. We will show that S' is also 
absorbing. Let U be an open neighborhood of S absorbed by S. Then U' := 7г-1([/) 
is an open set containing 5'. Take χ G U'. Then n(x) G U. So there is a ζ € 5 being 
a best reply to π(χ). Since ζ G 7г(Л'), there is a ζ' G R' with 7τ(ζ') = ζ. Then by 
Lemma 6.1, г' is a best reply to x. So, because z' G S', U' is absorbed by S'. 
By the persistency of R', R' = S'. Hence S С n(R') = f(S') С S and consequently, 
S = 7г(Д'). So we have proved that n(R') is a persistent retract of Г. 
(b) Suppose that Я is a persistent retract of the game Г. Then R' := ÜJLjiïJ, wherein 
for i G Ν, 
К '•= {χΊ £ К Ι χΊis t h e l i f t °f s o m e χι e Иг} 
is a retract of the game Γρ. Let V be an open neighborhood of R absorbed by R and 
let V' := 7Г-1( ). Then V' is an open set containing R'. In order to show that V' 
is absorbed by R', take x G V'. Then π(χ) G V. So there is a ζ G Д which is a best 
reply to π(χ). If, for each i, z\ is the lift of z,, then π(ζ') = ζ. So, by Lemma 6.1, z' 
is a best reply to x. Since z' G R' this implies that Я' absorbs V'. 
Finally, we will show that R' is a persistent retract. Suppose that S' С R' is an 
absorbing retract of the game Γρ. Then, as in part (a), π(5') is an absorbing retract 
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of the game Γ. Since π(5") С 7г(Л') = R, the persistency of R implies that π(5') = 
R = TT(R'). SO S' = R' and R' is persistent. < 
Corollary 6.7 The solution concept apER that assigns to a game Γ the collection 
of persistent equilibria is weakly invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. 
(a) Suppose that ζ is a persistent equilibrium of the game Γρ. Then ζ € E(Tp) Π R' 
for some persistent retract R' of Γρ. By Theorem 6.1 we get 
TT(Z) e π(£(Γρ) Π R') С π(Ε(Γ
Ρ
)) П тг(Д') = Е(Г) П тг(Д')· 
However, тг(Д') is a persistent retract of Г by part (a) of the previous theorem. Hence, 
π(ζ) is a persistent equilibrium of the game Γ. 
(b) Suppose that a; is a persistent equilibrium of the game Γ. Then χ € Ε(Γ) Π R 
for some persistent retract R of Γ. So, the lift x' of a; is an element of the persistent 
retract R' of the game Γρ defined in part (b) of the previous theorem. Furthermore, 
x' is an element of Е(Гр) by Theorem 6.1. Hence, x' is a persistent equilibrium of 
the game Γρ. < 
In the next example we show that the concepts OPRE and OPER are not invariant. 
E x a m p l e 6.4 For the 2 χ 2-bimatrix game 
1,-1 -1,1 
r = 
L - 1 , 1 i . 
we consider the extension set Ρ := {( | , | ) } . Then 
' 1 , - 1 -1 ,1 0,0' 
Γ Ρ = 
. - 1 , 1 1,-1 0,0. 
The unique persistent retract of the first game is Δ2 x Δ2, while Δ2 x {q e Δ3 | сз = 0} 
is the only persistent retract of the second game. Since the inverse image under π of 
Δ 2 x Δ 2 is equal to Δ 2 χ Δ 3 , GPRE is not invariant. This observation was also made 
by Mertens (1987). 
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Furthermore, ( ( | , § ) , ( | , § ) ) is the only persistent equilibrium of the game Γ and 
((§' | ) ' (2' 2 Ό)) 1S t n e o n ' y persistent equilibrium of the game Γρ. However, 
T _ I ( (è , è), ( Ь è)) = {(l ï )} * conv({(ì, 1,0), (0,0,1)}) φ {((ì , | ) , ( ì , 1,0))}. 
Which shows that OPER is not invariant. < 
Lemma 6.8 Let Γ and Γ* 6e ίωο abr-equivalent games. Then R is an absorbing 
retract of the game Γ if and only if R is an absorbing retract of the game Γ*. 
Proof. Let R be an absorbing retract of the game Γ. In order to show that Л is an 
absorbing retract of the game Г*, let V be an open neighborhood of R absorbed by 
R in the game Г. 
Take χ G V. Then we can find a sequence (x*) f c e ] N in V of completely mixed strategy 
profiles converging to x. Since R absorbs V, there exists a sequence ( 2 ' ) . „ in R 
such that, for all k, zk is a best reply to xk in the game Г. By Lemma 6.5, zk is 
also a best reply to xk in the game Г*. We may suppose that the sequence (z*) f c e ] N 
converges, say to z. Then ζ G R and ζ is a best reply to χ in the game Γ*. < 
Since two abr-equivalent games have the same absorbing retracts, they have the same 
persistent retracts. So we have 
Corollary 6.8 The solution concept OPRE that assigns to a game the collection 
of persistent retracts is abr-invariant. 
In the two-person case the solution concept OPER that assigns to a game the set of 
all persistent equilibria is abr-invariant. We do not know whether this is true for the 
situation where more than two players are involved. 
T h e o r e m 6.8 For two-person games the solution concept OPER is abr-invariant. 
Proof. Let Γ and Γ* be two abr-equivalent two-person games. Take a strategy pair 
χ & E(T) Π R, wherein R is a persistent retract of the game Γ. By symmetry, it is 
sufficient to show that χ Ç. Ε (Γ*) Π R and that Л is a persistent retract of Г*. 
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Since, by Theorem 6.7, R is a persistent retract of the game Γ*, the proof is complete if 
we can show that χ € Ε(Γ*). Since R is persistent in Γ, there is an open neighborhood 
V of R that is absorbed by R in the game Γ. Suppose that x\
m
 > 0. First we will 
show that there exists a completely mixed strategy pair y € V such that e™ is a best 
reply to j/2 in Γ. 
(a) Suppose that such a pair does not exist. Consider the set R' С Δ defined by 
R' := {z e R | zlm = 0}. 
Clearly, R' is a proper subset of R, since χ £ R and x\
m
 > 0. We will show that R' 
absorbs V. Let у € V and choose a sequence (yk)kels of completely mixed strategy 
pairs in V that converges to y. Since R absorbs V, there is a sequence (^*)fcGjvJ in R 
such that zk is a best reply to yk for all k. In view of our assumption, e™ is not a best 
reply to y\. Hence, zkm = 0 for all k. We may suppose, without loss of generality, 
that the sequence {zk)keJS converges, say to z*. Then z*m = 0. So, z* e R' and z* 
is a best reply to y. Hence, V is absorbed by R'. Contradiction. 
(b) In view of part (a) we may choose a completely mixed pair у in V such that e™ is 
a best reply to 3/2· Since ej™ is also a best reply to X2, it is a best reply to the strategy 
of player 2 in the pair y(X) := Xx + (1 — \)y for any 0 < λ < 1. Moreover, y(X) is 
completely mixed and y(\) —> χ as λ -* 1. Hence, ej™ is an admissible best reply to 
x. Because Γ and Γ* are abr-equivalent, e™ is also an admissible best reply to χ in 
the game Γ*. 
(c) Similarly, one can show that e™ is a best reply to x\ in the game Γ* if X2
m
 > 0-
(d) By parts (b), (c) and Lemma 2.2, a; e E(T*). < 
6.5 Rationalizable strategies and curb sets 
In this section we deal with the concept of rationalizability as developed by Bernheim 
(1984) and Pearce (1984). Furthermore, we investigate curb sets introduced by Basu 
and Weibull (1991). 
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Definition 6.3 A strategy i t of player i is called rationalizable if for each j there 
is a non-empty subset X, of Δ ; such that 
(1) i, e x , 
(2) Y[ Xj has the 6esi response property, i.e. for any z3 € X¿, there exists a 
У-з
 e
 П * , ц
с 1 і
№ ) such that z, e ßj(y-3). 
The set 7£t of rationalizable strategies of player г is non-empty. 
Theorem 6.9 The solution concept ORA that assigns to a game the set Tí := \\t 7it 
is invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. The proof is complete if we can 
show that π - 1 (7Í) = TV, where Ti {71') is the set of strategy profiles consisting of 
rationalizable strategies of the game Γ (Τρ). 
(a) Let х'
г
 € Τί[. Then for each j there is a non-empty subset Xj of Δ^ such that 
x[ e X[ and П^ X] bas the best response property. By Lemma 6.1 and the linearity 
of 7Г, for all j , also Г] тт(Х!) has the best response property. Since ΤΓ,(Χ^) € 7г(Х
г
'), 
this implies that п
г
(х[) e Τί% and x[ g π~1(71ι). Hence, TV С ж~1(7 ) . 
(b) Let x't be a strategy of player г with π,(ι',) G Tít. Then for each j there is a 
non-empty subset X¡ of Δ., such that π,(χ() G X, and [Τ, - j^ has the best response 
property. Consider Xj := πΓ^Χ,) . In order to show that Г] Xj has the best response 
property, we take a z3 € Xj . Then there is a y_j e П»^і соп (Хг) with тт^(^) € 
ßj(y-3). By Lemma 6.1, z3 6 ß'jiyLj), wherein t/^  is the lift of j / t . Since y( G соп (Х^), 
Π Xj has the best response property. Since x't G 7ί[, π-1 (TV) С TV. < 
In the next example we show that the solution concept ORA is not abr-invariant. 
Example 6.5 The games 
'1,0 1,0 
Г = 
1,0 1,0' 
and Г* = 
1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0. 
are abr-equivalent. For the first game Δ2 x Δ2 is the set of rationalizable strategies. 
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Since in the second game the second strategy of player 1 is strictly dominated, this 
second strategy is not rationalizable for player 1. <j 
Definition 6.4 A retract R is closed under best repites if for all players i G N and 
all strategy profiles x_ t € R-t we have 
Д(х_.) С Rt. 
A retract that is minimal with respect to the closedness under best replies is called a 
curb set. 
T h e o r e m 6.10 The solution concept σου that assigns to a game the collection of 
curb sets is weakly invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. 
(a) Suppose that the retract R' of the game Υ ρ is closed under best replies. We will 
show that the retract R := n(R') is also closed under best replies. Take a strategy 
profile X-t e R-t and a strategy y, € /3,(x_t). Obviously, for each player j φ ι, there 
is a strategy x'} e R'3 with π} [x'}) = x3. Let y[ denote the lift of yt. Then Lemma 6.1 
implies that y[ e /3t(i'_J. Hence, y[ e R[ and уг = nt(y[) e nt(R't) = R,. 
(b) Let ñ b e a retract of the game Г that is closed under best replies. Then as in 
part (a) one can show that the retract R' := π _ 1 ( η ) is closed under best replies. 
(c) Now suppose that R' is a curb set of the game Tp and that the retract S С 7τ(η') 
is closed under best replies. Then, in view of part (b), 
S' := {x e R' \ φ) € S} 
is a retract of the game Tp that is closed under best replies. By the minimality of R', 
S' = R'. So, we have S С π(η ') = TT(S') С S. Hence, S = π(η ' ) . This shows that 
7г(Л') is a curb set of the game Г. 
(d) Suppose that R is a curb set of the game Г. Then, by part (b), R' := n~1(R) is 
closed under best replies. So R' contains a curb set S'. Then, in view of part (a), 
7r(5") С 7Г(Д') = R and ff(5') is closed under best replies. Hence, π(5') = R. < 
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Next we show that the solution concept acu is neither invariant nor abr-invariant. 
Example 6.6 For the 3 x 3-bimatrix game 
•1,1 1,1 0,0 
Γ = 1,0 1,1 1,1 
.0,0 0,1 1,1 
we consider the extension set Ρ = {( | ,0, | ) } . Then 
1,1 1,1 0,0-1 
I > = 
1,0 1,1 1,1 
0,0 0,1 1,1 
i l ι ι ¿ ι 
2 ' 2 2 ' 1 2 ' 2 
One easily shows that Δ 3 χ Дз is the unique curb set of the game Г. Since the stategy 
e4 of player 1 in the game Τ ρ is strictly dominated by the strategy e 2, e^ 0 Ri for 
any curb set R = R\ χ Ri of the game Γρ. In combination with the fact that 
7г - 1(Дз χ Дз) = Δ4 χ Δ 3 this implies that the solution concept acu is not invariant. 
In order show that the acu is not abr-invariant, we consider the abr-equivalent games 
Γ and Γ* introduced in example 6.5. 
Let R be a curb set of the game Γ and let ρ 6 Ri. Then Δ 2 = /Зг(р) С Лг- Hence, 
ei G R2 and Δ2 = A ( e i ) С Лі. So Δ2 χ Δ2 is the only curb set of the game Γ. 
Similarly, {βχ} χ Δ 2 is the only curb set of the game Γ*. This implies that the solution 
concept acu is not abr-invariant. < 
6.6 Some non-invariant solution concepts 
In this section we deal with the (non-)invariance of the solution concepts OES and OQ 
defined in sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.7, respectively. 
The solution concept OES that assigns to a game the collection of essential sets of 
that game is not weakly invariant as the following example of Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986) shows. 
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Example 6.7 The only minimal essential set of the game 
Γ = [1,0 3,0] 
is the set S := {ei} χ {e\,ei}. For the P-extended game 
Гр = [1,0 3,0 2,0], 
where Ρ := {( | , | ) } , the only minimal essential set is S' := {ei} χ {еі,е2,ез}. 
So, there is no essential set T" of the game Гр with π(Τ') = S. Hence, ass is not a 
weakly invariant solution concept. 
Furthermore, π(5') = {ei} χ {ei, e 2, (§,§)} is a non-minimal essential set of the game 
Γ. Hence, also minimal essentiality is not weakly invariant. < 
The next example shows that a^s is not abr-invariant. 
Example 6.8 Again we consider the abr-equivalent games Γ and Γ* introduced 
in example 6.5. Let for δ > 0 
' Ι , ί 1,0" 
1 + δ,δ 0,0. 
Clearly, (e 2, βχ) is the unique equilibrium of this game. Therefore, (ег, e\) is contained 
in any minimal essential set of the game Г. Since the strategy e 2 of player 1 is strictly 
dominated in the game Г*, no minimal essential set of Г* contains (ег,еі). < 
The solution concept OQ that assigns to a game its collection of Q-sets is neither 
weakly invariant nor abr-invariant, as the following example shows. 
Example 6.9 For the game Γ in example 6.2, 
5 : = { (
е і
, 9 ) е Д з х Д 2 | д і е { і , і , | } } 
is a Q-stable set, and therefore also an element of OQ{T). Furthermore, since Q-sets 
always contain a proper equilibrium, any element of стс(Гр) must contain the only 
Ti = 
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proper equilibrium (ei, ( ¿ , ^ ) ) of that game. Hence, π(5') Φ S for any element S' 
οΐσα(Γ
Ρ
). 
Finally, we consider the the two abr-equivalent games Γ and Γ* introduced in example 
6.3. The unique Q-stable set of the first game is {ei}x{(j, f), (f, | ) , ( | , £)}· Since for 
the second game {βι} χ {(j, | ) , ( | , | ) , ( ^ , ^ ) } is the only Q-stable set, the solution 
concept considered in this example is not abr-invariant. < 
6.7 Making solution concepts weakly invariant 
In this section we describe a procedure to modify certain solution concepts in such 
a way that the resulting concept is weakly invariant. First we introduce the class of 
so-called projection stable solution concepts for which we define our procedure. The 
main property of such a concept is the fact that (1) the projection of a solution for 
the extension of a game is a solution for the original game. For technical reasons we 
also require that (2) every game has at least one solution (3) the Hausdorff limit of a 
sequence of solutions is also a solution and (4) a closed set containing a solution is a 
solution itself. 
Our method to make projection-stable solution concepts weakly invariant can be 
described as follows. First we consider the solutions for a normal form game with the 
property that, for every extension of the game, the inverse image (under the canonical 
projection) is a solution for the extended game. Let us call these solutions extension-
stable (e-stable for short). Next we consider the collection of minimal e-stable sets. 
Now our class of candidate solutions is too small to generate a weakly invariant 
solution concept. Therefore, we consider the (larger) class of those e-stable sets that 
are projections of a minimal e-stable set for some extension of the game. In this 
way we obtain a new collection of solutions and we show that the resulting solution 
concept is weakly invariant. Moreover, in section 6.9, we show that if a projection-
stable solution concept satisfies a property of the Kohlberg-Mertens program the 
modified solution concept has the same property. 
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Definition 6.5 A solution concept σ is projection-stable - p-stable for short - if 
for any game Γ 
(1) σ(Γ) φ φ (non-emptiness property) 
(2) if a sequence Si, S2, •.. of elements of σ(Γ) «^-converges to S, then S is also 
an element of σ(Γ) (closedness property) 
(3) every closed set Τ containing an element of σ(Γ) is also an element of σ(Γ) 
(monotonicity property) 
(4) the projection πρ(Τ) of an element Τ of σ(Γρ) is an element of σ(Γ) for all 
extension sets Ρ for the game Γ (projection property). 
We introduce the modification of a p-stable solution concept σ in three steps. 
Step 1: First we consider the class of those sets in σ(Γ) for which Kpl{S) € σ(Γρ) 
for all extension sets Ρ for Γ. Such sets are called extension-stable (e-
stable for short). 
Step 2: Next we consider the class of minimal e-stable sets. 
Step 3: Finally, we consider the class σ* (Γ) of those e-stable sets 5 of Γ for which 
there exists an extension set Ρ for Γ and a minimal e-stable set Τ of Γρ 
such that π
Ρ
( Τ ) = S. 
Definition 6.6 For a p-stable solution concept σ, we call the solution concept σ* 
as introduced in the foregoing three steps the modified solution concept. 
Note that σ*(Γ) contains at least all minimal e-stable sets of Γ. We wil show that 
the modified solution concept σ* is weakly invariant and that σ*(Γ) φ φ, for all Г. 
Theorem 6.11 If σ is a p-stable solution concept, then σ*(Γ) φ φ, for all Г. 
Proof. Let Γ = (M, и) be a finite game. 
(a) First we will show that AM is an e-stable set. So let Ρ be an extension set for 
the game Γ. Since π-1 (AM) = Δ^, the non-emptiness property and monotonicity 
property of σ imply that Δχ, e σ(Γρ). 
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(b) Finally we prove that each e-stable set S contains an element of σ* (Γ) by showing 
that each e-stable set S contains a minimal e-stable set. 
If S is not minimal, take a sequence S\ D S2 Э · • · of e-stable sets of the game Γ 
contained in S. If Ρ is an extension set for Γ, then π _ 1 ( 5 χ ) D π _ 1 (52) D ··· are ele­
ments of σ(Γρ). Because the sequence π - 1 (Si), π _ 1 ( 5 2 ) , . ·. converges to f\{ 7r_ 1(5j), 
the closedness property of σ implies that 7Г_1(П{ Si) = f)¿ я'1 (Si) С σ(Γρ). Hence, 
fìi Si is an e-stable set of Г. Then Zorn's lemma implies that S contains a minimal 
e-stable set. < 
In order to prove the weak invariance of the modification σ* of a p-stable solution 
concept σ, we need two lemmas and some notation. 
Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. For an extension set Q for the game Γ 
we introduce the extension set Q for Γρ consisting of the lifts of the elements of Q 
in Γρ. If, on the contrary, R is an extension set for the game Γρ, then Ρ o R := 
Ρ U {(7Tp)j(rf ) I г* e R} is an extension set for the game Г. It is straightforward to 
check the following 
Lemma 6.9 (1) (Гр)д = TpUQ and KPOQ = 7TpuQ 
(2) Грод = (Гр)д and -крон = πρ ο π
Λ
. 
We need this result in the proof of 
Lemma 6.10 Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. Then 
(1) πρ 1 (5) is an e-stable set of Γ ρ if S is an e-stable set of Γ 
(2) πρ{Τ) is an e-stable set of Τ if Τ is an e-stable set of Τ p. 
Proof. (a) In order to prove (1), let R be an extension set for the game Γρ. Then, by 
Lemma 6.9 and the assumption that S is an e-stable set of Г, тгл1[і'р1(5)] = itp\R(S) 
is an element of σ(Γρ 0«) = ст((Гр)д). Hence, Жр1^) is an e-stable set of Γρ. 
(b) Let Q be an extension set for the game Γ. Then, by Lemma 6.9, (Гр)д — ( Г с )
р 
and πρ о TTQ = WQ о пр. Since Г is an e-stable set of Γρ, π^ χ (Τ) is an element of 
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σ((Γρ)ο) = σ((Γ(3)ρ). Therefore, by the projection property of σ, ι ^ ΐ ί ^ Γ ) ] is ал 
element of O~{FQ). Furthermore, since 
π
Ρ
(Τ) = π ρ [ π 0 ( π τ ΐ ( Γ ) ) ] = π β [ π ρ ( π ^ ( Γ ) ) ] , 
рІ^ЧПсп^ЫТ)}. 
Finally, the monotonicity property of σ implies that 7Γρ1[πρ(Γ)] € O~(TQ). < 
Theo rem 6.12 The modification σ* of a p-stable concept σ is weakly invariant. 
Proof. Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ. The proof consists of two parts. 
(a) In this part of the proof we will show that π(5) e σ*(Γ) if 5 € σ*(Γρ). 
Suppose that 5 is an element of σ*(Γ
Ρ
). Then there exists an extension set R for Tp 
and a minimal e-stable set U of the game (Гр)д = Гр 0 д such that ~KR{U) = 5. Hence, 
by Lemma 6.9 (2), 7Tp(S) = nP{ïïR(U)) = KP0R{U). SO, nP(S) is the projection of 
the minimal e-stable set U. Hence, πρ(5) is an element of σ*(Γ). 
(b) In this second part of the proof we will show that for each Τ € σ*(Γ) there is an 
5 e σ*(Γ
Ρ
) such that Τ = π
Ρ
( 5 ) . 
Suppose that Γ is an element of σ*(Γ). Then there exists an extension set Q for the 
game Γ and a minimal e-stable set U of TQ such that KQ{U) = T. Let Q (P) be 
the extension set for Γρ (TQ) consisting of the lifts of the elements of Q (P). Now, 
according to Lemma 6.10, π ^ ^ ί / ) is an e-stable set of (Тс)р = (TP)Q- So, by part 
(b) of the proof of Theorem 6.11, 7г^1(?7) contains a minimal e-stable set, say V, of 
the game (Гр)д. Then, according to Lemma 6.10 (2), ÎT P (V) is an e-stable set of FQ. 
Furthermore, 7г
р
( ) с U. So, 7г
р
( ) = U, since U is a minimal e-stable set. Define 
S :- 7TQ(V). Then it follows from the definition of σ* that S = KQ{V) G σ*(Ι>) and, 
by Lemma 6.9, 
* P ( S ) = npfrqiV)) = T T Q M V O ) = *Q(U) = T. 
This concludes the proof of part (b). < 
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6.8 Some projection-stable solution concepts 
In this section we will give three examples of p-stable solution concepts. 
As we have seen in example 6.8 that the solution concept OES that assigns to a game 
the collection of essential sets is not weakly invariant. However, the modification of 
this solution concept is weakly invariant by Theorem 6.12 and 
T h e o r e m 6.13 The solution concept OES that assigns to a game the collection of 
essential sets is p-stable. 
Proof. (a) By Theorem 2.2 (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)), aEs(F) Φ Φ, for all 
normal form games Γ. 
(b) Suppose that Si, S2, • • · is a sequence of essential sets of Γ ая-converging to a set 
S. If У is an open set containing S, then S¿0 С V for some ¿0· Since S¿0 is essential 
for Г, there is an open set U containing Г such that E(T') Π V φ φ for all Γ' € U. So 
S is essential for Γ. 
(c) Let Ρ be an extension set for Γ and let Τ be an essential set of Γρ. Take an 
open set V containing π(Γ). Then π _ 1 ( Κ ) is an open set containing T. Since Τ 
is essential for Γρ, there is a number δ > 0 such that E(t) П 7r- 1(V) φ φ, for all 
f e B
s
(Tp). Now suppose that Γ' e BS(T). Then, obviously, T'P € Βδ(ΓΡ). So 
E(T'P) Π тг - 1( 0 φ φ. For an a: e Е(Г'Р) П π - 1 (У) however, Lemma 6.1 implies that 
π (χ) e Ε(Γ') Π V. Hence, π (Τ) is essential for Г. 
In view of the parts (a), (b) and (c), the solution concept OES is p-stable. < 
Next we consider the two stability concepts σα and OQ introduced by Hillas (1990). 
T h e o r e m 6.14 The solution concept он that assigns to a game the collection of 
Η-sets is p-stable. 
Proof. We only show that ан has the projection property. 
Let Ρ be an extension set for the game Γ and suppose that Γ is an Η-set of the game 
Γρ. We have to show that π(Γ) is an Η-set of the game Γ. 
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Let V be an open set containing π(Γ). Then π~ι(ν) is an open neighborhood of T. 
So there is a number δ > 0 such that fix(V') Л тг~1( ) φ φ if ά^φ,β) < ί. 
Furthermore, note that for the KM-perturbation 0 of Γρ we have Δ(π(0)) = Δ(0) = 
Ajvf. So, by Lemma 6.4, there is a constant К > 0 such that for any у G Δχ, and 
ζ' G AM there is a, ζ Ε Δχ, with π(ζ) = г' and 
Up - zu«, < tfmaxfllOIU \\ж(у) - z'||TO} = Κ\\π(υ) - z'\U 
Let φ: Δ—»Δ be an upper semicontinuous compact- and convex-valued correspondence 
with άοοίφ,β) < Κ~ιδ. We will show that fix(<¿>) Г) ф ф. 
Now consider the correspondence φ: Δχ,—»Δχ defined by 
i/>(i) := {y G Δχ Ι π(ΐ/) 6 φ{π(χ))}. 
Since y> is a compact- and convex-valued upper semicontinuous correspondence and 
π is linear, also ψ is a compact- and convex-valued upper semicontinuous correspon­
dence. Furthermore, ά00(φ,β) < δ as we will show now. 
Suppose that у G Ψ(χ)· Then n(y) G φ(π(χ)). Since dTO(<£,/?) < Κ_1δ, there is 
a, ζ' £ β(π(χ)) with ||7r(y) - z'\\oo < Κ~χδ. So a ζ € Δχ can be found such that 
\\y — ¿Hoc < ^ΙΙπ(ΐ/) — 2'lloo < δ and π{ζ) = л'. Then ζ G /3(x) by Lemma 6.1. Hence, 
ψ(χ) С S Í ( / 3 ( X ) ) . In an analoguous way, one proves that /3(x) С Ві{ф{х)). 
The foregoing implies that fix(V0 П 7r - 1(V) 7ε ^. Now if χ* G fix(V0 Π π - 1 (У), then 
π(χ*) G fix(v) and π(χ*) G VA. Hence fix(v) П V Φ ф. Since φ was chosen arbitrarily, 
this implies that π(Τ) is an Η-set of the game Г. <3 
Finally, we come to the second stability concept introduced by Hillas. Since the 
solution concept CQ that assigns to a game the collection of Q-sets is not weakly 
invariant, the following theorem is important. 
Theorem 6.15 The solution concept OQ that assigns to a game the collection of 
Q-sets is p-stable. 
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Proof. We only show that OQ has the projection property. Let Ρ be an extension 
set for the game Γ and suppose that Τ is a Q-set of the game Γρ. In order to prove 
that π(Τ) is a Q-set of the game Г, we first note that π(Τ) is a closed, non-empty 
set. Let V be an open set containing π(Γ). Since Τ is a Q-set of Γρ and 7r - 1(V) is 
an open neighborhood of T, there is a number δ > 0 such that 
Ε(Γ
Ρ
[ξ])Γ\π-ι(ν)ϊφ 
for every Q-perturbation ξ of the game Γρ with ||£||oo < δ. Corresponding to a Q-
perturbation 7 of the game Γ with Ц7Ц00 < ¿ we introduce the Q-perturbation 7 of 
the game Γρ, where for i G N and proper subset К of L% 
/ (ъіКПМг) КффКПМіфМі 
К 0 otherwise. 
Obviously, since Ц7Ц00 < ¿, Ц7Ц00 < 6. Hence, E(TP[j]) Π π - 1 ( ν ) -φ φ and we can 
take a strategy profile χ G Ε(Γρ[7]) Π π _ 1 ( ν ) . Then π(χ) e V. It remains to be 
shown that π(χ) 6 .Ε(Γ[7]). Since for all i G N and all proper subsets К of M, 
nt(x)(K) > xt(K) > ъ[К) = Ъ(К Π M,) = Ъ(К), 
we know that π(χ) e П г ^ Д т ) · Now let у
г
 e Δ,(7). Then the lift z¿ of yt is an 
element of Δ»(7). Hence, u,(x_¿| z¿) < Vi(x-t\ xt). Therefore we have 
Ui{n(x)-t\ yt) = ω,(π(χ)_,| π fa)) = i;¿(x_,| ζ,) < υ,(χ_4 | χ,) = иДтг(х)_,| ^(x¿)). 
Since 7/
г
 was chosen arbitrarily , π(χ) € Ε(Γ[7]). < 
6.9 On propert ies of modified p-stable solution concepts 
In this section we will investigate which properties of a p-stable solution concept are 
inherited by its modification. 
We start with the abr-invariance of a solution concept. So suppose that σ is an 
abr-invariant solution concept. In order to show that the solution concept σ* is abr-
invariant, we need the following result that can easily be proved with the help of 
Lemma 6.1. 
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Lemma 6.11 If two games Γ and Γ* are abr-equivalent, then Γρ and Tp are 
abr-equivalent for any extension set Ρ for the game Γ. 
This lemma implies that a closed subset of Ад/ is e-stable for the game Г if and only 
if it is e-stable for the game Г'. Hence, σ* is abr-invariant if σ has this property. 
6.9.1 ON CONNECTEDNESS, ADMISSIBILITY AND BACKWARD INDUCTION 
Theorem 6.16 (Connectedness) Let σ be a p-stable solution concept. If, for a 
game T, every minimal element of σ(Γ) ¿5 connected, then all elements of σ*(Γ) are 
connected. 
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. 
(a) First we will show that every minimal e-stable set of Γ is connected. So take 
a minimal e-stable set Τ of Γ and suppose that Τ is not connected. Then there 
are two disjoint, non-empty and closed sets ΤΊ and T2 in AM with ΤΊ U T2 = T. 
Furthermore, 7\ and T2 are no e-stable sets of Γ, since Τ is minimal. Then there 
are extension sets Ρ and Q for Γ such that πρ 1 (Τ 1 ) is not an element of σ(Γρ) and 
7rQ1(^2) 1S n o t a n e l e m e n t °f £Т(Г'д). Let Q be the extension set for Γρ consisting of 
the lifts of the elements of Q. Then, by Lemma 6.9 and the projection property of 
" . ^ ( т р Ч Г і ) ) = *PIQ(TI) = 7ГРІС(ГІ) is not an element of σ ( ( Γ
Ρ
) 0 ) = a{TPuQ). 
Similarly, 7Гр^д(Т2) is not an element of а(Гр и д) . 
However, 7ip¿g(T) is an element of ст(Гри<э), since Τ is an e-stable set of Γ. Con­
sequently тгрід(Т) = 7ГрІд(7і) U ipJgtTj) contains a minimal, hence connected, 
element of <х(Гр
и
р). Since 7Tp¿g(Ti) and πρ^ς(Τ 2 ) are non-empty, closed and dis­
joint sets, that connected element of σ(Γρυφ) must be contained in one of these sets. 
Then, in view of the monotonicity property of σ, one of these sets is an element of 
σ(Γρυς?) which leads to a contradiction. 
(b) Let 5 be an element of σ*(Γ). Then there is an extension set Ρ for Γ and a 
minimal e-stable set Τ of Γρ with тгр(Г) = S. From part (a) it follows that Τ is 
connected. Hence, S must be connected since πρ is continuous. < 
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Definition 6.7 A solution concept σ is called perfect-valued if, for every game Γ, 
each minimal element of σ(Γ) is contained in ΡΕ(Γ). 
T h e o r e m 6.17 (Admissibility) If σ is a perfect-valued p-stable solution concept, 
then all elements of σ*(Γ) are contained in PE(F). 
Proof. Again the proof is in two parts. 
(a) First we show that every minimal e-stable set of Γ is contained in PE(T). Let 
S be an e-stable set of Γ. Take an extension set Ρ for Γ. Then, π - 1 (5) is an 
element of σ(Γρ). By the assumption in the theorem and the monotonicity of σ, 
this implies that π - 1 (5) Π ΡΕ(Γρ) is an element of σ(Γ>). Since by Theorem 6.3, 
7T-1{S)nPE(rP) = n-1{S)nx-l(PE{T)), ff-^SnP^r)) is an element of σ(Γ>). 
Hence, S Π PE(T) is an e-stable set of Γ. Therefore, any minimal e-stable set of Γ is 
contained in PE(T). 
(b) Secondly we show that every element of σ*(Γ) must be contained in ΡΕ(Γ). 
Suppose that S is an element of σ*(Γ). Then there is an extension set Ρ for Γ and 
a minimal e-stable set Τ of Γ ρ with π (Τ) = S. From part (a) it follows that Τ is a 
subset of PE(Tp). So, by Theorem 6.3, S = π(Τ) С π(ΡΕ(Τ
Ρ
)) = ΡΕ(Γ). < 
Since every element of σ*(Γ) is also an element of σ(Γ), we clearly have 
T h e o r e m 6.18 (Backward Induction) Let σ be a p-stable solution concept. If, for 
every game Γ, every element of σ(Τ) contains a proper equilibrium, then all elements 
of σ* (Γ) contain a proper equilibrium. 
6.9.2 INDEPENDENCE OF INADMISSIBLE STRATEGIES 
In this section Γ := (M, и) will again be a fixed game. Suppose that S is an e-stable 
set of Г and that the pure strategy m of player j is not an admissible best reply 
against S (i.e., e™ ^ Bj(S)). Let Г' be the game induced by the deletion of the pure 
strategy m of player j in the game Г as in Definition 4.5 of section 4.4.3. 
In order to describe the relation between extensions for the games Г' and Г, take an 
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extension set Ρ for the game Γ'. Note that for the P-extended game T'P = (L',v'), 
v[ = u\ ο πρ. Now we will construct an extension set Ρ for the game Γ in such a 
way that Γ is extended to the game Tp analoguous to the extension of Γ' to Г^. To 
this end we introduce for each p[ € Ρ the strategy p[ in Δ(Μ,) as follows: if г φ j , 
then p[ = p[ and if г — j , then p[ is the strategy obtained from p[ by inserting a zero 
as the m-coordinate. The extension set Ρ := {p[\ p[ € P} yields the extended game 
Γρ = (L,w), where wt := ut ο πρ. 
Lemma 6.12 The pure strategy m of player j in the game Γ ρ is not an admissible 
best reply against π ^ χ ( 5 ) . 
Proof. Suppose that the pure strategy m of player j in the game Γρ is an admissible 
best reply against π ^ 1 (5). Then an χ £ π J,1 (S) can be found such that e!" e ß"(x_j). 
Hence there is a completely mixed sequence {xk)k€lN in A¿ converging to χ such that 
e™ e ßjix'Lj) for all k. Then however, (7Tp(xk))k€iN 1S a completely mixed sequence 
in AM converging to 7г
я
(х) e 5 and, for all k, 
e? = *p(e?)eßJ(np(xk)_J). 
This leads to e"1 e В" (5), which contradicts our assumption concerning m. < 
For an element χ € ( Δ Μ ) Ο := {у € Ал/ I (Уз)т = 0}> "jOfy) is the strategy in (Ам>)} 
obtained by the deletion of the m-th coordinate of the strategy x}. If furthermore vx 
denotes the identity on ( Δ ^ - ^ for г φ j , then v(x) := ( ^ Ί ( Χ Ι ) , . . . , v
n
(x
n
)) defines a 
continuous map :{Ам)о -> Δ Μ 1 · 
Next, it will be shown that Γ'
Ρ
 can be seen as the game induced by the deletion of 
player j ' s pure strategy m from Γρ. This deletion leads to the game ( Γ
ρ
) ' = {L',w'}. 
If μ: ( Д І ) О -* A¡,< is the map associated with the deletion of m, the following lemma 
implies the commutativity of the diagram 
(AL)o — % AL, 
1 π* | "" ' 
(Δ
Μ
)ο —"—> Δ
Μ
. 
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Lemma 6.13 ν ο πρ = πρ ο μ. 
Proof. Note that π
ρ
( χ ) G ( Δ Μ ) Ο for all χ G (A¿)0. 
(a) If i φ j , then for all x, G A(Lt) 
г{[пр]
г
{х,)) = [π
ρ
],(χ,) = [πρ],(χ,) = [πρ],(μ,(χ,))· 
(b) If i = j , we only have to prove that [vonp]J(el) = [προμ]^(β') for alH € Lj\{m}, 
since all maps involved are linear. We consider two cases. If I G M3 \ {τη}, then 
If Ζ e Kj, then 
",(М,(Ф) = ",#) =Р\ = M,(eJ) = M, (^(4)), 
which completes the proof. < 
Lemma 6.14 Г'
Р
 = (Г
р
) ' . 
Proof. Since both games have Δ^> as strategy space, we have to show that w't(x) = 
v[(x) for all χ in Δχ,'. Take an χ in Δ/,< and let χ be the lift of χ in AL. Then, 
xJm = 0, μ(χ) = χ and (р^) т = 0 for all l G K¡. Therefore, 
w[(x) = wl{x) =ut(np(x)) =u't(v{np(x)) =η[(π
Ρ
{μ{χ))) =u't(nP{x)) = v[(x), 
where the fourth equality follows from Lemma 6.13. < 
Corresponding to a closed subset S of Дд^, we consider the set S' := v(S П ( Δ Μ ) Ο ) 
that plays a role in the following definition. 
Definition 6.8 A perfect-valued solution concept τ is independent of inadmissible 
strategies if for any game Γ the following holds: if 5 G τ (Γ) and m is not an admissible 
best reply against S, then S' contains an element of τ(Γ'). 
Theorem 6.19 (Independence of inadmissible strategies) If σ is a perfect-valued 
p-stable solution concept that is independent of inadmissible strategies, then σ* is 
independent of inadmissible strategies. 
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Proof. Let S £ ¿г* (Г) ала assume that m is not an admissible best reply against 
S. We have to show that the set S' contains an element of σ*(Γ'). 
(a) First we consider the set SO '·= 5 Π ( Δ Μ ) Ο · Since S is e-stable, S contains a minimal 
e-stable set T. Then Τ e σ*(Γ) and Theorem 6.17 implies that Τ С РЕ(Г) С So­
if Q is an extension set for the game Γ, π ^ Τ ) С ^ ' ( S o ) . Since Τ is e-stable, 
т ^ С П
 e σ(Γ<3)· Hence, in view of the monotonicity of σ, π^1(5ο) G ст(Гс). There­
fore, So is an e-stable set. 
(b) In order to show that S' is an e-stable set of the game Г', we take an extension 
set Ρ for the game Γ'. 
Let Ρ be the extension set for the game Γ as constructed before. Then, in view of 
part (a), π J,1 (So) is an element of σ(Γρ). Moreover, for any χ € πΤ χ (5 0 ) , 
This implies that π ^ 1 ( 5 0 ) с (A¿)0 . So μ{πρ1(30)) = π Τ 1 ^ ) ' . Therefore, since σ 
is independent of inadmissible strategies, μ(πρ1(3ο)) is a n element of σ((Γρ)'). So, 
μ(π^ 1 (5ο)) is an element of σ(Γ'
Ρ
) by Lemma 6.14. Then, in view of Lemma 6.13, 
irpfrfoHSo))} = " M ^ 1 (So))] = HSo), 
which implies that ß(itpl(So)) С 7Гр1(^'(5о)). Hence, by monotonicity, np1(u(So)) is 
an element of σ{Υ'
Ρ
). Therefore, v(So) = S' is an e-stable set of Γ'. 
(c) Finally, since each e-stable set of Γ' contains an element of σ'(Γ'), the proof is 
complete. < 
6.10 An alternative way to modify solution concepts 
In this section, we describe a method based on an idea of van Damme (1987) to modify 
solution concepts in such a way that the resulting solution concept is invariant. After 
that we will show that this method does not generate solution concepts that inherit 
all the Kohlberg-Mertens properties of the original solution concept. 
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Let σ be a solution concept. We call a closed set S G Δ d-stable if π(5) G σ(Γ*), 
where Γ* is the reduced (normal form) game of the game Γ. Given σ we consider the 
solution concept σ', where σ'(Γ) consist of the minimal d-stable sets. 
T h e o r e m 6.20 (1) If σ satisfies the non-emptiness property and closedness prop­
erty, then σ'(Γ) φ φ, for all Г. 
(2) The modification σ' of a solution concept σ is invariant. 
Proof. (1) Let Γ = Γ*ρ, where Г* is the reduced game of Г. 
First we will show that the class of d-stable sets is non-empty. By the non-emptyness 
of σ(Γ*), we can take an S G σ(Γ*). Then, by definition, π - 1 (5) is a d-stable set. 
Next we will show that each d-stable set S contains a minimal d-stable set. If S is not 
minimal, take a sequence Si D S2 D • • · of d-stable sets contained in S. Then n(Si) D 
7г(5г) D · · ·, so the sequence π(5ι) ,π(52), . . . converges to fit71"^») = π(Π« &)• Since 
Π, ""(S,) G σ(Γ*), by the closedness of σ, also π(Π, St) G σ(Γ*). So f)t St is a d-stable 
set contained in S. Then Zorns lemma implies that there exists a minimal d-stable 
set contained in S. 
(2) Let Γ be a game and let R be an extension set for Γ. Write Γ = Γρ, where Г* is 
the reduced game of Г. 
(a) Let Τ G σ'(Γ
η
). We will prove that nR(T) G σ'(Γ). Since, by Lemma 6.9 (1), 
Гд = (Гр)я = Г р
о Д
, we know that Г* is also the reduced game of Г. Then we know 
that TTp0ji(T) is an element of σ(Γ*) since Τ is a d-stable set of Гд. Hence, by Lemma 
6.9 (2), 7і>[7Гд(Т)] = nPaR(T) G σ(Γ*) and тгд(Т) is a d-stable set of Г. 
In order to prove that 7Гд(Т) is a minimal d-stable set of Г, take a minimal d-stable 
set S С 7Гд(Т). Consider the closed set T' := T r u r ^ S ) . Clearly, π
Ροη
(Τ') = 
7Гр[тгл(Г')] = M S ] i s a n element of σ(Γ*). So, T' is a d-stable set of Гд. Then 
T' — T, since T" С Τ and Τ is a minimal d-stable set of Гд. From this it follows that 
Τ С πη
1
 (S). Hence, тгд(Г) С n^n^iS)] = S С тгд(Т) and 7Гд(Т) = S is a minimal 
d-stable set of Г. 
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(b) Let S £ σ'(Γ) and let ζ* € KR1{S). We will prove that there is a set Γ e 
ст(Гд) with ζ* £ Τ and 7г
л
(Г) = S. Let I be the map defined in Lemma 6.6. 
Take Τ := 1{S). Clearly, г* e Γ and Τ is closed. Furthermore, by Lemma 6.6 (2), 
TTPOR(T) = nP[nR(T)\ = прЦ-1 (l(S))] = irp{S) e σ(Γ·). So, Γ is a d-stable set of 
the game Гд (= Г >
о Я
) . 
Finally, in order to prove that Τ is minimal, take a minimal d-stable set T' С Τ 
of Г
л
. Then тгд(Г') = S, since π
α
(Τ') С π
η
(Τ) = S, nR(T') is d-stable by part 
(2)(a) and S is d-stable by assumption. Hence, since I = π ^ 1 by Lemma 6.6 (2), 
T' = ЫГ)] = l(S) = T. < 
In the next example we show that by modifying a solution concept in this way the 
backward induction property can get lost. 
E x a m p l e 6.11 Reducing the game 
Γ = 
leads to 
Γ* = 
6,0 6,0 η 
8,0 0,8 
0,8 8,0 
3,4 7,0J 
"6,0 6,0 
8,0 0,8 
L0,8 8,0 
For the game Γ*, {(ei,q) € Δ 3 χ Δ 2 | gì £ { j i j i f } } is the only minimal Q-set. 
Note that any d-stable set S of the game Γ contains the strategy pairs (ei, q) with 
?i e { j , 5 , | } . Hence, 
Г : = { ( е і , 9 ) е Д 4 х Д а | g i e { ì , ì , f } } 
is the only minimal Q-set of the game Г. This set however does not contain the only 
proper equilibrium (ei, ( ^ , j¡)) °f *he game Г. Note that all minimal Q-sets contain 
a proper equilibrium and that σ£(Γ) = {E(T)}. < 
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On Q-stable sets 
In this chapter it will be shown that for bimatrix games Q-stable sets are finite. 
As such, this result can be seen as an extension of the finiteness of KM-stable sets 
(minimal strictly perfect sets) of bimatrix games as was proved by Jansen, Jurg and 
Borm (1994). Furthermore we will give an example to show that both our result and 
the result of Jansen, Jurg and Borm cannot be generalized to games with more than 
two players. 
The basis of the finiteness result for bimatrix games is the fact that reply-equivalence 
of strategies generates a finite number of equivalence classes. Two strategies of a 
player are called reply-equivalent if his opponent has the same set of best replies to 
both strategies in any Q-perturbed game. If a Q-set intersects with the product of two 
equivalence classes - one for each player - one point in this intersection is selected. 
By showing that the finite set obtained in this way is also a Q-set the main purpose of 
this chapter is achieved. In the final section we consider a three-person game whose 
unique KM-stable set is a line segment. 
The results in this chapter are based on Vermeulen, Potters and Jansen (1995) and 
Hillas, Vermeulen and Jansen (1995). 
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7.1 Perturbed bimatrix games 
For an m χ n-bimatrix game we write M := {1,2,•••,τη} and N := {1,2,••·,η} 
as usual. In the two-person case we denote a Q-perturbation as a pair (δ,ε), where 
і^
к)ке (М) a n { ^ (ει,)ί&ν(Ν) а г е v e c t o r s of non-negative real numbers. The (δ,ε)-
restricted game corresponding to (A,B) - denoted by (Α,Β,δ,ε) - is defined as the 
game which only differs from (A, B) in the sense that the strategy spaces are restricted 
to the polytopes 
Am(á) := {ρ G Д
т
 I (е
к
,р) > δ
κ
 for all К £ V{M)} 
and 
Δ„(ε) := {q £ Δ
η
 | (eL,q) > EL for all L € V(N)}. 
Note that the set E(A, Β, δ, ε) of equilibria of this restricted game is non-empty if 
||(<5,ε)||οο is small. 
For convenience of the reader we repeat the definition of a Q-stable set for a two-
person game. (cf. Hillas (1990)) 
Definition 7.1 A closed set S of equilibria of (A,B) is called a Q-set if for any 
open set V containing S there is a number η > 0 such that each (δ, s)-restricted game 
with ||(<5,ε)||οο < η has an equilibrium in V. A Q-set that does not properly contain 
another Q-set is called a Q-stable set. 
In the next lemma Q-sets are characterized in terms of sequences. The proof is 
analoguous to the proof of Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 7.1 Let (A,B) be an m χ n-bimatrix game. A closed set S of equilibria 
of (A,B) is a Q-set if and only iflimsvLpkE(A,B,6k^k) Π S φ φ for every sequence 
(¿*,5fc)Jt of completely mixed Q-perturbations converging to zero. 
Proof. We only show that 5 is a Q-set if the condition mentioned in the lemma is 
satisfied. Suppose that S is not a Q-set. Then there exists an open set V containing 
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S such that for every к G IN there is a Q-perturbation (Sk,ek) with ||(<5fc,efc)||oo < £ 
and E{A,B,6k,ek) Π V = φ. For A; e IN we introduce the sequence (6kh,ε*'1)ft6]N 
of completely mixed Q-perturbations defined by 6$ := bkK + £ and ε£Λ := ε£ + £. 
Then, for an open neighborhood 1У of 5 with cl(W) С V, there must be a natural 
number Hk > к such that for all h > Я* 
(If such a number i/* does not exist, cl(W) contains a cluster point (pk, qk) of the se­
quence (E(A,B,Skh,ekh))hlN. In that case {pk,qk) is an equilibrium of (A,B,ôk,ε*) 
contained in the set cl(W) С V, leading to a contradiction with the foregoing.) 
So the sequence (6kHk,ekHk)k ^ of completely mixed Q-perturbations is convergent 
to zero and E{A, B, 6kHk,ekH") П W = φ for all A;. Contradiction. < 
7.2 Two equivalence relations 
In this section we split up the strategy space of each player into a finite number of 
equivalence classes. These classes correspond with the equivalence relations intro­
duced in 
Definition 7.2 For an m χ n-bimatrix game (A,B) two strategies ρ and ρ of 
player 1 are reply-equivalent, denoted as ρ ~д ρ, if C(p) = C(p) and ρ and ρ have the 
same set of best replies in any restricted strategy space Δ
η
(ε) . A similar equivalence 
relation can be defined for the strategies of player 2. 
At this point the reader should convince himself that the equivalence classes corre­
sponding to ~д do not only depend on the best replies in the original game (A, B) 
but. e.g., also second best replies, third best replies, etc. are important. This will be 
elaborated in Example 7.1. 
In order to prove that the number of equivalence classes corresponding to these rela­
tions is finite, we consider a second pair of equivalence relations. First we introduce 
some concepts that play an important role in the definition of these relations. 
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For an extremal point q of the restricted strategy space Δ
η
(ε) we define the tight 
constraints in q by 
Te(q):={L€V(N)\(eL,q)=eL}. 
We associate with q the. polyhedral cone Ke (q) consisting of those points χ in Ж " for 
which 
(eL,x)>0 fo ra l lL€7¡ (g) 
and (ejvji) = 0. 
Since q is an extremal point of the polytope Δ
η
(ε), the cone KE(q) is pointed (cf. sec­
tion 10.1). Hence, by Theorem 10.2, each point in K
c
(q) is a nonnegative combination 
of extremal directions of the cone. 
An important role in the definition of our equivalence relations is played by the union 
7І2 of all extremal directions of length one (with respect to || ||oo) over all possible 
cones of the form K
e
(q). The set TZ\ of extremal directions of length one in IRm is 
defined analogously. 
Now note that each cone K
e
(q) is described in terms of a subset T
e
(q) of V(N). Since 
V(N) is a finite set, this makes clear that there are only finitely many cones in M n 
that can be written as K
e
 (q) for some ε and q. Furthermore, since each of these cones 
is polyhedral and pointed, it has only finitely many extremal directions of length one 
by Theorem 10.2. Hence, TZ-¿ must be finite. Similarly 7?.i is a finite set. So we have 
a proof of 
Theorem 7.1 Tt\ and V,2 чге finite sets. 
Note that, by Theorem 10.3, 111 and TZ2 are just the sets of (normalized) directions 
of the edges of all possible restricted strategy spaces. So obviously all vectors of the 
form ві — ej for some i and j with г φ j are extremal directions. In the Example 7.2 
we will show that also extremal directions of a different form are possible. 
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Definition 7.3 For an m χ n-bimatrix game (A, B) we say that two strategies ρ 
and ρ of player 1 are direction-equivalent (denoted as ρ ~d t r p) if C(p) = C(p) and 
pBr > 0 if and only if pBr > 0 for all r € H2. 
A similar equivalence relation can be defined on Δ
η
. Now, since both Hi s are fi­
nite sets according to Theorem 7.1, there are only finitely many equivalence classes 
corresponding to the relation ~di
r
. In order to show that the number of equivalence 
classes corresponding to ~д is also finite, we need 
L e m m a 7.2 Direction-equivalent strategies are reply-equivalent. 
Proof. Assume that ρ ~d t r ρ and that g is a best reply in Δ η (ε) to p. We only 
show that q is also a best reply to p. Because the set of best replies in Δ
η
(ε) to ρ is 
exactly the set of points in Δ„(ε) where q i-t pBq attains its maximum, this set is the 
convex hull of those extremal points of Δ
η
(ε) that are best replies to p. Therefore we 
may assume without loss of generality that q is an extremal point of Δ„(ε). 
(a) Let q' e Δ„(ε). Then q' —q 6 K
e
(q). So q' - q = V Λ,Η, where for all j , Χ3 > 0 
and r3 is an extremal direction of K£(q). Hence, 
pBq' = pB(q + ^ \}r3) = pBq + ^ ^зРВг3. 
3 ] 
So, the proof is complete if we can show that pBr3 < 0 for all j . 
(b) For a fixed j , consider the vector q" :— q + Xr3, where λ > 0. Then, for a set L 
in Τ
ε
 (q) we have 
(eL,q") = {еь,Я + Xr3) > (eL,q) = eL, 
while for an L $ T
e
(q), (e¿, q") > ει for small λ. Hence q" is an element of Δ
η
(ε) for 
some small λ > 0 and r3 = A_ 1(g" — q). Now we can deduce that, for τ3 in K
e
(q), 
pBr3 = pBX-^q" -q) = X^pBiq" -q)<0. 
This implies that pBr3 < 0 also holds, since ρ ~^
Ι Γ
 p. < 
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The equivalence classes in Д
т
 corresponding to ~д are denoted by Vi,..., к and 
those in Δ
η
 by Wi, . . . , W¿. 
Example 7.1 Consider the 2 x 3-bimatrix game 
~0,3 1,0 1,2 
(A,B) = 
1,0 0,3 1,2 
For a Q-perturbation (J,e) of the game (A, B), the polytope Дз(е) is a subset of the 
strategy space Δ 3 of player 2. If £{&,/} > ejt +e/ for all fc, l e {1,2,3} with fc φ I, this 
polytope looks like the shaded area in the next picture. 
Here "£{12}" ("£{2}") indicates the line segment in Дз(е) defined by the linear equality 
<7l + 92 = £{1,2} (?2 = £{2})· 
Consider the extremal points q1 and q2 of Δ 3 (ε) in the picture. The extremal direction 
г = (1,-1,0) in R2 is obtained by normalizing q1 — q2. Take ρ = ( ^ , ^ ) and 
ρ' = ( j^ , ^ ) . Then the calculations 
5 7 , 7 5 
p ß r = — 3 - — · 3 < 0 and ρ'Br = — - 3 - — · 3 > 0 
12 12 12 12 
show that ρ and ρ' are not direction-equivalent. They are also not reply equivalent 
since pB attains its maximum over Дз(е) in q2 and p'B in ql. < 
eL •= < 
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Example 7.2 For the strategy space Δ
η
 with η > 4 and for η G (0, 5 ^ т ) w e 
consider the Q-perturbation (£ь)ьет>(і ) with 
• 3η if \L\ = 2, n € L 
щ if |L| = n - 1 
τ? if |L| = 1 
V 0 else. 
Take the vectors q and q' in Δ
η
 defined by 
9 : = (1-7177,77, ...,77,277) and 9' := (1 - (2n - 3)η,2η,... ,2*7,77). 
Note that 77 < ^ ζ ϊ implies that both 1 - 7177 and 1 — (2n - 3)77 are larger than 277. 
Then it is easy to check that q,q' € Δ
η
(ε) . Furthermore, 
%(q) = №, {i, n} I 2 < i < n - 1} U {{2,.... тг}} 
and %(q') = {{i,n} I 2 < г < n - 1} U {{n}}. 
So, %{q) Π Te{q') = {{i,n} | 2 < г < тг — 1}. Then q and q' are neighboring extremal 
points of Δ
η
(ε) , which implies that the normalization oîq—q' = 77(71—3, — 1 , . . . , —1,1) 
is an extremal direction of Δ
η
(ε) . < 
7.3 On t h e equivalence classes 
The next theorem is the main tool in the proof of the finiteness of Q-stable sets. 
Loosely speaking, the theorem says that each limsupkE(A,B,Sk,ek) is the union 
over a certain number of equivalence classes V x W . 
Theorem 7.2 Let (A, B) be an πι χ n-bimatrix game and let the strategy pair 
(p,q) be an element of\ims\i-pkE(A,B,Sk,eh) for some sequence {^к>£к)кег^ of com­
pletely mixed Q-perturbations converging to zero. If (p, q) € V* x W* for some equiv-
alence classes V* and W* corresponding to ~д, then 
V* x W* С Η ι η β ι ι ρ ^ Λ , Β , ί ' , ε * ) . 
к 
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If the conditions mentioned in the theorem are satisfied, we may suppose, without loss 
of generality, that there exists a sequence {pk,Qk)ke1N converging to (p, q) such that, 
for every к € IN, (ph,qk) is an equilibrium of the game (A,B,6k,ek). Since there are 
only finitely many equivalence classes corresponding with ~д, this sequence can be 
taken in such a way that all points pk are contained in some equivalence class, say V, 
corresponding with ~д, and all qk are contained in some equivalence class, say W, 
corresponding with ~д. 
In order to prove that an arbitrarily chosen point (p, q) € V* x W* is an element of 
the set limsupj. E(A,B,Sk,ek), we introduce, for each A; G IN, the strategies 
pk ~ pk + (p - p) and qk :=qk + (q-q). 
Obviously, (pk, qk) -> (p, q) as к -¥ oo. So the proof of Theorem 7.2 is complete if we 
can show that (pk,qk) € E(A,B,6k,ek) for large k. To that purpose we consider, for 
each к € IN, the minimal face Fjt of Am(Sk) containing pk and the minimal face G к 
of Δ
η
(ε*) containing qk. 
In the following two lemmas we will prove that pk £ F* П V and qk € G к П W for 
large к. 
L e m m a 7.3 pk € Fk and qk € Gk for large к. 
Proof. We only prove the second inclusion. 
(a) First we show that qk is an element of A
n
(ek) for large k. For an L € V(N) we 
consider the cases C{q) f)L = φ and C(q) Π L φ φ (keep in mind that C(q) = C(q)). 
First assume that C(q) Г\Ьф φ, say jo 6 C(q) Π L. 
Take 0 < η < | min{gj | j e C(q)}. Since qk -> q and ||e*||oo -* 0, as A: -> oo, we 
know that for large k, q^g > qjo -η > 2η-η — η and Цег^ Цоо < η. Hence, for large k, 
(eL,qk) >qk0>V>ekL-
Secondly, for an L with C(q) Π L = φ, (ε^,ς) = (e¿,q) = 0. So 
(eL,qk) = (eL,qk + q - q) = (eL,qk) > e\. 
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η 
Together with the observation that Υ] qk = 1, the foregoing implies that qk G Δ„(ε*) 
for large k. 
(b) In order to prove that qk is an element of G* for large k, we will show that, 
for large k, %k(qk) = T
e
k(qk). Now suppose that {eL,qk) = ekL. If L Π C(q) φ φ, 
then (e£,gfc) > 0. Therefore, (ei,qk) > ε\ for large k. So we may conclude that 
L Π C{q) = φ. In that case (eL, qk) = (eL,qk + q- q) = (ei,qk) = E\. < 
L e m m a 7.4 pk G V and çfc G W /or iarje A;. 
Proof. We only show that, for large k, pk G V, i.e. pk ~д pk. First note that 
C(pk) = C(pk) for large k, because both strategies are completely mixed. Let 
{^L)LGV,N\ be a vector such that Δ η (ε) φ φ and let ς be a best reply in Δ η (ε) φ φ 
to pk. The proof is complete if we can show that q is also a best reply to pk for large 
k. So, we must show that for large к 
pkB(q -q')>0 for all q' e Δ
η
(ε) . 
We consider two cases. 
(1) Suppose that (for all k) pkB(q - q') > 0 for some q' G Δ
η
(ε) . 
Since pk G V for all k, q is a best reply to pk for all k. This implies that g is a best 
reply to p. Hence q is also a best reply to p, because ρ ~д p. So pB(q — q') > 0. 
If pB(q — q') > 0, then pkB(q — q') > 0 for large k, because pk -> ρ as к -¥ со. If 
pB(q — q') = 0, then q' is also a best reply to p. In that case q' is also a best reply to 
ρ and pB(q — q') = 0 . This implies that 
pkB(q - q') = pkB(q - q') + pB(q - q') -
 PB(q - q') = pkB(q - q') > 0. 
(2) Suppose that (for all k) pkB(q - q') = 0 for some q' G Δ
η
(ε) . 
As in part (1) one can show that also in this case pB(q — q')= pB(q — q') = 0 . Hence 
pkB(q - q') = pkB(q - q') = 0 . < 
With the help of the Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, we get 
( p \ qk) e (Fk Π V) x (G* Π W) for large к. 
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Hence, (pk,qk) G E(A,B,6k,ek) for large A; as is implied by 
Lemma 7.5 For all A; e IN, (Fk П V) χ (Gk Π W) is a subsei of E{A,B,Sk,ek). 
Proof. Let fc e IN. Take (p',q') € (Fk Π V) χ (G* П W). Because both pk and 
ρ' are elements of V, pk ~ n p'. Since (p*, gfc) e E(A,B,Sk,ek), qk is a best reply 
in Δ
η
(ε*) to pk. So by definition, qk is also a best reply in Δ
η
(ε*) to p'. Then 
however all elements of Gk - the minimal face containing q
k
 - are best replies in 
Δ
η
(ε*) to p'. In particular q' is a best reply to p'. Similarly, p' is a best reply to q', 
so (p',q') e E(A,B,Sk,ek). « 
7.4 The finiteness of Q-stable sets 
In this section we show that for a bimatrix game each Q-set contains a finite Q-set. 
In particular this implies that Q-stable sets are finite. 
Let 5 be a Q-set of a bimatrix game (A, B). If for some equivalence classes V and W 
S n ( V x W ) ^ 
we select one point in this intersection. The set of equilibria selected in this way is 
denoted by S*. Using this selection method we can prove 
Theorem 7.3 For a bimatrix game every Q-set contains a finite Q-set. 
Proof. Because there are only finitely many equivalence classes, it is obvious that 
S* is a finite set. Since S is a Q-set, we know that 5nlimsup f c E(A,B,ôk,£k) is non-
empty for agiven sequence (Sk,ek). _j of completely mixed Q-perturbations converg-
ing to zero. Take a point (p',q') in this intersection. Take the equivalence classes V 
and W containing p' and q', respectively. Then (p', q') e 5Π (V χ W). Hence, by con­
struction, S* contains an element, say (p*,q*), of V x W. By Theorem 7.2, (p*,q*) is 
also an element of lim supfc E(A, B,5k,ek). Consequently, S*nlimsup fc E(A,B,Sk,ek) 
is non-empty. Since the sequence (Sk,ek)k ^ was chosen arbitrarily, by Lemma 7.1, 
S* is a Q-set. < 
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Since a Q-stable set is simply a minimal Q-set, Theorem 7.3 implies 
Corollary 7.1 For a bimatrix game every Q-stable set is finite. 
Furthermore Theorem 7.3 implies that the set of all equilibria of a bimatrix game 
contains a finite Q-set. This provides a new proof of 
Corollary 7.2 Every bimatrix game possesses a Q-stable set. 
Finally, we give an example of a game with a unique Q-stable set. 
Example 7.3 For the 2 χ 3-bimatrix game in Example 7.1 the set of equilibria 
E(A, B) equals {p e Δ 2 | § < px < §} χ {e3}. Now take a Q-stable set S С E{A, В). 
Since the equivalence classes of player 1 generated by ~R are Vi := {(1,0)}, V2 := 
{(§, D b з := {(!, è)}, V4 := {(Ì, | ) } , V5 := {(0,1)}, V6 := {(p, 1 - p)| ρ € (1, §)}, 
V7 := {(p, 1 - p ) | p G (f, §)}, V8 := {(ρ, 1 -p)\ ρ e ( | , ì )} and V9 := {(p, 1 -p)\ p G 
( | , 0 )} , it is clear that only the sets V¿ χ {ез} with г = 2,3,4,7,8 can occur as a 
non-empty intersection of a set V x W with S, since S С E(A,B). Furthermore, for 
г = 2,3,4, Vi x {e3} is a set consisting of one point. So, 
Т:={(И).(И),(Шх{е»} 
must be a subset of S. However, since Τ has a non-empty intersection with cl(Vj) χ 
{ез} for i = 7,8, Τ itself is a Q-set. Hence, Τ is the only Q-stable set of this game. < 
7.5 Stable sets for games with more than two players 
In the previous section we showed that Q-stable sets of bimatrix games are finite. We 
also mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that Jansen, Jurg and Borm (1994) 
proved the finiteness of KM-stable (minimal strictly perfect) sets of bimatrix games. 
We will show that these results cannot be extended to normal form games with more 
that two players. 
We will present a three-player normal form game whose unique KM-stable set is a line 
segment (so clearly not a finite set). Furthermore, this line segment is also exactly 
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the set of perfect equilibria. Since each Q-stable set contains a KM-stable set and is 
itself contained in the set of perfect equilibria (cf. Hillas (1990), this example is also 
a counterexample for the finiteness of Q-stable sets for games with more than two 
players. In fact, the same line of reasoning shows that the finiteness result cannot be 
obtained for any stability concept whose stable sets contain KM-stable sets. 
Example 7.4 We consider a three player game Γ where players 1 and 2 have two 
pure strategies each, while the third player has three pure strategies. In the tableau 
below, player 3 has to make a choice between strategies L, M and R. Given his choice, 
players 1 and 2 are involved in a 2 χ 2-bimatrix game where player 1 is the row-player 
and player 2 the column-player. Given the choice of all three players, the numbers 
in the corresponding entry in this tableau denote the payoffs of players 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
L : 
1,0,1 0,0,1 
0,0,1 1,0,1 
M R : 
1,0,0 0,1,0 
.0,0,0 1,0,0 
'1,0,0 0,0,0" 
.0,1,0 1,0,0. 
Take a KM-perturbation ζ := ((0, 0), (0, 0), (0, ζ2, Сз)) of Г with ζ2 > 0 and ζ3 > 0. 
First we will show that the (-perturbed game Γ[ζ] has a unique equilibrium. 
So, let ((x\, x2), (3/1,2/2)1 (zi, Z2> 23)) be an equilibrium of Γ[ζ]. Note that the pure 
strategies M and R of the third player are strictly dominated by L. Therefore player 
3 will play those two strategies with minimum weight in an equilibrium: z2 = C2 and 
z3 = C3. Hence, ( z b z2, z3) = (1 - ζ2 - ζ3, ζ2, ζ3). 
Now it is easy to see that ( ( i i , x2), (3/1, y2)) must be an equilibrium of the 2 x 2 -
bimatrix game (A, B) with player 1 as row-player and player 2 as column-player and 
payoff matrices 
Α ­
Ι 0 
0 1 
and В := 
0 Сз 
Сг 0 
Since both C2 and Сз are larger than zero, the game has exactly one Nash equilibrium; 
a simple calculation shows that {{x\, х2),(Уіі îte)) must be equal to the strategy 
triplet ((C2(C2 + Сз)" 1, Сз(С2 + Сз)"1) (f, §))· 
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So the unique equilibrium of Τ[ζ] is 
((C2(C2 + СзГ1, Сз(Сг + СзГ1), (è, §), (i - Ca - Сз, Ca, Cs))· 
Now take Сз > 0 and α > 0. For the KM-perturbation С with C2 : = аСз> the unique 
equilibrium of Г[С] can be written as 
Р(Сз, a) := (( ïfs, i b ) , (è- è)- (1 - (1 + «)Сз, <*Сз, Сз))· 
Hence, ρ(α) := ((-jx^, ï+^), (§> 2)' (*> 0, 0)) = ^ m Р(Сзі α ) must be an element of 
any KM-set of Г. This observation implies that 
Γ :={((*, i - t ) , ( i , | ) , (1,0,0)) | i e [0,1]} 
must be a subset of any KM-set 5 of Γ by the closedness of 5. Then the fact that 
Τ = ΡΕ(Γ) and the admissibility of KM-stable sets leads to the conclusion that Τ is 
the unique KM-sable set of Γ. 
In the same way it can be shown that Τ is contained in each Z-set of a stability 
concept Ζ satisfying "every Z-stable set contains a KM-stable set". If Ζ also satisfies 
admissibility we can even conclude that Τ is the unique Z-stable set of Γ. (Provided, 
of course, that we have existence for Z.) < 

Chapter 8 
Strictly perfect 
and (strictly) proper equilibria 
In the theory of normal form games the notions of (strictly) perfect алсі proper equi­
librium are probably the best known refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. By 
definition both strictly perfect and proper equilibria are perfect. In his monograph 
van Damme (1987) indicated that he had run into difficulties in trying to prove that 
a strictly perfect equilibrium is proper. For this reason he introduced strictly proper 
equilibria and proved that such equilibria are (strictly perfect and) proper. The ques­
tion whether a strictly perfect equilibrium is (strictly) proper remained open. In 
section 2 of this chapter two examples are given showing that strictly perfect equilib­
ria need neither be strictly proper nor proper. Furthermore it is proved that strictly 
perfect equilibria of 3 x 3-bimatrix games and zero sum games are indeed proper 
(sections 3 and 4, respectively). Finally in section 4 it is proved that, in the case of 
a bimatrix game, an equilibrium is strictly proper if it is both strictly perfect and 
quasi-strong. 
This chapter is based on Jansen and Vermeulen (1995) and Vermeulen and Jansen 
(1995). 
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8.1 Some definitions 
In this section we define strictly perfect and strictly proper equilibria for bimatrix 
games as introduced by Okada (1981) and van Damme (1987), respectively. Both 
kinds of equilibria have a stability property with respect to KM-perturbations of the 
strategy spaces of the players. Therefore we repeat for two-person games the definition 
of a KM-perturbation. 
Let (A, ß ) be an m χ n-bimatrix game. As we know, a KM-perturbation of (A, B) is 
a a pair {δ, ε) € ΠΙ™ χ Ж " such that the sets 
Δ » № := {Ρ 6 Δ „ | pt > δ, for all i} 
and Δ
η
(ε) := {q € Δ „ | q} > ε-, for all j} 
are non-empty. The (δ, ε)-perturbed game corresponding to (A,B) is denoted by 
(ΑΒ,δ,ε). 
Using for a strategy ρ € Am(¿) and a strategy q € Δ
η
(ε) the notation Cg(p) := 
{¿| p, > ¿,} and Ce(q) := {j\ q3 > ε3), Corollary 2.1 implies 
Lemma 8.1 A strategy pair (p, q) £ Am(¿) χ Δ
η
(ε) is an equilibrium of (Α, Β, δ, ε) 
if and only if 
С5(р)сРВх(Ч) and Ce(q)cPB2(p). 
By requiring stability against all (small) perturbations in strategies, Okada introduced 
the concept of strictly perfect equilibrium. 
Definition 8.1 An equilibrium (p,q) € E(A,B) is called strictly perfect if for any 
open neighborhood V of (p, q) there exists a number η > 0 such that V Π E(A, Β, δ, ε) 
is non-empty for all KM-perturbations (δ,ε) with \\(δ,ε)||οο < η. 
Clearly an equilibrium {p,q) is strictly perfect if and only if the set {(p,q)} is a 
KM-stable set. As in Lemma 4.2 one can show that in the foregoing definition the 
KM-perturbations may be chosen to be completely mixed. 
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In trying to prove the conjecture that a strictly perfect equilibrium is proper, van 
Damme introduced strictly proper equilibria. 
Definition 8.2 An equilibrium (p, q) € E(A, B) is called strictly proper if there 
exist a neighborhood U of 0 € Ш.™ χ IR" and a continuous function ƒ : E/ -* A
m
 χ Δ
η 
such that 
(a) /(δ,ε) Ε Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε), for all (δ,ε) e Ù 
(b) lim ƒ (δ, ε) = (ρ, q). 
(¿,ε)->(0,0) 
It is obvious that a strictly proper equilibrium is also strictly perfect. 
All known relations between (strictly) perfect and (strictly) proper equilibria are 
displayed in the following diagram. 
proper 
strictly proper /* ( M y e r s o n ( 1 9 7 8 » \ perfect 
(van Damme (1987)) ^
 s t r i c t l y perfect ^ ( S e l t e n <1 9 7 5» 
(Okada (1981)) 
Furthermore it is well-known that, generally speaking, perfection implies neither 
properness nor strict perfection and that properness implies neither strict perfection 
nor strict properness. 
In section 8.2 the diagram is completed. First we will present an example of Peter Jurg 
of a strictly perfect and proper equilibrium that is not strictly proper. Concerning 
the question whether a strictly perfect equilibrium is proper, only some partial results 
were obtained by various authors. Borm (1990) showed that for 2 χ n-bimatrix games 
strictly perfect equilibria are proper. Furthermore it can be proved that a strictly 
perfect equilibrium of a two-person zero-sum game is proper (cf. section 4). In the 
next section, we will give an example of a 3 χ 4-bimatrix game with a strictly perfect 
equilibrium that is not proper. This shows that the implications in the diagram are 
the only ones that are true in general. 
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8.2 Two counterexamples 
We start with an example of Peter Jurg to show that not every strictly perfect (or 
proper) equilibrium is strictly proper. 
Example 8.1 Consider the 3 χ 3-bimatrix game (A,B) given by 
•1,0 1,0 i,o-
(A,B)= 2,0 0,1 0,2 
.0,2 2,1 0,0. 
For this game E{A, B) = S U T, where 
S := {e,} X {q e Δ 3 | 9 ι < \,q2 < \) 
and 
Г:={р€Д 3 |р 2 =рз}х{(е.г.°)} · 
For the perturbed game (Α,Β,δ,ε) we have 
({(l-263,S3,S3)}x{qeA3(e)\q1 = 11} 
{(1 - i 2 - δ3ιδ2,δ3)} x{qe Δ 3 ( ε ) | qi < \,q2 < \) 
{ ( ( 1 - А а - * з , * 2 , * з ) , ( е і , е 2 , 1 - е і - е 2 ) ) } и 
{ ( l -2J 2 ,5 2 ,<5 2 ) }x{geA 3 (£) |92 = H 
Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) = < 
if δ2 < ¿3 
if <52 = ¿3 
if δ2 > δ3. 
Now take (p*, q*) - ((1,0,0), {\, \, 0)). We will show that (p*,q*) is a strictly perfect 
and proper equilibrium that is not strictly proper. 
Clearly, (p*,g*) is a strictly perfect equilibrium of the game (A,B). The equilibrium 
is also proper, because ((1 - η, |τ?, \η),{\ —'П^2~'П^ 2т;)), is an 877-proper pair for all 
0 < η < i . 
Now we will show that (p*,q*) is not strictly proper. Suppose that (p*,q*) is strictly 
proper. Then there is a neighborhood U С Ш+ x IR+ of (0,0) and a continuous 
function ƒ:{/ -)· Δ 3 χ Δ 3 with f(6,e) e Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) and lim ¡(δ,ε) = (p*,q*). 
(<5,ε)->(0,0) 
Strictly perfect and (strictly) proper equilibria 165 
Take a fixed completely mixed ε G IR+ (sufficiently small) and a number η > 0. For 
λ G (0,1), define ¿(λ) := (η, Χη, (1 - Χ)η). Let 
L = L „ : = { ( Î ( A ) ) £ ) | 0 < À < 1 } 
be the line segment of KM-perturbations (<5(λ),ε) of (A, B). Clearly, L = L
v
 С U for 
sufficiently small η and ε. We will argue that there cannot be a continuous function 
ƒ ~ Up,fq)'-L -*• Δ 3 χ Δ 3 with /(δ(Χ),ε) e Ε(Α,Β,δ(Χ),ε) at all. Suppose that 
such a function ƒ does exist. Consider the following picture: 
e 3 
The outer triangle depicts Δ3 and the inner triangle depicts Δ 3 (ε). If (δ(Χ),ε) is a 
KM-perturbation in L with 0 < λ < | , then δ(Χ)2 < <5(λ)3. In which case we know 
that qi = \ for every (p,q) G E{A,Β,δ(Χ),ε). Specifically, /4(δ(Χ),ε)χ = \. Hence, 
by the continuity of ƒ,, ί4{δ{\),ε)ι = \. 
On the other hand, for | < λ < 1 we get <5(Л)г > ¿(λ)3. Then the fact that 
/(<5(λ),ε) G Ε(Α,Β,δ(Χ),ε) yields f9(S(X),e)i G {ει, § - /,( ί(λ),ε) 3 } . Furthermore, 
we know that Д(а(А),г)з > ε 3. So, /4{δ(Χ),ε)ι < т а х { г і , | — ε 3 }. Then, by the 
continuity of fq, /4{δ(^),ε)ι < тах{гі, \ — ε 3} < \. Contradiction. Hence, such a 
function ƒ does not exist, which implies that (p*,q*) is not strictly proper. < 
Next we give an example of a strictly perfect equilibrium that is not proper. 
Q2 = 
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Example 8.2 Consider the 3 χ 4-bimatrix game 
(A,B) = 
1,3 
7,0 
0,0 
0,0 
7,0 
1,3 
0,2 
-3,0 
0,2 
0,2 
0,0 
0,2 
For this game (e 2,e 4) is an equilibrium. We will show that (е2,е^) is a strictly 
perfect but not a proper equilibrium. However, first we will give an impression of 
the geometric aspects of this counterexample. Consider the picture below. The x-y 
plane depicts the space K, of KM-perturbations. The z-axis depicts the strategy space 
Δ 3 χ Δ4. The two shaded triangles depict the graph of the equilibrium correspondence 
over the space of KM-perturbation close to the target equilibrium (e2,ei). 
In fact, a perturbed game has more than one equilibrium close to this equilibrium 
(each point represents a "vertical" line segment of equilibria) but still, locally, the 
graph over the completely mixed KM-perturbations consists of two separate con-
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vex parts. The overlap indicated by the dotted lines corresponds to those KM-
perturbations (δ, ε) e /С with 2δ3 > ¿ι and 2δχ > <S3. Clearly, the equilibrium 
correspondence is not convex-valued in this area. This is a nessecity for a coun­
terexample, since a strictly perfect equilibrium with an equilibrium correspondence 
that is locally convex-valued is always proper (cf. Theorem 8.3 and Theorem 4.8). 
In order to show that (e 2,e 4) is strictly perfect, take a completely mixed KM-pertur-
bation (δ,ε) of (A,B). We distinguish two overlapping cases. 
(a) If ¿i > ¿3, we consider the strategy pair (p,q) € Δ 3 χ Δ4, where 
' 9i = ει 
' Pl = δι 
P2 = 1 - 3¿i 
p 3 = 2¿i 
and 
92 Ιεχ + ε2 + ε 3 
9з = т £ 1 + 2 ε 2 + 2ε3 
.94 = 1 - 6 | ε ι - 3 ε 2 - 3 ε 3 · 
Then (p,q) e Δ3{δ) χ Δ 4 (ε) for small (δ,ε) and (ρ,q) -> (e 2,e 4) as (δ,ε) -> (0,0). 
Since eiAq = e3Aq > e\Aq, we know that Cg(p) = {2,3} = PB\(q). The equality 
pB = (3<$i,6¿i,6<5i,6¿i) implies that C
€
(q) = {2,3,4} = PB2(p). So, in view of 
Lemma 8.1, (p,q) is an equilibrium of the perturbed game (Α,Β,δ,ε) for small (δ,ε). 
(b) If ¿3 > ¿1, we consider the strategy pair (p, q) e Δ 3 χ Δ 4 , where 
' q\ = ei + \ε2 + ε 3 
' P i = 2 ¿ 3 
Ρ2 = 1 - 3¿3 
, Рз = <5з 
and 
92 = ε 2 
9 3 = 2εχ + ψε2 + 2ε3 
. g4 = 1 - 3εχ - 6 | ε 2 - 3ε3. 
Then (p,q) G Δ3(<5) x Δ 4(ε) for small (δ,ε), (p,q) -* (e 2,e 4) as (δ,ε) -+ (0,0) and, 
as in part (a), one can show that (p,q) is an equilibrium of the perturbed game 
(Α,Β,δ,ε) for small (δ,ε). 
In order to show that (e 2,e 4) is not proper, suppose that (p,q) is an //-proper pair 
close to (e 2,e 4) with η small. 
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Suppose that pBe\ > pBe\. Then q± < щ\ by the n-properness of (p,q). This is 
impossible since q is close to e±. Hence, pBe\ < pBe\. A similar argument shows that 
pBe2 < рВе^. These last two inequalities can be written as p\ < 2p3 and рз < 2ρχ. 
So, the inequalities pz < ηρι or p
x
 < ηρ3 cannot hold (since ρ is completely mixed). 
Therefore e\Aq = e3Aq by the η-properness of (p, q). This equality yields qi = q2. 
Furthermore, if e2Aq < e3Aq, then p2 < ηρ3 by the 77-properness of (p, q). This is 
impossible since ρ is close to e 2. Hence e^Aq > e3Aq, which yields 7<h +6^2—3^3 > 0. 
Together with the equation qi = qi this leads to the inequality ІЗдг > З93. 
Now the assumption that pBe2 < pBe3 implies q2 < щ3. This inequality together 
with 3<7з < ІЗдг leads to the contradiction 
ІЗ92 < 13r/g3 < 3q3 < 13q2. 
So we may conclude that pße2 > pBe3 = pBe± > pBe2. Hence, the equality pBe2 = 
pBe3 holds. Since the equality q\ = q2 implies that pBe\ = pBe2, we have pBe\ = 
pBe2 = pBe3. This is impossible for a completely mixed strategy ρ e Δ3. < 
8.3 The three by three case 
The previous example shows that a strictly perfect equilibrium of an m χ n-bimatrix 
game need not be proper when m > 3 and n > 4. However, Borm (1990) showed that 
strictly perfect equilibria of 2 χ n-bimatrix games are proper. We will now show the 
same for the only remaining case, i.e. 3 χ 3-bimatrix games. 
Theorem 8.1 Every strictly perfect equilibrium of a 3 χ 3-bimatrix game (A,B) is 
a proper equilibrium. 
The proof of this theorem is subdived into three cases. These cases will be treated 
separately in Lemma 8.2 till Lemma 8.4. 
Let (A,B) be a 3 χ 3-bimatrix game. Let (p*,<?*) be a strictly perfect equilibrium 
of (A,B). Wc will show that (p*,q*) is proper. Assume w.l.o.g. that 1 € C(p*) and 
1 e C(q'). 
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Lemma 8.2 If either |C(p*)| > 2 or \C{q*)\ > 2, then (p*,q*) is proper. 
Proof. Assume that |C(p*)| > 2. Then we can also assume that {1,2} С C(p*). 
Define 
С := min{p* | i e С{р*)} (< 1). 
Choose μ > 0 such that μ < \ζ. Define V := Βμ?{ρ*,α*). Then, since (p*,q*) is 
strictly perfect, there exists an η > 0 such that 
Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε)πνφφ 
for all KM-perturbations with ||(á,e)||oo < V- Clearly we may assume that η < μ. We 
will prove that there exists a μ-proper pair (p,q) in Δ 3 χ Δ 3 with \\(p, q)-(p*,q*)\\oo < 
μ. Take 
δ:=ε:={η,η2,η3) and ё := (η,η3,η2). 
(a) Assume that |C(g*)| > 2. W.l.o.g. {1,2} С C(q*). Since ||(¿,e)||oo < П there is 
a strategy pair (p,q) G Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) with \\{p,q) — (p*,?*)||oo < M· We will show that 
(p, q) is μ-proper. Since (p, q) E V, we can calculate that for i = 1,2, 
Pi >Pt -μ2>ρ*ί-μ>ΡΪ - -^ > ^C > v-
So, {1,2} С Cs(p). Then, by Corollary 2.1, eiAq = e2Aq > e3Aq. Similarly, ρΒβχ = 
рВе
г
 > рВез. 
Now assume that e3Aq < e2Aq(= e\Aq). Then, again by Corollary 2.1, p 3 = η3. So, 
рг = η
3
 < η • η < ηρι < μρ\ 
and рг = η3 — η • η2 < ηρ? < μρ2· 
Similarly we can show: if pBe3 < pBe2{= pBe\) then q3 < ßqi and q3 < μςΊ. This 
shows that (p, q) is μ-proper. 
(b) Suppose that \C{q*)\ = 1. Then C(q*) = {1}. Take 
(p,q)eE(A,B,6,e) 
and (p,q) ΕΕ(Α,Β,δ,ε) 
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Case 1. Suppose that ipBei > pBe3. We will show that (p,q) is μ-proper. 
Because of the assumption pBe2 > рВез and the fact that (p,q) e Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) we 
know pBei > pBe2 > pBe3 and e\Aq = e2Aq > e3Aq. Suppose that {e\Aq =)e2Aq > 
e3Aq. Then, like in (a), we can deduce that p3 < μρχ and p3 < μρ^. Furthermore, 
the fact that рВе
л
 > pBe2 > pBe3 only leaves us to check the cases pBe\ > pBe2, 
pBe\ > pBe3 and pBe2 > pBe3. To this end, note that (p, q) G Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) and we 
can again use Corollary 2.1. So: if pBei > pBe2, then q2 = ε2 = η
2
 = η · η < Щ\ < 
μqι. lîpBei > pBe3, then q3 = ε3 = η
ζ
 < η·η < щ\ < μqι. Finally, if pBe2 > pBe3, 
then q3 = ε3 = η
3
 < η • η2 < ηq2 < μ<72· Hence, (ρ, g) is μ-proper. 
Case 2. Suppose that pBe3 > pBe2- Then we can prove that (p,q) is μ-proper 
analogous to Case 1. 
Case 3. Now we may assume that pBe2 < pBe3 < pBe\ and pBe3 < pBe2 < pBe\. 
Then there is a number λ G [0,1] such that for ρ(λ) := λρ + (1 — λ)ρ we have 
p(\)Be2 = p{\)Be3 < p{\)Bei. We will show that (p(A),g) is μ-proper. 
Suppose that p(\)Be2 =p(X)Be3 < p(X)Bei. We know that (p, q) £ V = Βμ2(ρ*,q*), 
while q* = (1,0,0) by assumption. So, q2 < μ2 < μ(1 — μ) < μqι and, similarly, 
9з < μ?ι· 
On the other hand, we already know that e\Aq = e2Aq > e3Aq. So, we only have to 
check the case e\Aq = e2Aq > e3Aq. In that case we have p3 = δ3 = η
3
. Assume 
that p3 > 0. So, p3 > ζ. Then, again, we use the fact that (p, q) G V = B^{p*,q*) 
and calculate that 
Рз > p 3 - μ
2
 > p*3 - μ
2
 > Рз - ^C > С - ^C > ^C > n > v3 = P3, 
which is impossible. So, p3 = 0 and C(p*) = {1,2}. Now note that \\p - p*||oo < β2 
and ||p - p'lloo < μ2. Then we also have ||ρ(λ) - ρ*И,» < μ2 since ρ(λ) is a convex 
combination of ρ and p. So, for г = 1,2, 
ρ(λ) 3 < μ2 = μ- μ < μ-\ζ < μ- (С -\θ < V (Pi -\θ < ßPWi-
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Hence, (p(A),g) is μ-ргорег. 
Now we have constructed in each case a μ-proper strategy pair in V = Bß2(p*,q*). 
However, μ was chosen arbitrarily in (0, \Q. Hence, (p*,ç*) is proper. < 
Now we are down to the case that |C(p*)| = |C7(g*)| = 1, i.e. (p*,q*) = (ei .ei) . Also 
in this case we will distinguish several subcases. In order to make the distinctions, 
define 
S := {ρ e Δ3 I ρ is completely mixed, pBe\ > pBe2 and pBe\ > pBe3} 
and Τ := {7 € Δ3 | q is completely mixed, e.\Aq > e2Aq and &\Aq > e3Aq). 
Then we can write 5 = S2 U 5 3 and Τ = T2 U T3 with 
S2 := {p € 5 I pBe2 > pBe3}, S3 := {p € S \ pBe3 > pBe2] 
and T2 and Γ3 are defined in the obvious way. Now we come to the first case, in 
which p* = e,\ e Δ3 is a clusterpoint of both S2 and S3, while the same holds for 
q* = ei e Δ 3 , T2 and T3. 
L e m m a 8.3 Suppose that for each ν > 0 the sets S2 Л Bv(p*), S3 Л Bu(p*), T2 Л 
B„(q*) and T3 Л Bv(q*) are non-empty. Then (p*,q*) is a proper equilibrium. 
Proof. Take η > 0 with η < \. Define ν := η2. Take ρ e S2 Л £„(p*), p G 
5 3ЛВ„(р*), ς G Τ2 ЛВ„(д*) and ç € Т3ЛВ1/(д''). Then we havepßei > pBe2 > рВе3, 
рВеі > рВе3 > рВе2, exAq > e2Aq > e3Aq and e\Aq > e3Aq > e2Aq. So we can 
find numbers λ, μ € [0,1] such that forp(A) := λ ρ + ( 1 — À)pand q^) := μς+(1-μ)ξ 
we have ρ(λ)ββι > p(\)Be2 =р(Х)Ве3 and e\Aq{\) > &2Αα{μ) = e3Aq^). Clearly, 
the strategy pair (ρ(λ),ς(μ)) is contained in B
v
(j>*,q*). We will show that (ρ(λ),ς(μ)) 
is η-ргорег. 
To this end, note that ρ(λ) and ς(μ) are completely mixed since these strategies are 
convex combinations of (completely mixed) strategies in S and T, respectively. 
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Assume that p(\)Bei > p(\)Be2 = p(X)Be3. Since q(ß) G B„(q*) = В^(е{) (and 
V < | ) ' w e c a n deduce for j = 2,3 that 
ΐ(μ)ι <Л2 < η(1 -η)< ης(μ)ι. 
Similarly we get that p(X)i < ηρ(λ)ι for i = 2,3. Hence, (ρ(λ),ΐ(μ)) is rç-proper. Now 
the proof is complete since η was taken arbitrarily in (0, | ) . < 
Thus we are left with the case in which e\ G Δ 3 is not a clusterpoint of at least one 
of the sets S2, S3, T2 and T 3. 
L e m m a 8.4 Suppose that there exists a number VQ > 0 such that at least one of 
the sets S2 Π BVo{p*), S3 П BVo(p*), T2 П B„a(q*) and T3 П Я„0(д*) is empty. Then 
(p*,q*) is a proper equilibium. 
Proof. Suppose that μ > 0 is a number with μ2 < u0 and S3 Π Βμι(ρ*) is empty. 
We assume w.l.o.g. that μ < \. Since (p*,q*) is strictly perfect, there exists a 
number η > 0 such that for every KM-perturbation (J,ε), Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) DBß2{p*,q*) 
is non-empty, whenever ||(<S,e)||oo < η. Choose η in such a way that η < μ. 
Now define δ := ε := (η,η,η2) and δ := {η,η2,η)- Then both KM-perturbations (δ,ε) 
and (¿, ε) are smaller or equal then η in maximum norm. Therefore we can choose 
(p,q) G Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε)ηΒμ,(ρ·,ς·) and (ρ, g) e Я ( Л , в Д е ) η Β , ^ ' , ΐ ' ) 
(a) Assume that ег^4д > езЛд. We will show that (p,q) is μ-proper. First note 
that (p,q) G Δ 3 ( ί ) χ Δ 3(ε) is completely mixed, since (δ,ε) is completely mixed. 
Then the fact that (p,q) G Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) П Bß2(p',q*) implies that ρ 6 5 and g G Г. 
Furthermore, note that ρ G Βμ2(ρ*) С В„0(р*). Hence, ρ G S2\S3, because ρ G 5 = 
5г U 5з and S3 Π В„0(р*) is empty. Now we know that pBe\ > pBe2 > pBe3. So, 
<7з = ε 3 = η
3
 by Corollary 2.1 and we can calculate, for j = 1,2, that 
Furthermore, if pßei > pBe2, then 
Î2 < μ 2 = μ • μ < μ(1 - μ) < μ9ι 
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since q £ Bß2(q*) = В^{е{) = Βμ2(1,0,0) and μ < \. 
On the other hand we have e\Aq > e2Aq > e3Aq, since g G Γ and, by assumption, 
e2Aq > e3Aq. If e2Aq > e3Aq, then рз = δ3 = η
2
 by Corollary 2.1, and we can 
calculate, for г = 1,2, that 
Рз = η
2
 = η • η < ηρί < μρτ-
Furthermore, if e\Aq > e2Aq, then 
Рг < μ2 = μ • μ < μ{1 - μ) < μρι 
since ρ G Βμι{ρ*) = Βμ2(βι) = Ζ?μ2(1,0,0) and μ<\· Hence, (p,q) is μ-proper. 
(b) If e3Aq > e2Aq then we can show that (ρ, ςί) is μ-proper by adjusting the proof 
in (a). So, we can assume that e3Aq > e2Aq and e2Aq > e3Aq. Then, since both q and 
q are elements of T, we know that e\Aq > e3Aq > e2Aq and e\Aq > e2Aq > e3Aq. 
Then we can find a number ζ € [0,1] such that for ç(C) := ζq + (I — ζ)ξ we have 
βχΑς(ζ) > езАд(С) = e2Aq(C). We will prove that (p,g(C) is //-proper. 
We already know that ρ is completely mixed. Furthermore, ς(ζ) is completely mixed, 
since it is a convex combination of the completely mixed strategies q and q. 
Also, we already noted that pBe\ > pBe2 > pBe3 and that q3 = q3 = η
2
. So, 
g(£)3 = η2 and we can deduce, for j = 1,2, that 
?(С)з = η2 = i-v<miC)j-
Furthermore, if ρΒβχ > pBe2 then 
q(ζ)2<μ2<μ•μ<μ(l-μ)<q(ζ)l 
since, due to the fact that q,q£ Bß2(q*), ς(ζ) 6 B^{q*) = £,,2(1,0,0). 
On the other hand we have e\Aq{Ç) > e3Aq(() = e2Aq{Q by the choice of ζ. Assume 
that eiAq(C) > e3Aq{() = e2Aq(C). Then, again from the fact that ρ e Βμι{ρ*) = 
Βμ2 (1,0,0) we get for г = 2,3, 
Ρί<μ2 <μ(1-μ) <μρ\· 
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This shows that (ρ, ς(ζ)) is /i-proper. 
(с) Now both in case (a) and (b) we have found a μ-ргорег pair that is ¿i2-close 
to (p*,q*)- Then (p*,q*) must be proper since μ was chosen arbitrarily in the open 
interval (0, щ). < 
8.4 Extra conditions to ensure the (strict) properness of 
strictly perfect equilibria 
In section 8.2 we saw that strictly perfect equilibria are not (strictly) proper in general. 
In this section we will first give an extra condition, namely quasi strongness, that 
guarantees the strict properness of a strictly perfect equilibrium of a bimatrix game. 
Then we will show that strictly perfect equilibria of zero sum bimatrix games are 
always proper. 
The first example in section 8.2 showed that we need an extra condition to ensure the 
strict properness of a strictly perfect equilibrium. In this section we show that the 
quasi-strongness of the equilibrium is such an extra condition. Here an equilibrium 
(p, q) is called quasi-strong if C(p) = PBi(q) and C(q) = PB^ip). The proof of this 
result is based on the fact that locally, i.e. close to the target equilibrium, the equi­
librium correspondence can be described by a (finite) system of linear (in)equalities. 
Then the theorem of Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos shows that this corre­
spondence is continuous. Finally, a selection theorem of Michael is used to obtain a 
continuous selection in the equilibrium correspondence, which shows that the target 
equilibrium is strictly proper. In order to describe the system of linear (in)equalities 
needed in the proof, we need several lemmas. 
L e m m a 8.5 Let (p*,q*) G A
m
 χ Δ „ . There exist a number η > 0 and an open 
neighborhood V of(p*,q*) such that for any KM-perturbation (δ, ε) with ||(¿, ετ)!^ < η 
C
s
(p)DC(p*) and C
e
(q)?C(q*) 
/огаІІ(р,
Ч
)е П(А
т
(6)хА
п
(е)). 
Strictly perfect and (strictly) proper equilibria 175 
Proof. Take μ := min{p* | г 6 C{p*)}. Let 771 := \μ and consider the open set 
Vi := {p e A
m
 I |b-p*| |oo < \μ}- Take a KM-perturbation (δ,ε) with ||(<5,ε)||οο < m 
and a strategy ρ e Vi Π Am(ô) and suppose that there is a coordinate ¿0 e С (ρ*) not 
contained in C&(p). Then p*
o
 > μ and pio = ôio < \μ. So |p*0 - p i o | = p?0 - p i o > 
μ — | μ = | μ contradicting the fact that ρ 6 Vi. 
In a similar way a number η2 > 0 and a set V2 С Δ η can be defined in such a way 
that η := min{7ji,7/2} and V := Vi χ V2 satisfy the conditions in the lemma. < 
The (easy) proof of the following result is left to the reader. 
Lemma 8.6 Let (p*, q*) € Д
т
 χ Δ
η
. There exists an open set V containing (ρ*, q*) 
such that 
PBi{q) С PBi{q*) and PB2(p) С PB2(p*) 
for all (p,q) E V. 
The foregoing two lemmas play a role in the proof of 
Lemma 8.7 Let {p*,q*) € Am χ Δ
η
 be a quasi-strong equilibrium of the game 
(A,B). There exist a number η > 0 and an open set V containing (p*,q*) such that 
for any KM-perturbation (δ,ε) with ||(<$,ε)||οο < V an^ a " (РіЧ) e VΓ)Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) 
C
s
(p) = C(p') and C
e
(q) = C{q*) 
and PBi(q) = PBi(q*) and PB2{p) = PB2(p*). 
Proof. Choose η > 0 and an open neighborhood V of (p*,q*) satisfying the condi­
tions in both Lemma 8.5 and Lemma 8.6. Then for all KM-perturbations (δ,ε) with 
Ι Ι ^ , ε ) ^ < η and (p, g) 6 V Π E(A, Β, δ, e) 
C(p·) С Cs(p) С РВг(
Я
) С PBifa*). 
Since (p*,q*) is quasi-strong, all inclusions are in fact equalities. Similarly, C(q*) = 
CM and PB2(p) = PB2(p·). < 
176 Chapter 8 
Now for a strategy pair ip*,q*) e A
m
 χ Δ„ and a compact neighborhood U of 
(0,0) G Η™ χ ïït™ we define the correspondence F: U-»Am χ Δ
η
 by 
F(S,e) := {(p,q) £ A
m
(6) χ Δ
η
(ε) | С tip) С C(p') and PB2(p) D PB2(p') 
C
e
(q) С C(qm) and PB^q) D P^ifa*)}· 
Lemma 8.8 Lei (p*,g*) be a quasi-strong and strictly perfect equilibrium of the 
τη χ η-game (A,B). There exists о compact neighborhood U of (0,0) € IR™ χ IR" 
such that the correspondence F: i/-*A
m
 χ Δ
η
 is continuous and non-empty, compact, 
convex-valued. 
Proof. Choose a number η' > 0 and a set V satisfying the conditions of Lemma 8.7. 
Since (p*, q') is strictly perfect, there is a number η" > 0 such that V Π E(A, Β, δ, ε) 
is non-empty for all KM-perturbations (δ,ε) with ||(<5,ε)||οο < ц"· Now 
tf:={(MIII№e)lloo<èmin{7/,7/'}} 
is a compact neighborhood of (0,0). We will show that F:U-»Am χ Δ
η
 has the 
properties mentioned in the lemma. 
Prom the definition of F it is clear that F is compact- and convex-valued. 
(a) First we will show that F is non-empty valued. Take a KM-perturbation (δ, ε) € U. 
Then ||(<$,ε)||οο < η". So, νΓ)Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) is non-empty, say it contains (p,q). Clearly, 
(p,q) is contained in Am(ö) χ Δ„(ε). 
Furthermore, ||(<5,ε)||οο < η' and (ρ, g) £ V ΠΕ(Α,Β,δ,ε). So, by Lemma 8.7, 
Cs(p) = C{p') and CE(q) = C(q') 
and Р В і ( 9 ) = Р В ! ( 0 and PB2(p) = PB2(p*). 
Hence, (p, q) is an element of Ρ(δ,ε). 
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(b) Finally, we will show that F is continuous. To this end, notice that, for (δ, ε) G U, 
we can write F(6, ε) = G(ô, ε) χ Η(δ,ε) wherein ΰ{δ,έ) is the set ofthose strategies 
ρ G A
m
 satisfying 
Pi > δί for all i 
< Pi = δί if ρ* = О 
к
 pBej > рВе
к
 for all к if j G PB2(p') 
and Η {δ, ε) is the set of those strategies q G Δ
η
 satisfying 
4j ^ £j f° r all J 
< 9j = £j if 9j = 0 
eiAq > ekAq for all к if г e PBi(q*). 
So, there are linear functions Л and ò such that 
F(S,e) = {(p,q) e Д
т
 χ Δ
η
 | A(p,q) < b(S,e)} 
for all (δ, ε) G Í/. Hence, by Remark 10.1, F is continuous. < 
Now we can give a proof of our main result. 
Theorem 8.2 For a bimatrix game, a quasi-strong and strictly perfect equilibrium 
is strictly proper. 
Proof. By Lemma 8.8, F is continuous and (non-empty) compact, convex-valued. 
Then Lemma 10.1 implies that the correspondence F*:U—»Am χ Δ
η
 defined by 
fF(S,e) if (¿,ε) ,4 (0,0) 
l{(p*, 9*)} if (5,ε) = (0,0) 
is lower semi-continuous and compact, convex-valued. So, by Theorem 10.5 (Michael) 
there exists a continuous function f:U —• A
m
 χ Δ
η
 with f (δ, ε) e F* (δ, ε). Then 
clearly, /(0,0) = (p*,q*). Furthermore, for a KM-perturbation (¿,e) G U, write 
/(δ,ε) = (p,q). Now, using the facts that (p,q) G F*(á,e) and (p*,qm) G E(A,B), we 
can calculate that 
Cs(p) С C(p*) С PB^q*) С PBl(q) 
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and C
e
(q) С C{q") С PB2(p*) С PB2(p). 
Hence, f (δ, ε) € Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) by Corollary 2.1. So, the restriction of ƒ to the set Ù 
can be used to show that (p*, q*) is strictly proper. < 
The following example shows that a strictly proper equilibrium need not be quasi-
strong. 
Example 8.3 For the 3 x 3-bimatrix game 
•1,1 1,1 1,0" 
(A,B)= 1,1 1,1 0,0 
.0,1 0,0 0,0. 
the set of equilibria is E(A,B) = {(p,q) Ε Δ 3 χ Δ 3 | ρ3 = q3 = 0}. Since for all 
completely mixed KM-perturbations (δ, ε) € /С we have 
Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) = {({I - δ2 - δ3,δ2,δ3),(1 - ε2 - ε3,ε2,ε3))}, 
(βι,βι) is the only strictly proper equilibrium as well as the only strictly perfect 
equilibrium. Obviously, the equilibrium (ei,ei) is not quasi-strong. Note that none 
of the quasi-strong equilibria is strictly perfect (proper). < 
The second example of the previous section showed that strictly perfect equilibria of 
bimatrix games need not be proper. We will show now that strictly perfect equilibria 
of zero sum bimatrix games (i.e. В = —A) are proper. 
We will use the next notational convention concerning the graph of a correspondence. 
As usual, when we have a correspondence H: Υ-ьХ, the graph of Η is the set of 
points {y,x) € Y x X for which ι is an element of H{y) (cf. section 10.2). It is 
denoted by g r a p h ^ ) . Furthermore, the set graph* (Я) С X x Y is defined as 
graph*(H) := {(x,y) \ (y,x) e graph(#)}. 
Then Theorem 10.7 (Kakutani) implies the following 
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Lemma 8.9 Suppose that X С ГО. and F С ГО. are non-empty, compact and 
convex. Suppose further that both G: X-frY and H: Y-bX are (non-empty) compact 
and convex valued use correspondences. Then: graph(G) Π graph* (H) is non-empty. 
Proof. The correspondence F: Χ χ Y-ъХ x Y defined by, for all (x, y) e X x У, 
F(x,y):=H(y)xG(x) 
is a non-empty- compact- and convex-valued use correspondence while Χ χ Y is non­
empty, compact and convex. Then by Theorem 10.7 (Kakutani) we can find a point 
(x*,y*) in Χ χ Y with (x*,y*) G F(x*,y*). So, by the defintion of F, this implies that 
x* e H(y*) and y* e G(x*). Then (x*,y*) € graph*(#) and (x*,y*) € graph(G). 
Hence, graph(G) П graph* (Я) is non-empty. < 
T h e o r e m 8.3 Let Г = {M, и) be a game and let χ 6 Δ be a strategy profile. Suppose 
that for every small number μ > 0 there is a number η > 0 such that Ε(Γ[ζ]) Γ\Βμ{χ) 
is non-empty and convex for every KM-perturbation ζ € К. with ||ζ||οο < V- Then 
{x} e стсл-м(Г). 
Proof. Take Г and ι e Δ as above. In order to show that {x} € стскм(Г) we 
need to prove that {x} is a connected CKM-set that is contained in the set of perfect 
equilibria of Г. 
Clearly, {i} is a KM-stable set. So, {x} С РЕ(Г). Furthermore, {χ} is definitely 
connected. So, we only have to show that {x} is a CKM-set. 
Since {x} is a non-empty closed subset of Δ, it is sufficient to prove Lemma 4.2 (2). 
To this end, take an open neighborhood V of {x}. Take a number μ > 0 such that 
the hypothesis in the Theorem holds for μ. We can choose μ small enough to ensure 
that, firstly, Βμ :— ο\(Βμ(χ)) С V and, secondly, that the hypothesis still holds for 
numbers λ > μ sufficiently close to μ. Now, by assumption, we can take a number 
η > 0 such that £(Γ[£]) Π Βμ(χ) is non-empty and convex whenever ||ζ||<χ, < η. 
Take a CKM-perturbation ε with ||ε||οο < η. We will prove that ηχ(β*[έ\) П V is 
non-empty. Let /C := {ζ € £ | HCIloo < η}. Let G:/С-»Δ be the correspondence 
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defined by, for all ζ € Κ.η, 
0(ζ):=Ε(Γ{ζ])ΠΒ
β 
and let Η: Δ-»Κ.η be defined by, for all χ 6 Δ, 
H(x) := {ε(χ)}. 
Now notice that both Δ and /C are non-empty compact and convex sets. Further­
more, both G and H are non-empty, compact valued. It is also clear that H is convex 
valued. In order to prove that G is also convex valued, take a. ζ Ε Κ.η. Then 
G(Ç) := Ε(Γ[ζ\) ΠΒμ= Ε(Γ[ζ\) Π f] Βλ(χ) = f] (Ε(Τ[ζ}) Π Βχ(χ)), 
λ>μ λ>μ 
and, by assumption and the choice of μ, all sets .Ε(Γ[£]) Π Βχ(χ) are convex for λ > μ 
sufficiently small. Hence, (7(ζ) is convex. 
Next, Η is obviously use. Using Lemma 10.2, the upper semicontinuity of G easily 
follows from the upper semicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence E and the 
fact that Βμ is closed. So, by Lemma 8.9, graph(G) Π graph* (Я) is non-empty. 
Take a point (ζ*,χ*) in this intersection. We will show that x* e fix(/î*[e]) Π V. 
First of all notice that (ζ',χ*) в graph(G) implies that x* G Ε(Γ[ζ*]) Π Bß. So, 
χ* e Βμ С V. Furthermore, we have that x* € Β(Γ[ζ*]). So, secondly we can deduce 
that x* e β(ζ*,χ*). Thirdly, however, from the fact that (ζ*,χ*) € graph*(#) we 
can conclude that ζ* e H(x*) — {ε(χ*)}. So, ζ* = ε(χ*). From these last two 
observations it follows that 
x* e ß(C,x') = β{ε{χ*),χ*) =β[ε](χ*) С β*[ε](χ'). 
Hence, χ* is a fixed point of the correspondence β*[ε]. < 
Corollary 8.1 Let (A, —A) be α two-person zero-sum game. Let (p*,q*) be a strictly 
perfect equilibrium of (A, —A). Then (p*,ç*) is a proper equilibrium. 
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Proof. Take a number μ > 0. Since (p*,q*) is strictly perfect, we can find a number 
η > 0 such that E(A, —Α,δ,ε) Π Bß(p*,q*) is non-empty for all KM-perturbations 
(δ, ε) with || (δ, ε) lloo < V- However, the perturbed game (Α, —Α, δ, ε) is still a zero-sum 
game. So, E{A,—Α,δ,ε) is convex. Then Ε(Α,-Α,δ,ε) Π Βμ(ρ* ,q*) is also convex. 
Hence, by Theorem 8.3, {(p*,q*)} e <гскм(А, -A). Then at least we know that 
{(p*,q*)} is a CKM-set. However, every CKM-set of the game (A, —A) contains a 
proper equilibrium by Theorem 4.8. Hence, {p*,q*) is a proper equilibrium. < 

Chapter 9 
The structure of solution concepts 
for bimatrix games 
The structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game has been described in several 
papers such as Winkels (1979), Jansen (1981) and Jansen and Jurg (forthcoming). 
All these authors showed that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is the finite 
union of polytopes. In Borm et al. (1993) it appeared that also the set of perfect 
equilibria is the finite union of polytopes and that each such polytope is a face of 
some maximal Nash subset. Also the set of strictly perfect equilibria, if non-empty, 
has this structure (cf. Jansen et al. (1994)). 
Recently, Jansen (1993) showed that the set of proper equilibria is the finite union of 
polytopes. The author defined an equivalence relation on the strategy space of each 
player. This equivalence relation partitioned these strategy spaces in a finite number 
of equivalence classes. The closure of each of these classes appeared to be a polytope. 
By considering the so-called ε-proper pairs within these classes the author proved 
that the set of proper equilibria of a bimatrix game is also a finite union of polytopes. 
In the first part of this chapter the same approach is used to (re) consider the structure 
of the set of (perfect) equilibria of a bimatrix game. Again we obtain a finite number 
of equivalence classes in the strategy space of each player. The equivalence relation in 
question is defined by the identification of strategies to which the other player has the 
same (pure) best replies. Within the closure of the product of two such equivalence 
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classes (one for each player), we first consider the set of equilibria. We call such a set 
a Nash set and show that all equilibria are contained in some Nash set and that such 
a set is a polytope. 
Next, within the product of two such equivalence classes we consider for a fixed ε > 0 
the set of ε-perfect equilibria. It turns out that the closure of such a set, if non-empty, 
is a product of polytopes. The intersection over all ε > 0 of these closures will turn 
out to be a product of polytopes as well. Furthermore it is proved that the union of 
all the polytopes of the latter kind, called Selten sets, is identical to the set of perfect 
equilibria. Finally we investigate how Nash (Selten) sets intersect and how Nash sets 
and Selten sets are related. 
In the second part of this chapter we will show that the set of strictly proper equilibria 
of a bimatrix game also the union of a finite number of polytopes. For a strictly proper 
equilibrium (p*,q*) of a bimatrix game (A,B) we consider the minimal Nash set F 
of (A, B) that contains (p*, q*). We will show that all strategy pairs in F are strictly 
proper. Then, since every Nash set is a polytope and there are only finitely many 
Nash sets, the proof is complete. 
The first part of this chapter is based on Vermeulen and Jansen (1994). The second 
part is a thoroughly revised version of Jansen and Vermeulen (1996). 
9.1 Best-reply equivalence 
In this section we introduce for each player an equivalence relation on his strategy 
space. The closure of each equivalence class appears to be a polytope and the inter­
section of such polytopes is empty or a face of both polytopes. 
Definition 9.1 For a bimatrix game two strategies ρ and ρ are called best-reply 
equivalent, denoted as ρ ~BR P, if ΡΒϊ(ρ) = PB2(p)- In a similar way an equivalence 
relation can be defined for the strategies of player 2. 
Since for an m χ n-bimatrix game, PB^ip) is a subset of {1,. . . ,m} for all ρ € A r a , 
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corresponding to the equivalence relation ~BR there can be only a finite number 
of equivalence classes, say Vi,··· , д/, in A
m
. Similarly, Δ
η
 is the finite union of 
the equivalence classes, say W i , · · · , VVV- For each s € {1 ,2 , · · · , M} and each t € 
{1,2, · • ·, JV} we choose représentants ps in Vs and ql Ç.Wt-
Since PBi(q) and PB2(p) are given by linear inequalities, it is straightforward to 
prove that the closure of each equivalence class is a polytope. In order to show that 
the intersection of two of such polytopes, if non-empty, is a face of both polytopes, 
we need 
Lemma 9.1 Let G be a face of the polytope cl(Vs). Then all the elements of 
relint(G) are best-reply equivalent. 
Proof. Take p(0),p(l) G relint (G). Let j 0 $ PB2(j>(0)) and suppose that j 0 e 
PB2(p(l)). For ε > 1 we introduce ρ(ε) := (1 - ε)ρ(Ο) + ερ(1). Since p(l) is an 
element of the relative interior of G, there is an ε > 1 such that ρ(ε) € G and 
p(e)BeJO = (1 - e)p(0)BeJO +ep{\)Bel0 > (1 - e)p(0)Ben + ep{\)Ben =p(e)Beh 
for some j i e PB2(ps) С PB2(p(0)). Therefore л І ΡΒ2(ρ(ε)), contradicting the 
fact that ΡΒ2{ρ(ε)) D PB2{ps). So j 0 І PB2(p(l)). Hence PB2(p(l)) С PB2(p(0)). 
By interchanging the roles of p(0) and p(l) it follows that p(0) ~BR p(l)· < 
Lemma 9.2 If the intersection of the closure of two equivalence classes is non­
empty, then this intersection is a face of both polytopes. 
Proof. We give a proof for the strategy space of player 1. Suppose that F := 
с1(
 я
) Π cl(VS') φ φ for s φ s'. Let G be the smallest face of с1(У^) containing F. 
Note that for this face G,GC\ relint(F) is non-empty. The proof is complete if we can 
show that G С cl(V
s
). So let p(0) S relint(G) and consider ρ(ε) := ερ" + (1 - ε)ρ(Ο) 
for 0 < ε < 1. We will show that ρ(ε) ~ в д ps for all 0 < ε < 1. 
(a) Let jo £ PB2(p3)- Then for an element p(l) € F Π relint(G) we have jo € 
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P 5 2 ( p ( l ) ) ала Lemma 9.1 implies that j 0 e PB2(p(0)). So, for all 0 < ε < 1, 
p(e)BeJO = ep°Be3a + (1 - e)p(0)Be}0 > vp*Be2 + (1 - е)р(0)Ве, = P{e)Be], 
for all j . Consequently, j 0 G ΡΒ2(ρ(ε)), for all 0 < ε < 1. 
(b) Let jo £ PB2(ps). Take j i G PB2(ps). As in part (1) one can show that л G 
PB 2(p(0)). This implies that ρ{ε)Βε3ο < p{e)Ben, for all 0 < ε < 1. So j 0 £ 
PB 2(p(e)). 
(c) From (a) and (b) of this proof we may conclude that ρ(ε) G V
s
 for all 0 < ε < 1. 
Hence p(0) = ϋπιρ(ε) is an element of cl(V
s
). So relint(G) С cl(V
s
) and obviously 
ε->0 
G С cl(V
s
). < 
9.2 On the set of equilibria 
In this section we consider the set of equilibria contained in the closure of the product 
of two of the equivalence classes (one for each player) as introduced in the foregoing 
section. 
For s e {1,2, •••,Μ} and t e {1,2, ·•·,#} the set 
K,t •= {(Ρ,β) e d(V.) x d(W t) I Pl = 0 if г І PBitf) and q3 = 0 if j £ PB2(p s)}, 
if non-empty, is called a Nash set. Obviously a Nash set is a polytope and each 
equilibrium is contained in some Nash set. Further, if (p, q) is an element of some Nash 
set Ms<t, then pt = 0 if i $ PBx{q) D PB^q1) and q3 = 0 if j $ PB2(p) D PB2(ps). 
In view of Lemma 2.2 this implies that (p, q) is an equilibrium. So 
Theorem 9.1 The set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is the finite union of poly-
topes. 
In the following example it appears that a Nash subset may be included in another 
Nash set. 
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Example 9.1 Let (A,B) be 2 χ 3-bimatrix game defined by 
"2,2 1,0 0,0' 
(A,B) = 
.2,2 0,0 1,0 
Let V 
and 
Then we have the Nash sets 
= { ρ € Δ 2 | PB2(p) = {1}} = Δ 2 
= {q € Δ 3 I PBi(q) = {1,2}} = {q € Δ 3 | q2 = ?з} 
= {q Ε Δ 3 I PBi{q) = {2}} = {q € Δ 3 \ q2 < <7з}· 
and 
M := {(P,9) e cl(V) x cliWO | <?2 = ?з = 0} = Δ 2 χ { e j 
M := {(Ρ, g) e cl(V) x cl(W2) I pi = 0 and q2 = q3 = 0} = {(e2 >ei)}. « 
A Nash subset not properly contained in another Nash set is called a maximal Nash 
set. Since the number of Nash sets is finite, each Nash set is contained in a maximal 
one. 
Note that a Nash set M
s
,t is the cartesian product of the two polytopes 
Kt •= {Ρ e c l(V
s
) | Pi = 0 if i i PBxtf)} 
Kt •= {я e сі(Ж) lì,- = о if i i PB2(p°)}. and 
Since A/'jt is a face of cl(V
s
) and NJ¿ is a face of CI(WÍ), Lemma 9.2 implies 
Lemma 9.3 The intersection of two (maximal) Nash sets is empty or a face of 
both Nash sets. 
In particular 
Corollary 9.1 If M = Λίχ x N2 is a Nash set contained in the (maximal) Nash set 
M = Mi x M2, then Mi is a face of Mi for i — 1,2. 
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9.3 On the set of perfect equilibria 
In this section the equivalence relations introduced in section 3 again play an impor­
tant role. We show that when we take the intersection over all ε > 0 of the closure of 
the collections of ε-perfect pairs which are contained in a particular product of two 
equivalence classes (one for each player), we get a subset of PE{A, B). Such a subset 
turns out to be the product of two polytopes and the union over all these subsets is 
PE(A,B). 
Because completely mixed strategies are crucial in the definition of perfect equilibria, 
we need a small adjustment of the equivalence classes introduced before: for s € 
{ 1 , . . . , M} and i G { 1 , . . . , Ν}, V* is the set of completely mixed strategies in V
s
 and 
Wt* is the set of completely mixed strategies in VV(. Note that some of these sets 
might be empty. However, if V* is non-empty, then cl(V*) = cl(V
s
) and cl(V*) is a 
polytope. Naturally, the same result holds for cl(W*) if Wt* is non-empty. 
For s € {1, - . . , M} , f e { 1 , . . . , Ν} and ε > 0 we introduce the set 
St,t(e) := {(p,q) £ V*3 x Щ | Pi < ε if г $ PBx{q) and q¿ < ε if j φ PB2{p)} 
of ε-perfect pairs in V
s
 x Wt. Note that cl(5Sit(e)) is a polytope for each ε > 0. Finally, 
S.,t := Π cI(SM(e)) 
<r>0 
if non-empty, is called a Selten set. 
After these preparations we prove that the set of perfect equilibria is the union of the 
Selten sets. 
T h e o r e m 9.2 Let (A,B) be an τη χ n-bimatrix game. An equilibrium (p,q) is 
perfect if and only if there is a pair (s, t) such that (p, q) € Ss,t • 
Proof. (a) Let (p, q) be a perfect equilibrium. Then we can find a decreasing 
sequence ( ε * ) * ^ in (0,oo) converging to zero and a sequence (ipk>qk))ke^ " i ^ m * 
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Δ
η
 converging to (p, q) such that (p*, qk) is e/t-perfect for every к G IN. For every к G 
IN there is a pair (s(fc),t(fc)) such that (pk,qk) 6 <5
s
(fc),t(Jk)( t^)· Because {1, . . . ,M} χ 
{1, . . . , Ν} is a finite collection, we may assume that for some s and t, s = з(к) and 
t = t(k), for every к G IN. Because ει, ε2, . . . is a decreasing sequence, 5 S ) t (ei) D 
<5
s
,t(e2) Э • · ·. This implies in particular that Sa¿(£k) contains, for all k, a tail of the 
sequence (p1 ,?1), (p2,q2), · · • and therefore 
(p,q)£ cl(«SSjt(ejk)) for every к G IN. 
Now we can conclude that 
oo 
(p,ç) G p | cl(5s,t(ejfe)) =SStt-
¡ f c = l 
(b) If (p,q) G SStt for some pair (s,t), then (p,q) e cl(<S,,t(ì)) for all к G IN. This 
means that we can find a sequence (¿jt)fceiM converging to zero and for all A a pair 
(pk,qk) such that (pk,qk) G Ss,,(£) and \\(pk,qk) - (p,q)\\oo < **• But (pfe,ofc) G 
iSS)t(^) means that (pk,qk) is a ¿-perfect pair. Since the sequence ((pk,qk))kew 
converges to (p, q) as к —> со, (ρ, g) is a perfect equilibrium. < 
In order to show that a Selten set is a polytope, for ε > 0 we introduce the sets 
Pt(e) := f ) {peA
m
\pi< ε} 
і£РВі(в«) 
and Q,(£) := f | {g G Δ
η
 | q¿ < ε}. 
j í P B 2 ( p · ) 
Note that these sets are polytopes. Furthermore, for ε > 0, 
•S.,t(e) = (v; nPt(e)) x (w; η Q,(e)). 
L e m m a 9.4 ƒƒ /or some pair (s, i), <SSit ts non-empty, then for ε > 0 
cl(S. l t(e)) = (С1( ; ) П Р , ( Е ) ) x ( c l ( W ; ) n Q . ( e ) ) . 
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Proof. Let ε > 0. In view of the observation preceeding this lemma, 
cl(5. l t ( e )) = c l (v ; η P t(e)) χ cl(w t* Π Q.(e)). 
Next we prove that c l ( v ; n P t (ε)) = cl(V;)nP t(e). It is obvious that c l (v ;nP t (e)) С 
c l (V;)nP t (e) . 
In order to prove the other inclusion, we take a p(l) 6 cl(V*) Π Ρί(ε). Because 
S
s
,t Φ Φ, we can find a point p(0) 6 V* Π Pt(e). Now for λ e [0,1], we introduce 
ρ(λ) := λρ(1) + (1 - λ)ρ(0). Then ρ(λ) is a completely mixed element of Pt(e), for 
all λ 6 [0,1). Furthermore it's easy to check that for every λ € [0,1), ρ(λ) ~дд pa. 
So, for such λ, ρ(λ) 6 V* Π Pt(t)). Because Итр(Л) = р(1), we find that p(l) G 
λ-»·1 
cl(v;nPt(e)). < 
By the description in the foregoing lemma, a Selten set Ss¿ can be written as 
Sttt = f ) d(S.,t(e)) = f ) (cl(V;) ПР4(е)) χ f] (cl(Wt*) nQ.(e)) 
ε>0 e>0 ε>0 
= (d(V;) Π Π Pt(e)) χ (cl(W;) Π f | Q.(e)) (1) 
e>0 ε>0 
= (ci(v;)npt(o)) χ (ci(w;)nQf(o)). 
Since the four sets occurring in this last expression are polytopes, Ss¡t is the product 
of two polytopes, and therefore is a polytope itself. In combination with Theorem 9.2 
we find 
T h e o r e m 9.3 For α bimatrix game the set of perfect equilibria is the union of a 
finite number of polytopes. 
Furthermore, the description given in (1) implies that a Selten set is also a Nash set. 
Hence a Selten set S = Si x S2 is contained in a (unique) maximal Nash set, say 
Λ/- = N\ x 7V2, and Corollary 9.1 implies that Sl is a face of jVt for i = 1,2. 
The bimatrix game introduced in example 9.1 has two Selten sets. For this game and 
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an ε > 0 all ε-perfect pairs are contained in 
Si(e) = {(P>9) e V* x WÍ | q2 < ε and q3 < e} 
= Δ 2 x {q G Δ 3 I q2 = q3 < ε} 
or S2(e) = {(ρ, ς) € V* x W2 \ q2 < ε, q3 < ε and px < ε} 
= {ρ e Δ 2 Ι pi < ε} x {q e Δ 3 | q2 < q3 < ε}. 
This leads to the Selten sets 
5 і : = П с1(51(е)) = Д 2 х { е і } 
and S2 := f] cl(52(e)) = {(e2,ei)}. 
Observing that the second Selten set is a proper subset of the first one, we introduce 
maximal Selten sets in a similar way as we did for Nash sets. 
9.4 On the set of strictly proper equilibria 
In this final section, we will investigate the structure of the set of strictly proper 
equilibria of a bimatrix game. In fact we prove 
T h e o r e m 9.4 For a bimatrix game the set of strictly proper equilibria, if non­
empty, is the (finite) union of faces of maximal Nash subsets. 
Proof. Let (p*,q*) be a strictly proper equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A,B) 
and let F be the minimal Nash set for the game (A,B) with (p*,q*) e F. Since 
(p*,g*) is strictly proper we can find a neighborhood U of (0,0) € H ^ χ Ш." and a 
continuous function ƒ = (fp,fq):U -*• A
m
 χ Δ„ such that f (δ, ε) € Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) for 
every KM-perturbation (δ, ε) € U and lim f {δ, ε) = (p*,q*)-
(Α,ε)->(0,0) 
Let (ρ, q) be a strategy pair in F. We will show that (p, q) is strictly proper. Let 
T: Ù-»[0,1] be defined by, for all KM-perturbations (δ, ε) 6 Ù, 
Τ(δ,ε) := {te IR | 0< t< 1 and tV > ο(«5,ε)} 
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wherein tV > b(ô, ε) represents the finite system of linear inequalities 
' t{pt -ρ*)>δ,- fp(S,ε), for all i = 1, . . . , m 
t{q3 - 9j ) > £j - fg(S,ε)j for all j = 1,. . . , η 
< 
t(e, - ek)A(q - q*) > (ek - et)Afq(S,e) for all i G PB^q*) and fc ^ PBx(q*) 
. t(p-p*)B(e} - ei) > fp(S,e)B(ei - e3) for all j € PB2(p*) and I $ PB2{j>*). 
Now, by Lemma 8.5, we can take a neighborhood V of (p*,q*) and a neighborhood 
EZ' of (0,0) in Μ!? χ И £ such that for all KM-perturbations (δ, ε) G Ù' and all 
(P,Q) 6 (Am(Ä) x Δ„(ε)) U V we have 
C(p*)cC
s
(p) and C7( Î* )C£7 S (Ç) . (1) 
Furthermore, we may assume that, for all i G PBi(q*) and к £ PB\(q*) we have 
e,Afq{6,£)>ekAfq{S,£) (2) 
since lim f (δ,ε) = (p*,q*). Obviously a similar assumption can be made for 
(ί,ε)-Κθ,Ο) 
player 2. Thirdly, also because lim f {δ, ε) = (p*,q*), we may assume that 
(¿,ε)->(0,0) 
/ (¿ ,ε) G У for all KM-perturbations (δ,ε) G Í7'. 
(a) We will show that, for every KM-perturbation (δ,ε) G U', Τ(δ,ε) is a closed 
interval of the form [0, í(¿, ε)] for some í(¿, ε) G [0,1]. 
Take a KM-perturbation (δ,ε) G U'. Clearly, 
Τ(δ,ε) = {t GIR I 0< t < 1 and tV > ο(δ,ε)} 
is compact and convex. Then, since Τ (δ, ε) С [0,1], it is sufficient to show that 
0 G Τ(δ,ε). However, this is straightforward to check, using the fact that fp(6,e) G 
Am(<5), /,(<5, ε) G Δ
η
(ε) and assumption (2). 
(b) Now we know that for a KM-perturbation (δ,ε) G U' we can write Τ(δ,ε) = 
[0, £(<5, ε)] for some number ί(δ, ε) G [0,1]. We will show that the function t: U' -> [0,1] 
defined in this way is continuous and that lim ί(ί,ε) = 1. 
(í,e)->(0,0) 
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(i) In order to prove the continuity, take a KM-perturbation (δ, ε) G U'. Then ί(ί,ε) 
is simply the maximal number t < 1 such that tV > b(S,e). Index the inequalities in 
this system with some (finite) index set H. Then we know that t(S, ε) is the maximal 
number t < 1 such that tVh > b(S,e)h for all ft G H. However, in part (a) we already 
observed that t = 0 is a solution of this system. So, b(S,e)h < 0 for all ft G Я , and 
then 
t(S, ε) = mm{V^b(5, ε)
Λ
 | ft G Я and Vh < 0} Л 1. (3) 
Hence, since b is continuous, t is a continuous function. 
(ii) We will also use formula (3) to show that lim t(ö, ε) = 1. Take an ft e Я 
(ί,εΗ(Ο,Ο) 
with Vh < 0. In case that there is an i ε {1,...,m} with Vh = pt — Ρ*, we get that 
Pt - ρ* < 0 and 
т/-іьлс л - St ~ / р № £ ) ' /P (¿> £ ) I - ¿ t 
*Ч o(o,ejh- 1— = 1 • 
Рг- Ρ' Ρ* - Рг 
So, clearly, Vh~lb{ß, e)h converges to ρ*(ρ* — ρ , ) - 1 > 1 as (δ,ε) converges to (0,0). A 
similar argument holds in case that there is a j G {1,... ,n} with V/, = q3 — q*. 
Otherwise we may assume that there is an г G PB\{q*) and а к ^ PBi(q*) such that 
Vh = (e, — ek)A{q — q*). In this case one easily checks that Vh-16(<$,e)/, converges to 
(e, - ek)Aq* 
(e, -ek)Aq* - (et-ek)Aq' 
Now, the nominator of this expression is larger than zero since г € PB\(q*) and 
к $ PBi(q*). Furthermore, the denominator is also larger than zero, since (e, — 
ek)A(q — q*) = д < 0. Thirdly, the fact that (p,q) is an element of the smallest Nash 
set F containing (p*,</*) implies that PBi(q*) С PBi(q). In particular, г G PB\{q). 
So, (e, — ek)Aq > 0. Together these three observations imply that the displayed 
expression is larger or equal to one. 
Now we have shown that, for each h £ H with V), < 0,
 л
-16(<$,е)ь converges to one 
as (δ, ε) converges to (0,0). Then formula (3) shows that ί(ί,ε) converges to one as 
(δ, ε) converges to (0,0). 
194 Chapter 9 
(с) Finally, consider the function g = (gp,gq):U' ->· Ж т χ H n defined by, for all 
KM-perturbations (δ, ε) ε U', 
9(δ,ε) ~ ¡(δ,ε) +t(6,e)((p,q) - (p*,q*)). 
We will show that (p, q) is strictly proper by proving that g satisfies the conditions 
mentioned in the definition of strict properness (Definition 8.2). Clearly, g is con­
tinuous and lim βίδ,ε) = (ρ, q) by part (b). So, we only have to prove that 
(i,e)-»(0,0) 
9(δ,ε) G Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε) for all KM-perturbations (δ, ε) € Ù'. 
Take such a (δ,ε) € U'. First of all, note that the coordinates of both gp(6, ε) and 
gq(ö,ε) sum up to one. Furthermore, since ί(δ,ε) 6 Τ(δ,e), we know for t e {1,...,m} 
that t(ö,ε)(ρ, —ρ*) >ôt — fp(6,e)t. Hence, 
9p{S,e)t = fp{S,e)t + t(6,£)(Pt-p*) > / p ( i , e ) , + ¿, - fp(S,e)t = St, 
which shows that <7
Ρ
(<5,ε) e A
m
(6). Similarly, it can be shown that gq(6,ε) e Δ τ 7 ι(ε). 
(i) First we will show that Сб(д
р
(о,г)) С Cí(/p(J,e)). Take an i £ 0{(/
ρ
(δ,ε)). Since 
we have chosen U' in such a way that f {δ, ε) € V, we know that С (ρ*) С C¡{fp{6,é)) 
by assumption (1). Therefore we have г ^ C(p*). Furthermore, C(p) С C(p*) since 
(p,q) is an element of the smallest Nash set containing (p*,q*)- So, we also have 
г φ С (ρ). Now we can compute that 
9p(S,e)t = / p ( i ,e ) t + <(А,е)(р, - p í ) = St + f(A,e)(0 - 0) = 5,. 
Hence, г £ Cí(ffp(á,e). 
(ii) Secondly, we will show that ΡΒ\(/4(δ,ε)) С PBi(gq(6^)). Take a pure strategy 
г G ΡΒι(/4(δ,ε)) and a f c e { l , . . . ,m}. We will show that егАдя(о,г) > екАдд(6,г). 
The proof is divided in two parts. 
Let us first assume that к e PBi(q*). Then we know that г,A: € PB\{q) and г,к e 
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PBi(q*) since PBi(fq(S,e) С PBi(q*) С PBi(q). Therefore, 
е
г
Ад,(6,е) = etAfq(S,e) +t{6,e){etAq - etAq*) 
= e,Α/,(ί,ε) +t(S,e)(ekAq- ekAq*) 
> ekAfg{6,e) + t(S,e)(ekAq - ekAq') = ekAgq{S,e). 
So, in this case the inequality holds. 
If, on the other hand, we assume that к ^ PB\{q*) then we know that 
t(<5,e)(e, - ek)A{q - g*) > (e* - et)Afq(S,e) 
since t(6, ε) is an element of T(S, ε). Rewriting this inequality yields 
e
x
Agq{S,e) = егА/ч{5,г) + t(S,e)etA(q* - q) 
> ekAfq(S,e) + t(ô,£)ekA{q" - q) = ekAgq(S,e). 
Hence, the inequality also holds in this case. 
(iii) Now recall that f (δ,ε) 6 Ε(Α,Β,δ,ε). Therefore, by Lemma 8.1, C¿(/P(¿,e)) с 
PBi(fq(S,e)). Hence, using the results of (i) and (ii) we get 
Cs(gP(S,e)) С Cs(fp(5,e)) С ΡΒγ{ί4{δ,ε)) С ΡΒ^δ,ε)). 
Similarly we can prove that C
e
(gq(6,ε)) С Pi?2(<?p(<S,e))· Hence, again by Lemma 
8.1,
 9{δ,ε)ΕΕ(Α,Β,δ,ε). 
So, for every strictly proper equilibrium (p*,q*) of (A,B), the minimal Nash set 
containing (p*, q*) consists of strictly proper equilibria. Since every Nash set is a face 
of a maximal Nash set by Corollary 9.1, we have a proof of the theorem. < 

Chapter 10 
Tools 
10.1 Polyhedral sets 
In this section we present an overview of those known results concerning polyhedral 
sets that are used in this dissertation. Proofs of these results can be found in e.g. 
Weyl (1950) and Schrijver (1986). 
For a non-zero vector η e IR* and a real number α G IR, 
H(n,a) := { ι e К ' Ι (η,χ) > a} 
is called the half space generated by (n, a) and 
V(n,a) := {x € IR* | {η,χ) = a} 
is called the hyperplane generated by (η,α). 
A non-empty set К С IR is called polyhedral if it is the intersection of a finite number 
of halfspaces, i.e., there are щ,..., n
m
 in ïïtfc and a\,..., am e IR such that 
m 
K=f)H{nt,at). 
A set К С IRfc is called a polytope if there are vectors p\,..., p
m
 in IRfc such that 
К = ch{pi , . . . ,p
m
} , i.e., 
m m 
К = { y j а
г
р
г
 Ι α, > 0 for all г and 2 J α, = 1 }. 
t = l г=1 
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Furthermore, К is called bounded if there is a real number С such that ЦхЦг < С for 
all χ e К. 
It is a well-known fact that К С ГО* is a polytope if and only if К is bounded and 
polyhedral. In particular, every polytope has a polyhedral description. 
A hyperplane V{n,a) is said to support a polyhedral set К = f]^L1 И{щ,а%) if 
КГ\ {п,а)фф,К and KcH(n,a). 
A (non-empty) subset F of К is called a face of К if there is a supporting hyperplane 
V{n, a) such that F = К Л V(n,a). 
Note that a subset F of a polyhedral set AT С IR* is a face of К if and only if there 
is a vector η e IR.fc such that the linear functional φ(η) : IRfc —> IR defined by 
φ(η)(χ) := (η,χ) (χ G H f c) 
is not constant on К while F is the set of points where ψ{η) attains its minimum. 
A hyperplane V is said to support a polyhedral set К in χ £ К if χ is an element of 
V and V supports K. 
For a set Π С ïïtfc, ал(П) is the minimal affine subspace of IR* that contains П. It is 
easy to see that 
η η 
ал(П) = (^ХіХг Ι η e IN, λ, e ГО, xj € Π and ^ λ, = 1}. 
t = l ι = 1 
Furthermore, the boundary dU of Π is defined as the collection of points χ 6 Π 
with the property that every neighborhood U of χ has a non-empty intersection with 
аЬ(П) \ Π. 
Theorem 10.1 (Supporting hyperplane theorem) Let К С Ж* be a polyhedral set. 
Then χ € dK if and only if there is a hyperplane that supports К in x. 
In fact this is equivalent with the statement that dK is the union of the faces of K. 
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A point a; in a convex set С is called extremal if for all y, ζ 6 С and A 6 (0,1), 
x = \y + (1 — \)z implies that χ = у — ζ. 
The collection of extremal points of С is denoted by ext(C). 
m 
For an element χ of the polyhedral set К = Ç\ Ή(η,,α,), the collection of tight 
inequalities is 
T{x) := {г | (nt,x) = аг}. 
m 
Notice that T(x) does in fact depend on the specific description fi ^ ( η , , α , ) of К. 
ι = 1 
With a non-empty subset Τ С {1,. . . ,τη} we associate the linear subspace 
Ц Т ) := {г/e H* I (пг,у) = 0 for all г G Τ} 
and the polyhedral cone 
C(T) := {y e Mk | (n„ j/> > 0 for all i e Г} . 
This cone is called pointed if L(T(2;)) = {0} for some χ £ K. It is easy to see that 
a cone C(T) is pointed if and only if 0 is an extremal point of C(T). A non-pointed 
cone does not have any extremal points. Furthermore, a vector χ ε К is an extremal 
point of К if and only if the cone C(T(x)) is pointed. 
A point χ φ 0 in C(T) is called an extremal direction of C(T) if χ can only be written 
as χ = \y + (1 — X)z for certain y,z £ C(T) and λ G (0,1) if y and ζ are non-negative 
multiples of x. 
Theorem 10.2 A pointed polyhedral cone has a finite number of extremal directions 
of length one. Furthermore, the cone equals the collection of non-negative combina­
tions of these extremal directions. 
πι 
Two extremal points χ and y of the polyhedral set К = f] Ц(п
г
,щ), are called 
ι = 1 
neighbors if L(T(x) Π Τ (у)) is one-dimensional. 
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m 
Theorem 10.3 Let χ be an extremal point of a polyhedral set К = f] Ή(π,,α,) . 
t = l 
Then the collection of extremal directions of length one of the cone Ск(х) equals 
the collection of vectors (y — x)\\x — y\\^, where у ranges through the collection of 
neighbors of x. 
10.2 Correspondences 
For two non-empty subsets X and Y of some IRfc and Ht' respectively, a correspondence 
F: X-frY is a function from X to 2Y \ φ, wherein 2 y is the power set of Y. 
F is called closed- (compact- or convex-)valued if F(x) is closed (compact or convex) 
for each χ £ X. 
F is called upper semicontinuous in χ € X if for every open neighborhood V of F(x) 
there exists an open neighborhood U of χ with F(x') С V for every x' € U. 
F is called lower semicontinuous in x G X if for every open set V with F(x) Π V ψ φ 
there exists an open neighborhood U of χ such that F(x') Π V is non-empty for every 
x' £ U. F is called continuous in χ £ X if it is both lower and upper semicontinuous 
in χ e X. 
F is called upper semicontinuous (use) if it is upper semicontinuous in every χ 6 X 
and lower semicontinuous (lsc) if it is lower semicontinuous in every χ E X. Naturally 
F is called continuous if it is both use and lsc. 
Lemma 10.1 Let F: X4>Y be lsc and let Ζ С X be closed. Suppose that H: X-*Y 
is a correspondence with 
(Ι) Η is lsc on Ζ 
(2) H(x) = F(x) for every χ e Χ \ Ζ 
(3) H(x) С F(x) for every χ e Ζ. 
Then Η is also lsc. 
Proof. Take a n i E l . We will show that H is lsc in x. 
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If χ £ Ζ. Then the lower semicontinuity of Я in χ easily follows from the fact that F 
equals ff by assumption (2) on the open set X \ Z. 
If χ G Ζ. Take an open set У in К with V П ff (x) is non-empty. Since ff is lsc 
on Ζ by assumption (1) we can take an open neighborhood U\ of χ in X such that 
V Π Я(х') is non-empty for every x' G Ζ Π Ui. Furthermore, V Π .F(x) is non-empty 
by assumption (3). So, we can take an open neighborhood Uj, of χ in A" such that 
V Π F(x) is non-empty for every χ G t/2 by the lower semicontinuity of F. 
Define U := U\ Π l¡2- Then U is an open neighborhood of χ in X. Furthermore, 
li x' Ç: U and χ' e Ζ, then χ' £ G Γλϋχ. So, У П Я(х') is non-empty. If χ' G t í 
and χ' ^ Ζ, then at least χ' G {/2. So, also in this case, V Π ff (χ') = У Π F(x') is 
non-empty by assumption (2). < 
For a correspondence F from X to Χ, χ £ X is called a fixed point of F if χ is an 
element of F(x). 
10.2.1 KNOWN RESULTS 
The next three results are very well known. Lemma 10.2 is straightforward to prove. 
Theorem 10.4 (the maximum theorem) is due to Berge (1966). A proof of this theorem 
can e.g. be found in Hildenbrand (1974). For a proof of Theorem 10.5 we refer to 
Klein and Thompson (1984) and Michael (1956). 
For a correspondence F:X-*Y, graph(F) := {(x, y) G Χ χ Y \ y G F(x)} is the 
graph of F. 
L e m m a 10.2 Let Y be compact and let F: X —wY be a closed-valued correspondence. 
Then the following three statements are equivalent: 
(1) F is use 
(2) graph(F) is closed in X xY. 
(3) For every sequence (xfc)jtgiN in X converging to x G X and (yk)keiN with 
yk G ^ (x*) for all k, the cluster points of (у*)*евм are elements of F(x). 
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Theorem 10.4 (Maximum theorem) Let F: X-frY be compact-valued and contin­
uous. Let f : Χ χ Y —y m be a continuous function. Then 
(1) The function χ ·->• m(x) := max{f(x,y) \ y G F(x)} is continuous. 
(2) The correspondence і и { у £ F(x) | f(x,y) = m(x)} is non-empty compact-
valued and use. 
Theorem 10.5 (Michael) Let X be compact and let F: X-frY be closed- and convex-
valued. Suppose, further, that F is Isc. Then F has a continuous selection, i.e. there 
is a continuous function f-.X—tY with f(x) G F(x) for all χ G Χ. 
10.2.2 A THEOREM OF COOK, GERARDS, SCHRIJVER AND TARDOS 
This section concerns the proof of a result due to Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos 
(1986) (to our knowledge). Since this result plays a major role in this dissertation, 
we will present a complete proof. A similar proof can be found in Schrijver (1986). 
Let Л be a ρ χ g-matrix. Define YA- = {Ò G IRP \ Αχ < bis solvable}. Then for a 
vector b € Y A and с e IR9 we can define the linear program V(A, b, c) by 
max (c, x) 
S. T. Ax < b. 
Furthermore, we define ХА(Ь) := {с 6 E ' | V(A,b,c) is solvable}. By the duality 
theorem for a 6 G Уд, the set ХА{Ь) is non-empty and consists of the vectors с G Ж ' 
such that the linear equation у A = с has a nonnegative solution. Therefore ХА(Ь) is 
independent of ò and we write XA instead. 
Let φ be the correspondence defined on YA by tp{b) := {x G Ш.' | Ax < b} and, for 
с G XA, let ψ
ε
 be the correspondence defined on Уд by 
ф
с
{Ь) :— {χ G Ж9 | (с,х) is maximal on у(Ь)}· 
We will use the Euclidean norm throughout this section: 
I M l 2 : = ( è * ? ) è afld |H||: = max{| |A*| |2 | | |x | |2 = l } . 
t = l 
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Further, d}j denotes the Hausdorff distance of two sets. Now we can prove 
Theorem 10.6 There is a real number D > 0 only dependent on A such that 
ан{ФЛЬ)Ж( ))< D\\° - 6'||2 for all ò,6' e YA and c&XA. 
Proof. This proof consists of four steps. In the first two steps we will prove the 
theorem for с = 0. In step 3 we will show that the inequality is correct for a fixed c. 
In step four we will show that the constant can be chosen to be independent of с 
Step 1: We start with the proof of the inequality in case b <b' and с = 0. 
Suppose that 6 < b'. Then φ(ο) С <p(b'). So, ан{}р{Ь)><р(Ь')) equals the infimum over 
those numbers ε > 0 with <£>(Ь') С B
e
(<p(b)). 
Take x' e (Ь') arbitrarily and χ £ ip(b) with Цх — х'Цг minimal. We will try to find 
an upper bound for ||a; — х'Цг that does not depend on χ or χ', since that will also be 
an upper bound for d#(y(ö), ¥>(&'))· So we may assume that χ Φ χ'. 
Let {α, I i — Ι,.,.,ρ} be the set of rows of the matrix A and let Τ be the set of 
indices г 6 {1,. . . ,p} such that (x,at) = b, (the tight constraints in x). 
Since χ φ χ', we can define the vector v* e IR' with length one by 
» _ x' - χ 
v :
~ | | ζ ' - χ | | 2 · 
Now χ is the unique point in ψ(ο) where the function ζ ι-+ (v,z) attains its max­
imum. So, by complementary slackness, v* can be written as a nonnegative linear 
combination of the rows {a, | г € Τ} . Therefore, we can choose a vector y* G Ш,^ . 
with υ* = у* A and у* > 0 only if г G T. We may assume w.l.o.g. that {a, | y* > 0} 
is linearly independent. Take I := {г e Τ \ у* > 0}. Then we have the following 
estimation 
IIζ' - я|І2 =(χ' - χ,ν*) = (χ' - χ,у*A) 
= Х ; » ; ( * ' - Х , О . ) < Х ; У ; ( Й ; - Ь . ) < І І » ' І І 2 - І І Ь ' - Ь І І 2 . W 
te/ ie/ 
The first inequality follows from the fact that y* > 0 implies (x, a,) = bt and the last 
inequality is Schwartz' inequality. So, we have to find an estimation for ||і/*|І2· 
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To this end, let Ä be the submatrix of A consisting of the rows {a, | г e I}. Since 
{a, | г € ƒ} is linearly independent, we know that the linear map L: Ш1 -> Et' defined 
by L(y) := yÄ is injective. Let Ä1 be the transpose of Ä. First we will show that the 
I χ /-matrix ÄÄ* is invertible. Take a y € Ж1 and assume that yÄÄ1 = 0. Then 
\\yÄ\\l = {yÄ,yÄ) =уАА1у1 = Q. 
So, yÄ = 0. Hence, у = 0 (since L was injective) and ÄÄ1 is invertible. 
Now define y* 6 M1 by y* := yT¡. Then, since I := {i \ y¡ > 0}, we clearly have 
y*Ä = у*A = ν* and ||у*|І2 = |ІУ*ІІ2· So we can deduce that 
y* = y*ÄÄt(ÄÄt)-1 = v'Ä^ÄÄ4)-1. 
Hence, 
ИЛЬ = \\ Ъ = F л Ш ' Г Ч Ь < ІИЬ · P W ) - 1 II = иЧАЛ'гЧ (2) 
since υ* has lenght one. Combining the results from (1) and (2) we get the estimation 
II*' - ¡ Φ < ІІУІІ2 • IIb' - г»ІЬ < P W ) - 1 ! ! • IIb' - MU-
So, if we define 
С := max{||Âf (АД') _ 11| | I is a set of independent rows of A}, 
we have dH{<p(b), <p(V)) < C\\b - &'||2 for all b, b' € YA with b < 6'. 
Step 2: We prove the inequality for с = 0. 
If bi en 62 G Уд, we consider b: = ftj V b2 6 Уд- By Step 1 we have: 
dH(<p(b), 4>{bt)) < CA\\b - b,| |2 for i = 1,2. 
The triangle inequality for d# gives d#(v(&i), ( Ы ) ^ С(ЦЬі - Ь||2 + II& — ЬгІЬ) < 
2Сд||оі — í>2ІІ2 as ò — b\ and ò — &2 are perpendicular. 
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Step 3. We prove the inequality for a fixed vector c. 
For a fixed vector с Φ 0 in IR' and &i, ò2 in 1RP we will prove that there is a number 
C" dependent on A and с with 
dwCV-cfbi), ^c(62)) < C"||i»i - 62II2. 
Clearly we may assume that ЦсЦг = 1. We define mt as the maximum value of (c, • ) 
over the set y(b t) for i = 1, 2. Then we can describe V>c(b,) by the linear system 
(3) 
We assume w.l.o.g. that тп\ < m 2 . Take a vector 12 in (^ (62) such that (с, 12) = " г. 
According to the first part of the theorem there is a vector X\ in <p(bi) such that 
| |#i — X2II2 < С · II&1 — &2ІІ2· By definition we have that (c, xi) < m i . Hence: 
0 < m 2 - m i < (c,x2) - (c,xi) < | |x2 -Х1Ц2 < C - ||62 - ί>ι | | 2 . 
'A' 
—с 
x< 
' ь, " 
—m, 
So we have 
h 
-ТП\ 
Ь 2 
—ТП2 
111 =||Ьі - bWÌ + (mi - тп2)2 < ЦЬі - ЬзЦІ + С 2 · ||*ι - Ь\\1 
=(1 + С 2 ) - | | Ь і - 0 2 І І І (4) 
Now the application of the first part of the theorem to the system (3) yields a number 
C" depending on A and с Then, using inequality (4), we can calculate that 
dH(Mbi), ΨΜ) < С" · H h 
—ТПі 
b2 
—m2 
ІІ2<с" і + с2-||оі-г>2||2 
Step 4. We prove the inequality in general. 
We will show now that we can find a number D, not depending on c, such that for 
all c, i>i and ò2 we have 
¿я(?МЬі), iMfc)) < ЯЦЬІ - Ma-
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Define the equivalence relation ~ on XA by: с ~ c' if for every subset ƒ of {1, . . . , p} 
it holds that 
there are λ, > 0 for all г G ƒ such that ^2 Xtat = с 
О· 
there are μ,. > 0 for all г' e ƒ such that £3 Міаі = c'· 
г€І 
Note that XA can be partitioned into a finite number of equivalence classes, say 
X\, . . . , XK and that these equivalence classes only depend on A. 
First we will show that for every b € Шр we have ф
с
(Ь) = фс'{Щ whenever с is 
equivalent with c'. 
To this end we take an x* in ip
c
(b). Then x* is a solution of the linear system 
Ax < b 
max(c,x). 
So by complementary slackness there are λ, > 0 for all i € { 1 , . . . ,p} such that 
ρ 
с = ¿jAta, = 2jAtan 
i= i «e/ 
while for each i in I := {i \ Х
г
 > 0} we have (a t,x*) = bt. Furthermore, because с 
and c' are equivalent, we can find μ, > 0 for all г G ƒ such that 
c' = ^μ
τ
α
ι
. 
ie/ 
Hence, we have: 
(c',x*) = ^ μ , ( σ , , ι * ) = ^ μ , ο » 
while for any χ in <£>(£>) it holds that 
(c'>x> = Σ Λ Κ , Ι ) < Σ]ΜΛ· 
г£/ «6/ 
Hence, ι* is an element of Vv (b). By symmetry it follows that ф
с
(Ь) = Vv (&) (5). 
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Now take représentants Cj in Xj and for each c,- a number C' as in step 3. Define 
D := max{Cj | 1 < j < K). 
Take a vector с e XA and 61,62 G YA- Take the representant c¿. that is equivalent 
with c. Then, using (5) we get 
аяШбі), ^(62)) = dffdMbi). iMfc)) ^ C i ' · Hbi - ball» ^ D ш № ~ M2. 
This proves the theorem for arbitrary vectors с φ 0, since we assumed in step 3 that 
с had length one. However, it also holds for с = 0 since then ip
c
{b) = <p(b) and we can 
apply step 1. < 
The Theorem of Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos is one of the basic tools in 
chapters 4, 6 and 8. We will frequently use it in the following form 
Corollary 10.1 Let Ρ С IR* and let b:P -> YA be linear. Then there is a real 
number D only dependent on A and b such that for all p,p' G Ρ and с € XA, 
dH(MKp)),il>c(b(p')))<D\\p-p%. 
Proof. According to Theorem 10.6 we have 
анШЧр)), Mbip'))) < DA\\b{p) - b(p')\\2. 
Furthermore, ||6(p) - 6(p')lh < | |6 | | | |р-р' |І2 since 6 is linear. Hence, 
ан(Фс(Ь(р)), МНР'))) < DA\\b\\\\p-p'\\2. < 
Notice that we can easily derive a similar corollary for any pair of norms || · || and 
|| · II* on ïïtp and IR17, respectively, by the equivalence of norms on a finite dimensional 
vector space. Therefore we will normally use this corollary as it is rephrased below 
(independent of the norms involved). 
208 Chapter IO 
Remark 10.1 Suppose that we have a finite system of linear (in)equalities that can 
be written as Ax < b(p) for ρ £ Ρ and certain linear functions A and 6. Furthermore 
suppose that the correspondence φ: Ρ —> Жя defined by 
ψ{ρ) := {χ e Ж" I Αχ < b(p)} (ρ G Ρ) 
is non-empty valued for all ρ £ P. Then φ is Lipschitz continuous. « 
10.2.3 THE THEOREM OF KAKUTANI 
In this note we give a proof of Kakutani's fixed point theorem directly from the KKM-
theorem without using an approximation argument. After all such an argument is 
already used in the proof of the KKM-theorem. The only other theorem we need in 
the proof, is the separation theorem saying that a compact convex set С С IR* and a 
point ρ & С can be separated by a hyperplane. A similar technique was used by Ky 
Fan (1969). 
1. The proof of Kakutani's fixed point theorem. 
The theorem of Shizuo Kakutani (1941) can be formulated as follows: 
Theorem 10.7 (Fixed point theorem of Kakutani.) Every compact- and convex-
valued use correspondence F:A
n
—»Δ„ has a fixed point. 
The basis of the proof presented in this section is the famous KKM-theorem (Knaster, 
Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz (1929)). 
Lemma 10.3 (Theorem of Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz.) Suppose that 
{Gt}içN is a collection of closed subsets of Δ„ with the property that Δχ С \J Gt 
η 
for every Τ С N. Then f] G, is non-empty. 
г = 1 
First we will show that the existence of a function ρ having certain properties leads 
to the fixed point theorem. Then we will show how to construct such a function. In 
order to describe the properties of this function, we need the following definition. 
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Definition 10.1 An dement ρ € Шп separates (weakly separates) χ e H n from 
С С Ж
71
 if for all у e С, 
(ρ, х ) > ( р , 2/) ((ρ,'χ) > (ρ, у)). 
Since in our situation we always have that С С Δ
η
 and χ € Δ„, we may assume 
w.l.o.g. that peV:={xeTRn \ ΣΓ
= 1 *< = 0}· 
Proof of the fixed point theorem: Suppose that F: Δ
η
- * Δ
η
 is a compact­
ant! convex-valued use correspondence without a fixed point. Assume, for the moment, 
that we can construct a continuous function ρ: Δ„ —• V that has the following two 
properties for every χ e Δ
η
: 
(1) p(x) separates χ from F(x) 
(2) there is an index i € C(x) with p(x)i > 0. 
This function ρ will be constructed in the next section. First it will be shown that 
this assumption leads to a contradiction. 
Define G, := {x e A
n
:p(x)i > 0} for each i e N. Note that (i) G, is closed (by the 
continuity of p) and (ii) for each non-empty Τ С Ν: Δχ С | J G» (by property (2)). 
Hence, the sets G\, . . . , G
n
 satisfy the conditions of the KKM-theorem and there is 
η 
a point ζ e Π G f So, from the definition of G» it follows that p{z)t > 0 for all i 6 N. 
However, p(z) e V and therefore, p(z) = 0. This contradicts property (1). < 
Conclusion: there is no compact- and convex-valued use correspondence F: Δ„—^Δ
η 
without a fixed point. 
2. The construction of p . 
Accordingly, the proof of the theorem depends on the construction of a continu­
ous function ρ: Δ
η
 —l· V with properties (1) and (2) under the assumption that 
F: Δ
η
—»A
n
 is use, compact- and convex-valued and has no fixed points. This con­
struction consists of two steps: 
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2.1 Pointwise construction. 
In this first part we will use the following well known lemma: 
L e m m a 10.4 (Separation theorem) For every compact and convex subset С of A
n 
and χ G A
n
 not contained in C, there exists a vector q Ç.V that separates χ from C. 
Note that we can choose the separating vector q in the hyperplane V. 
Since, by assumption, F has no fixed points, there exists a vector qi(x) € V that 
separates χ from F (χ). In other words, the separation theorem guarantees the exis­
tence of a function qi:A
n
 —> V satisfying property (1). In the next step we change 
the function qi in such a way that also property (2) is satisfied. To do so we need the 
following vectors 
dT ~ \T\~
l
 eT - \N\T\~
1
 eN\T for ΤφΦ,Ν. 
Note that <fy separates every point χ G AT weakly from Δ
η
 and therefore from F (χ). 
Choose a real number ε(χ) > 0 so small that (dc(i) + £(х)чі(х))г < 0 if г ^ C(x). 
This is possible since dc(
x
)ti is strictly negative for each г ^ C{x). 
Then we define the function q2 : An —> V by 
(d
c{x)+e(x)qi(x) iíC(x)¿N 
q2{x) := < 
[qi(x) iîC(x)=N. 
For Ç2 the following properties hold: 
(1) q2{x) separates χ from F(x), and 
(2)* if C(x) φ Ν, then q2{x)l < 0 for all г $ C(x). 
Up to now we did not bother about continuity. In the next section we will show that 
<72 can be used to construct a continuous function q with the right properties. 
2.2 Global construction. 
First we prove that q2{x) separates points у close to χ from the set F(y). For χ € Δ η 
and a number η > 0, define Β(χ,η) := {y G Δ
η
 | \\χ - уЦг < η}-
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L e m m a 10.5 For every χ G Δ
η
 there is a number η
χ
 > 0 such that q2 (z) separates 
y from F(y) for all y e Β(χ,η
χ
). 
Proof. Take a point χ in Δ
η
. Because of property (1) of qi(x) and the compactness 
of F(x) we can find an α 6 IR with (q2(x), x) > a> (q2(x),z) for all ζ € F(x). Then 
U := {у Ε Δ
η
 I (52(2),у) > α} and W := {ζ e Δ„ | {q2{x),z) < a) are two disjoint 
open sets. Furthermore, χ is an element of U and F(x) is a subset of W. So, since F 
is an use correspondence there exists a number η
χ
 > 0 with F(y) С W if у 6 Β (χ, η
χ
) 
and, moreover, Β(χ,η
χ
) С С/. Then 92(1) separates у and F(y). <j 
We can take the real numbers η
χ
 > 0 (in Lemma 10.5) small enough to guarantee 
that C(y) D C{x) for all у € Β(χ,η
χ
). Now the collection {-Β(χ,ηι)}ιςΔ„ is an open 
cover of the compact set Δ
η
. So we can find a finite number of points ζχ,... ,z
m
 in 
Δ„ such that B\,... ,B
m
 is still an open cover of Δ
η
, where Bk ·= B{zk,r]Zk). 
Take ί?* := η
Ζΐΐ
. Define ak: Δ η -* [0, 1] by ak(x) := (1 - V^W^k - xh)+-
Note that ak is continuous and that a* (x) > 0 if and only if χ € Bk • Now we can 
define p: An -> Ш," by 
m 
k=l 
Clearly, ρ is continuous, since ai,...,a
m
 are continuous. Furthermore, p(x) is an 
element of V since p(x) is a linear combination of the points q2(zk) in V. 
Claim. This function ρ satisfies properties (1) and (2). 
Proof of (1). Take a point χ in Δ
η
. Let L = L(x) be the set {к \ а
к
(х) > 0} = 
{к I x G Bk}· Note that L is non-empty since B\,..., B
m
 covers Δ„. So we can write 
m 
Ρ(χ) = ^2ak{x)-q2(zk) = Y^ak(x)-q2(zk). 
fc=l kSL 
Now for each к G L, χ is an element of Bk = B(zk,qZk). This implies that q2(zk) 
separates χ from F(x) by the choice of η
ζι>. So, since p{x) is a strictly positive 
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combination of the vectors {q2(zk)}heL that separate χ from F(x), the vector p(x) 
separates χ from F{x) too. 
Proof of (2). (a) If C(x) = N, property (1) implies that p(x) φ 0. Furthermore, 
p(x) is an element of V i.e., the sum of the coordinates of p(x) is 0. Therefore there 
must be an index ι € N = C(x) with p(x), > 0. 
(b) If C{x) φ N. Consider the (non-empty) set L = L(x) = {к | ak(x) > 0} = 
{k | χ € Bk}- Take an index i fi C(x). For each к G L, C(zk) С C(x) by the choice of 
Щк- Therefore, г fi C(zk) if к S L. Then property (2)* of q<i implies that qi{zk)% < 0 
for all к € L. Hence, 
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х)г = ^2o¡k{x) • 9 2 (ΖΑ), = Σ α * ( χ ) " ЯгСг*), < 0 
since L is non-empty and α* (χ) is strictly positive for all к e L. Conclusion: if 
г fi C(x) then p(x) t < 0. However, the sum over all coordinates of p(x) equals 0 and 
therefore there must be an index г e C(x) with р(х)
г
 > 0. <з 
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ι
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РВ
г
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ъ
) set of pure best replies of player i to x_» 23 
PB(x) set of pure best replies to x, i.e. Y\teN PB»(x_,) 23 
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u, payoff function of player г 22 
ζ KM-perturbation of an η-person normal form game 41 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift behandelt enkele onderwerpen in de niet-coöperatieve speltheorie. 
Er wordt, enkele uitzonderingen in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 daargelaten, uitsluitend 
gekeken naar gemengde uitbreidingen van eindige spelen in normale vorm. Een eindig 
spel in normale vorm is een spel dat, in de eerste plaats, gespeeld wordt door een eindig 
aantal spelers. Verder heeft elke speler slechts een eindig aantal (pure) strategieën. 
De spelers spelen het spel door elk een strategie in hun verzameling pure strategieën te 
kiezen. Vervolgens krijgt elke speler een uitbetaling. Deze uitbetaling wordt volledig 
bepaald door de gemaakte keuzes (en kan per speler verschillend zijn). 
In de gemengde uitbreiding van een dergelijk spel hebben de spelers de mogelijkheid 
om elk van hun pure strategieën met een bepaalde kans te spelen. Een strategie in 
zo'n uitbreiding is dus in feite een kansverdeling over de pure strategieën. Het spel 
wordt gespeeld door elke speler zo'n kansverdeling te laten kiezen. De uitbetaling 
voor een speler in dit spel is nu zijn verwachte uitbetaling die gegeven wordt door de 
gekozen kansverdelingen. In het vervolg zal in deze samenvatting met de term "spel" 
de gemengde uitbreiding van een eindig spel in normale vorm bedoeld worden. 
Een van de taken van de niet-coöperatieve speltheorie is nu het ontwikkelen en on-
derzoeken van oplossingsconcepten. Een oplossingsconcept is een functie die aan elk 
spel Γ een collectie (niet-lege, gesloten) deelverzamelingen van de strategieënruimte 
toevoegt. Beide aspecten, zowel ontwikkeling als onderzoek van oplossingsconcepten, 
worden in dit proefschrift behandeld. 
Het onderzoek in het proefschrift spitst zich toe op twee onderwerpen, te weten in-
variantie van oplossingsconcepten in de hoofdstukken 3 en 6, en stabiliteit van oploss-
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ingsconcepten in de hoofdstukken 4 en 8. De hoofdstukken 1 en 2 zijn inleidend. In 
hoofdstuk 5 worden de verbanden tussen diverse stabiliteitsconcepten bestudeerd. In 
de hoofdstukken 7 en 9 wordt gekeken naar de struktuur van verschillende oploss-
ingsverzamelingen. Hoofdstuk 10 bevat het wiskundige gereedschap dat regelmatig 
in de bewijzen gebruikt wordt. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt bewezen dat elk zwak invariant oplossingsconcept voor normale 
vorm spelen op precies een manier kan worden uitgebreid tot een zwak invariant 
oplossingsconcept voor strategische vorm spelen. Indien een oplossingsconcept voor 
normale vorm spelen zelfs invariant is, dan is deze uitbreiding dat ook. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een nieuw stabiliteitsconcept, genaamd CKM-stabiliteit, gede-
finieerd. Er wordt bewezen dat dit stabiliteitsconcept voldoet aan alle eisen van het 
Kohlberg-Mertens programma die beschreven staan in hoofdstuk 2. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt bewezen dat elke stabiele verzameling in de zin van Mertens 
een stabiele verzameling in de zin van Hillas bevat. Het bewijs is gesplitst in vier 
gedeelten. Eerst wordt beargumenteerd dat elke stabiele verzameling in de zin van 
Mertens homotopie-stabiel is. Dit resultaat is al beschreven in het artikel van Mertens 
zelf. Vervolgens bewijzen we dat elke homotopie-stabiele verzameling een CKM-
stabiele verzameling is. Dan introduceren we een nieuw type stabiliteit, genaamd 
CT-stabiliteit en bewijzen we dat elke CKM-stabiele verzameling een CT-stabiele 
verzameling bevat. Tenslotte bewijzen we dat elke CT-stabiele verzameling een H-
stabiele verzameling bevat. Tezamen leveren deze vier deelresultaten het gewenste 
bewijs. Overigens tonen de laatste twee deelresultaten ook aan dat CKM-stabiliteit 
hetzelfde is als H-stabiliteit, aangezien gemakkelijk kan worden aangetoond dat H-
stabiliteit CKM-stabiliteit impliceert. Verder kan worden opgemerkt dat het resultaat 
van Govindan (1995) een eenvoudig gevolg is van de resultaten van dit hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 6 is een studie van de invariantie van diverse oplossingsconcepten voor 
normale vorm spelen. In het eerste gedeelte wordt gekeken in hoeverre een aan-
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tal oplossingsconcepten invariant zijn. Aan bod komen Nash evenwichten en enkele 
hieraan gerelateerde concepten, perfecte en propere evenwichten, KM-stabiele verza-
melingen, persistentie, rationalizeerbare strategieën, curb verzamelingen, essentialiteit 
en Q-stabiele verzamelingen. Al deze concepten worden onderzocht op drie soorten 
invariantie, te weten zwakke invariantie, invariantie en abr-invariantie. In het tweede 
gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk wordt een methode ontworpen om bepaalde oplossingscon-
cepten, te weten de projectie-stabiele concepten, om te bouwen tot zwak invari-
ante concepten. We bewijzen verder in dit hoofdstuk dat de eigenschappen van het 
Kohlberg-Mertens programma uit hoofdstuk 2 niet verloren gaan bij het toepassen 
van deze methode. 
Na hoofdstuk 6 verleggen we onze aandacht naar twee-persoons spelen, te weten de 
bimatrix spelen. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt aangetoond dat de Q-stabiele verzamelingen 
van een bimatrix spel altijd eindig zijn. Verder wordt aan de hand van een voorbeeld 
uitgelegd waarom dit resultaat niet geldt voor spelen met meer dan twee spelers. 
Hoofdstuk 8 is een verzameling resultaten aangaande de verbanden tussen strict per-
fecte, propere en strict propere evenwichten van bimatrix spelen. Ten eerste wordt in 
twee voorbeelden (een 3 χ 3-, respectievelijk een 3 χ 4-bimatrix spel) aangetoond dat 
stricte perfectie properheid noch stricte properheid impliceert. Vervolgens bewijzen 
we dat een strict perfect evenwicht van een 3 χ 3-bimatrix spel wel proper is. Tezamen 
met het feit dat Borm (1990) dit al bewezen heeft voor 2 χ n-bimatrix spelen betekent 
dit dat bovengenoemd 3 x 4 voorbeeld zo klein mogelijk is. Verder wordt aangetoond 
dat een strict perfect en quasi sterk evenwicht strict proper is en dat een strict perfect 
evenwicht van een nulsom spel proper is. 
Hoofdstuk 9 behandelt de structuur van enkele oplossingsconcepten voor bimatrix 
spelen. Aangetoond wordt dat de collectie van Nash evenwichten, van perfecte even­
wichten en van strict propere evenwichten elk geschreven kan worden als de vereniging 
van een eindig aantal polytopen. 
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